Chapters 1 and 2 introduced the problem that despite significant improvements over the past half century, extreme poverty remains widespread in the developing world. An estimated 1.374 billion people live on less than $1.25 per day at 2005 U.S. purchasing power parity, and some 2.6 billion—close to 40% of the world’s population—live on less than $2 a day. As you will see in the next few chapters, often these impoverished people suffer from undernutrition and poor health, have little or no literacy, live in environmentally degraded areas, have little political voice, are socially excluded, and attempt to earn a meager living on small and marginal farms (or as day laborers) or in dilapidated urban slums. In this chapter, we set the stage with an in-depth examination of the problems of poverty and of highly unequal distributions of income.

That development requires a higher GNI, and hence sustained growth, is clear. The basic issue, however, is not only how to make GNI grow but also who would make it grow, the few or the many. If it were the rich, it would most likely be appropriated by them, and progress against poverty would be slow, and inequality would worsen. But if it were generated by the many, they would be its principal beneficiaries, and the fruits of economic growth would be shared more evenly. Thus many developing countries that had experienced relatively high rates of economic growth by historical standards discovered that such growth often brought little in the way of significant benefits to their poor.

No society can surely be flourishing and happy, of which by far the greater part of the numbers are poor and miserable.

—Adam Smith, 1776

We will spare no effort to free our fellow men, women and children from the abject and dehumanizing conditions of extreme poverty.

—United Nations Millennium Declaration, 2000

Social protection directly reduces poverty and helps make growth more pro-poor.

—Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2010

The coincidence of severe and persistent poverty and hunger indicates the presence of poverty traps—conditions from which individuals or groups cannot emerge without the help of others.

—International Food Policy Research Institute, 2007
Because the elimination of widespread poverty and high and even growing income inequality are at the core of all development problems and in fact define for many people the principal objective of development policy, we begin Part Two by focusing on the nature of the poverty and inequality problem in developing countries. Although our main focus is on economic poverty and inequalities in the distribution of incomes and assets, it is important to keep in mind that this is only part of the broader inequality problem in the developing world. Of equal or even greater importance are inequalities of power, prestige, status, gender, job satisfaction, conditions of work, degree of participation, freedom of choice, and many other dimensions of the problem that relate more to our second and third components of the meaning of development, self-esteem, and freedom to choose. As in most social relationships, we cannot really separate the economic from the noneconomic manifestations of inequality. Each reinforces the other in a complex and often interrelated process of cause and effect.

After introducing appropriate measures of inequality and poverty, we define the nature of the poverty and income distribution problem and consider its quantitative significance in various developing nations. We then examine in what ways economic analyses can shed light on the problem and explore possible alternative policy approaches directed at the elimination of poverty and the reduction of excessively wide disparities in the distributions of income in developing countries. A thorough understanding of these two fundamental economic manifestations of underdevelopment provides the basis for analysis in subsequent chapters of more specific development issues, including population growth, education, health, rural development, and foreign assistance.

In this chapter, therefore, we will examine the following critical questions about the relationship among economic growth, income distribution, and poverty:

1. What is the extent of relative inequality in developing countries, and how is this related to the extent of absolute poverty?
2. Who are the poor, and what are their economic characteristics?
3. What determines the nature of economic growth—that is, who benefits from economic growth, and why?
4. Are rapid economic growth and more equal distributions of income compatible or conflicting objectives for low-income countries? To put it another way, is rapid growth achievable only at the cost of greater inequalities in the distribution of income, or can a lessening of income disparities contribute to higher growth rates?
5. Do the poor benefit from growth, and does this depend on the type of growth a developing country experiences? What might be done to help the poor benefit more?
6. What is so bad about extreme inequality?
7. What kinds of policies are required to reduce the magnitude and extent of absolute poverty?
We begin the chapter by defining *inequality* and *poverty*, terms that are commonly used in informal conversation but need to be measured more precisely to provide a meaningful understanding of how much progress has already been made, how much remains to be achieved, and how to set incentives for government officials to focus on the most pressing needs. You will see that the most important measures of poverty and inequality used by development economists satisfy properties that most observers would agree are of fundamental importance. After a discussion of why attention to inequality as well as poverty is important, we then use the appropriate measures of poverty and inequality to evaluate the welfare significance of alternative patterns (or “typologies”) of growth. After reviewing the evidence on the extent of poverty and inequality in the developing world, we conclude with an overview of the key issues in poverty policy. Some important principles of effective poverty policies are considered, together with some initial examples of programs that have worked well in practice. We conclude the chapter with a comparative case study of Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire, which illustrate issues of the quality of growth and the difficulties of achieving it.

### 5.1 Measuring Inequality and Poverty

In this section, we define the dimensions of the income distribution and poverty problems and identify some similar elements that characterize the problem in many developing nations. But first we should be clear about what we are measuring when we speak about the distribution of income and absolute poverty.

#### Measuring Inequality

Economists usually distinguish between two principal measures of income distribution for both analytical and quantitative purposes: the personal or size distribution of income and the functional or distributive factor share distribution of income.

**Size Distributions**  The personal or size distribution of income is the measure most commonly used by economists. It simply deals with individual persons or households and the total incomes they receive. The way in which that income was received is not considered. What matters is how much each earns irrespective of whether the income was derived solely from employment or came also from other sources such as interest, profits, rents, gifts, or inheritance. Moreover, the locational (urban or rural) and occupational sources of the income (e.g., agriculture, manufacturing, commerce, services) are ignored. If Ms. X and Mr. Y both receive the same personal income, they are classified together irrespective of the fact that Ms. X may work 15 hours a day as a doctor while Mr. Y doesn’t work at all but simply collects interest on his inheritance.

Economists and statisticians therefore like to arrange all individuals by ascending personal incomes and then divide the total population into distinct groups, or sizes. A common method is to divide the population into successive **quintiles** (fifths) or **deciles** (tenths) according to ascending income levels and
then determine what proportion of the total national income is received by each income group. For example, Table 5.1 shows a hypothetical but fairly typical distribution of income for a developing country. In this table, 20 individuals, representing the entire population of the country are arranged in order of ascending annual personal income, ranging from the individual with the lowest income (0.8 units) to the one with the highest (15.0 units). The total or national income of all individuals amounts to 100 units and is the sum of all entries in column 2. In column 3, the population is grouped into quintiles of four individuals each. The first quintile represents the bottom 20% of the population on the income scale. This group receives only 5% (i.e., a total of 5 money units) of the total national income. The second quintile (individuals 5 through 8) receives 9% of the total income. Alternatively, the bottom 40% of the population (quintiles 1 plus 2) is receiving only 14% of the income, while the top 20% (the fifth quintile) of the population receives 51% of the total income.

A common measure of income inequality that can be derived from column 3 is the ratio of the incomes received by the top 20% and bottom 40% of the population. This ratio, sometimes called a Kuznets ratio after Nobel laureate Simon Kuznets, has often been used as a measure of the degree of inequality between high- and low-income groups in a country. In our example, this inequality ratio is equal to 51 divided by 14, or approximately 3.64.

To provide a more detailed breakdown of the size distribution of income, decile (10%) shares are listed in column 4. We see, for example, that the bottom

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Individuals</th>
<th>Personal Income (money units)</th>
<th>Share of Total Income (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Quintiles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>2.0</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>2.4</td>
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<td>8</td>
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<td>10</td>
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<td>15</td>
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<td>16</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>22</td>
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<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>10.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>12.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (national income)</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Income inequality** The disproportionate distribution of total national income among households.
10% of the population (the two poorest individuals) receives only 1.8% of the total income, while the top 10% (the two richest individuals) receives 28.5%. Finally, if we wanted to know what the top 5% receives, we would divide the total population into 20 equal groups of individuals (in our example, this would simply be each of the 20 individuals) and calculate the percentage of total income received by the top group. In Table 5.1, we see that the top 5% of the population (the twentieth individual) receives 15% of the income, a higher share than the combined shares of the lowest 40%.

**Lorenz Curves** Another common way to analyze personal income statistics is to construct what is known as a **Lorenz curve**. Figure 5.1 shows how it is done. The numbers of income recipients are plotted on the horizontal axis, not in absolute terms but in **cumulative percentages**. For example, at point 20, we have the lowest (poorest) 20% of the population; at point 60, we have the bottom 60%; and at the end of the axis, all 100% of the population has been accounted for. The vertical axis shows the share of total income received by each percentage of population. It is also cumulative up to 100%, meaning that both axes are the same length. The entire figure is enclosed in a square, and a diagonal line is drawn from the lower left corner (the origin) to the upper right corner. At every point on that diagonal, the percentage of income received is exactly equal to the percentage of income recipients—for example, the point halfway along the length of the diagonal represents 50% of the income being distributed to exactly 50% of the population. At the three-quarters point on the diagonal, 75% of the income would be distributed to 75% of the population. However, the Lorenz curve itself shows the disparity in income distribution.
population. In other words, the diagonal line in Figure 5.1 is representative of "perfect equality" in size distribution of income. Each percentage group of income recipients is receiving that same percentage of the total income; for example, the bottom 40% receives 40% of the income, while the top 5% receives only 5% of the total income.²

The Lorenz curve shows the actual quantitative relationship between the percentage of income recipients and the percentage of the total income they did in fact receive during, say, a given year. In Figure 5.1, we have plotted this Lorenz curve using the decile data contained in Table 5.1. In other words, we have divided both the horizontal and vertical axes into ten equal segments corresponding to each of the ten decile groups. Point A shows that the bottom 10% of the population receives only 1.8% of the total income, point B shows that the bottom 20% is receiving 5% of the total income, and so on for each of the other eight cumulative decile groups. Note that at the halfway point, 50% of the population is in fact receiving only 19.8% of the total income.

The more the Lorenz line curves away from the diagonal (line of perfect equality), the greater the degree of inequality represented. The extreme case of perfect inequality (i.e., a situation in which one person receives all of the national income while everybody else receives nothing) would be represented by the congruence of the Lorenz curve with the bottom horizontal and right-hand vertical axes. Because no country exhibits either perfect equality or perfect inequality in its distribution of income, the Lorenz curves for different countries will lie somewhere to the right of the diagonal in Figure 5.1. The greater the degree of inequality, the greater the bend and the closer to the bottom horizontal axis the Lorenz curve will be. Two representative distributions are shown in Figure 5.2, one for a relatively equal distribution (Figure 5.2a) and the other for a more unequal distribution (Figure 5.2b). (Can you explain why the Lorenz curve could not lie above or to the left of the diagonal at any point?)

---

**FIGURE 5.2 The Greater the Curvature of the Lorenz Line, the Greater the Relative Degree of Inequality**

![Lorenz Curve Diagrams](chart.png)

(a) A relatively equal distribution

(b) A relatively unequal distribution
Gini Coefficients and Aggregate Measures of Inequality  

A final and very convenient shorthand summary measure of the relative degree of income inequality in a country can be obtained by calculating the ratio of the area between the diagonal and the Lorenz curve divided by the total area of the half-square in which the curve lies. In Figure 5.3, this is the ratio of the shaded area $A$ to the total area of the triangle $BCD$. This ratio is known as the **Gini concentration ratio** or **Gini coefficient**, named after the Italian statistician who first formulated it in 1912.

Gini coefficients are aggregate inequality measures and can vary anywhere from 0 (perfect equality) to 1 (perfect inequality). In fact, as you will soon discover, the Gini coefficient for countries with highly unequal income distributions typically lies between 0.50 and 0.70, while for countries with relatively equal distributions, it is on the order of 0.20 to 0.35. The coefficient for our hypothetical distribution of Table 5.1 and Figure 5.1 is approximately 0.44—a relatively unequal distribution.

Four possible Lorenz curves such as might be found in international data are drawn in Figure 5.4. In the “Lorenz criterion” of income distribution, whenever one Lorenz curve lies above another Lorenz curve, the economy corresponding to the upper Lorenz curve is more equal than that of the lower curve. Thus economy $A$ may unambiguously be said to be more equal than economy $D$. Whenever two Lorenz curves cross, such as curves $B$ and $C$, the Lorenz criterion states that we “need more information” or additional assumptions before we can determine which of the underlying economies is more equal. For example, we might argue on the grounds of the priority of addressing problems of poverty that curve $B$ represents a more equal economy, since the poorest are richer, even though the richest are also richer (and hence the middle class is “squeezed”). But others might start with the assumption
that an economy with a stronger middle class is inherently more equal, and those observer might select economy C.

One could also use an aggregate measure such as the Gini coefficient to decide the matter. As it turns out, the Gini coefficient is among a class of measures that satisfy four highly desirable properties: the anonymity, scale independence, population independence, and transfer principles. The anonymity principle simply means that our measure of inequality should not depend on who has the higher income; for example, it should not depend on whether we believe the rich or the poor to be good or bad people. The scale independence principle means that our measure of inequality should not depend on the size of the economy or the way we measure its income; for example, our inequality measure should not depend on whether we measure income in dollars or in cents or in rupees or rupiahs or for that matter on whether the economy is rich on average or poor on average—because if we are interested in inequality, we want a measure of the dispersion of income, not its magnitude (note that magnitudes are very important in poverty measures). The population independence principle is somewhat similar; it states that the measure of inequality should not be based on the number of income recipients. For example, the economy of China should be considered no more or less equal than the economy of Vietnam simply because China has a larger population than Vietnam. Finally, we have the transfer principle (sometimes called the Pigou-Dalton principle after its creators); it states that, holding all other incomes constant, if we transfer some income from a richer person to a poorer person (but not so much that the poorer person is now richer than the originally rich person), the resulting new income distribution is more equal. If we like these four criteria, we can measure the Gini coefficient in each case and rank the one with the larger Gini as more unequal. However, this is not always a perfect solution. For example, the
Gini coefficient can, in theory, be identical for two Lorenz curves that cross; can you see why by looking at curves B and C in Figure 5.4? And sometimes different inequality measures that satisfy our four properties can give different answers as to which of two economies are more unequal.4

Note that a measure of dispersion common in statistics, the coefficient of variation (CV), which is simply the sample standard deviation divided by the sample mean, is another measure of inequality that also satisfies the four criteria. Although the CV is more commonly used in statistics, the Gini coefficient is often used in studies of income and wealth distribution due to its convenient Lorenz curve interpretation. Note, finally, that we can also use Lorenz curves to study inequality in the distribution of land, in education and health, and in other assets.

Functional Distributions The second common measure of income distribution used by economists, the functional or factor share distribution of income, attempts to explain the share of total national income that each of the factors of production (land, labor, and capital) receives. Instead of looking at individuals as separate entities, the theory of functional income distribution inquires into the percentage that labor receives as a whole and compares this with the percentages of total income distributed in the form of rent, interest, and profit (i.e., the returns to land and financial and physical capital). Although specific individuals may receive income from all these sources, that is not a matter of concern for the functional approach.

A sizable body of theoretical literature has been built up around the concept of functional income distribution. It attempts to explain the income of a factor of production by the contribution that this factor makes to production. Supply and demand curves are assumed to determine the unit prices of each productive factor. When these unit prices are multiplied by quantities employed on the assumption of efficient (minimum-cost) factor utilization, we get a measure of the total payment to each factor. For example, the supply of and demand for labor are assumed to determine its market wage. When this wage is then multiplied by the total level of employment, we get a measure of total wage payments, also sometimes called the total wage bill.

Figure 5.5 provides a simple diagrammatic illustration of the traditional theory of functional income distribution. We assume that there are only two factors of production: capital, which is a fixed (given) factor, and labor, which is the only variable factor. Under competitive market assumptions, the demand for labor will be determined by labor’s marginal product (i.e., additional workers will be hired up to the point where the value of their marginal product equals their real wage). But in accordance with the principle of diminishing marginal products, this demand for labor will be a declining function of the numbers employed. Such a negatively sloped labor demand curve is shown by line $D_L$ in Figure 5.5. With a traditional neoclassical upward-sloping labor supply curve $S_L$, the equilibrium wage will be equal to $W_E$ and the equilibrium level of employment will be $L_E$. Total national output (which equals total national income) will be represented by the area $0RLE$.5 This national income will be distributed in two shares: $0W_EL_E$ going to workers in the form of wages and $W_EL_E$ remaining as capitalist profits (the return to owners of capital). Hence in a competitive market economy with constant-returns-to-scale
production functions (a doubling of all inputs doubles output), factor prices are determined by factor supply and demand curves, and factor shares always combine to exhaust the total national product. Income is distributed by function—laborers are paid wages, owners of land receive rents, and capitalists obtain profits. It is a neat and logical theory in that each and every factor gets paid only in accordance with what it contributes to national output, no more and no less. In fact, as you may recall from Chapter 3, this model of income distribution is at the core of the Lewis theory of modern-sector growth based on the reinvestment of rising capitalist profits.

Unfortunately, the relevance of the functional theory is greatly diminished by its failure to take into account the important role and influence of nonmarket forces such as power in determining these factor prices—for example, the role of collective bargaining between employers and trade unions in the setting of modern-sector wage rates and the power of monopolists and wealthy landowners to manipulate prices on capital, land, and output to their own personal advantage. Appendix 5.1 examines the economic implications of factor price distortions, and we return to consider their implications for policy at the end of this chapter.

**Measuring Absolute Poverty**

Now let’s switch our attention from relative income shares of various percentile groups within a given population to the fundamentally important question of the extent and magnitude of absolute poverty in developing countries.
In Chapter 2, we defined the extent of absolute poverty as the number of people who are unable to command sufficient resources to satisfy basic needs. They are counted as the total number living below a specified minimum level of real income—an international poverty line. That line knows no national boundaries, is independent of the level of national per capita income, and takes into account differing price levels by measuring poverty as anyone living on less than $1.25 a day or $2 per day in PPP dollars. Absolute poverty can and does exist, therefore, as readily in New York City as it does in Kolkata, Cairo, Lagos, or Bogotá, although its magnitude is likely to be much lower in terms of percentages of the total population.

Absolute poverty is sometimes measured by the number, or “headcount,” $H$, of those whose incomes fall below the absolute poverty line, $Y_p$. When the headcount is taken as a fraction of the total population, $N$, we define the headcount index, $H/N$. The poverty line is set at a level that remains constant in real terms so that we can chart our progress on an absolute level over time. The idea is to set this level at a standard below which we would consider a person to live in “absolute human misery,” such that the person’s health is in jeopardy.

Of course, to define a minimum health standard that is invariant across historical epochs is an impossibility, in part because technology changes over time. For example, today we have 15-cent oral rehydration therapy packets that can save the life of a child in Malawi. Not long ago, the death of a child after a diarrheal disease would be taken as a sad but inevitable part of life, whereas today we regard such a death as a catastrophic moral failure of the international community. We simply come as close as we can to establishing a reasonable minimum standard that might hold over a few decades so that we can estimate more carefully how much progress we have made on a (more) absolute rather than a (highly) relative scale.

Certainly one would not accept the international poverty level of $1.25 a day in an unquestioning way when planning local poverty work. One practical strategy for determining a local absolute poverty line is to start by defining an adequate basket of food, based on nutritional requirements from medical studies of required calories, protein, and micronutrients. Then, using local household survey data, one can identify a typical basket of food purchased by households that just barely meet these nutritional requirements. One then adds other expenditures of this household, such as clothing, shelter, and medical care, to determine the local absolute poverty line. Depending on how these calculations are done, the resulting poverty line may come to more than $1.25 per day at PPP.

In many respects, however, simply counting the number of people below an agreed-on poverty line can have its limitations. For example, if the poverty line is set at U.S. $450 per person, it makes a big difference whether most of the absolute poor earn $400 or $300 per year. Both are accorded the same weight when calculating the proportion of the population that lies below the poverty line; clearly, however, the poverty problem is much more serious in the latter instance. Economists therefore attempt to calculate a total poverty gap (TPG) that measures the total amount of income necessary to raise everyone who is below the poverty line up to that line. Figure 5.6 illustrates how we could measure the total poverty gap as the shaded area between poverty line, $PV$, and the annual income profile of the population.
Even though in both country A and country B, 50% of the population falls below the same poverty line, the TPG in country A is greater than in country B. Therefore, it will take more of an effort to eliminate absolute poverty in country A.

The TPG—the extent to which the incomes of the poor lie below the poverty line—is found by adding up the amounts by which each poor person’s income, $Y_i$, falls below the absolute poverty line, $Y_p$, as follows:

$$
TPG = \sum_{i=1}^{H} (Y_p - Y_i)
$$

(5.1)

We can think of the TPG in a simplified way (i.e., no administrative costs or general equilibrium effects are accounted for) as the amount of money per day it would take to bring every poor person in an economy up to our defined minimum income standards. On a per capita basis, the average poverty gap (APG) is found by dividing the TPG by the total population:

$$
APG = \frac{TPG}{N}
$$

(5.2)

Often we are interested in the size of the poverty gap in relation to the poverty line, so we would use as our income shortfall measure the normalized poverty gap (NPG): $NPG = APG/Y_p$; this measure lies between 0 and 1 and so can be useful when we want a unitless measure of the gap for easier comparisons.

Another important poverty gap measure is the average income shortfall (AIS), which is the total poverty gap divided by the headcount of the poor: $AIS = TPG/H$. The AIS tells us the average amount by which the income of a poor person falls below the poverty line. This measure can also be divided by the poverty line to yield a fractional measure, the normalized income shortfall (NIS): $NIS = AIS/Y_p$. 

![FIGURE 5.6 Measuring the Total Poverty Gap](image)
The Foster-Greer-Thorbecke Index  We are also often interested in the degree of income inequality among the poor, such as the Gini coefficient among those who are poor, $G_p$, or alternatively, the coefficient of variation (CV) of incomes among the poor, $CV_p$. One reason that the Gini or CV among the poor can be important is that the impact on poverty of economic shocks can differ greatly, depending on the level and distribution of resources among the poor. For example, if the price of rice rises, as it did in 1998 in Indonesia, low-income rice producers, who sell a little of their rice on local markets and whose incomes are slightly below the absolute poverty line, may find that this price rise increases their incomes to bring them out of absolute poverty. On the other hand, for those with too little land to be able to sell any of the rice they grow and who are net buyers of rice on markets, this price increase can greatly worsen their poverty. Thus the most desirable measures of poverty would also be sensitive to the distribution of income among the poor.

As was the case with inequality measures, there are criteria for a desirable poverty measure that are widely accepted by development economists: the anonymity, population independence, monotonicity, and distributional sensitivity principles. The first two principles are very similar to the properties we examined for inequality indexes: Our measure of the extent of poverty should not depend on who is poor or on whether the country has a large or small population. The monotonicity principle means that if you add income to someone below the poverty line, all other incomes held constant, poverty can be no greater than it was. The distributional sensitivity principle states that, other things being equal, if you transfer income from a poor person to a richer person, the resulting economy should be deemed strictly poorer. The headcount ratio measure satisfies anonymity, population independence, and monotonicity, but it fails on distributional sensitivity. The simple headcount fails even to satisfy the population independence principle.

A well-known poverty index that in certain forms satisfies all four criteria is the Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (FGT) index, often called the $P_\alpha$ class of poverty measures. The $P_\alpha$ index is given by

$$P_\alpha = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^{H} \left( \frac{Y_p - Y_i}{Y_p} \right)^\alpha$$  \hspace{1cm} (5.3)

where $Y_i$ is the income of the $i$th poor person, $Y_p$ is the poverty line, and $N$ is the population. Depending on the value of $\alpha$, the $P_\alpha$ index takes on different forms. If $\alpha = 0$, the numerator is equal to $H$, and we get the headcount ratio, $H/N$. If $\alpha = 1$, we get the normalized poverty gap.

If $\alpha = 2$, the impact on measured poverty of a gain in income by a poor person increases in proportion to the distance of the person from the poverty line. For example, raising the income of a person from a household living at half the per capita poverty line by, say, one penny per day would have five times the impact on poverty reduction as would raising by the same amount the income of a person living at 90% of the poverty line.

If $\alpha = 2$, the resulting measure, $P_2$, can be rewritten as

$$P_2 = \left( \frac{H}{N} \right) \left[ NIS^2 + (1 - NIS)^2 (CV_p)^2 \right]$$  \hspace{1cm} (5.4)
As Equation 5.4 shows, $P_2$ contains the $CV_p$ measure, and it satisfies all four of the poverty axioms. Clearly, $P_2$ increases whenever $H/N$, NIS, or $CV_p$ increases. Note from the formula that there is a greater emphasis on the distribution of income among the poor ($CV_p$) when the normalized income shortfall is small and a smaller emphasis when the NIS is large.

$P_2$ has become a standard of income poverty measure used by the World Bank and other agencies, and it is used in empirical work on income poverty because of its sensitivity to the depth and severity of poverty. For the same reason, the $P_2$ measure has now become part of the Mexican constitution (chap. 5, art. 34). Mexico uses the $P_2$ poverty measure to allocate funds for education, health, and welfare programs for the poor (in particular in the Progresa Oportunidades program, described at the end of Chapter 8), in accordance with the regional intensity of poverty.

Values of $P_0$ and $P_2$ for selected developing countries are found in Table 5.6 later in this chapter.

The Newly Introduced Multidimensional Poverty Index

Poverty cannot be adequately measured with income, as Amartya Sen’s capability framework, examined in Chapter 1, makes apparent. Income is imperfectly measured, but even more important, the advantages provided by a given amount of income greatly differ, depending on circumstances. To capture this idea the United Nations Development Program used its Human Poverty Index from 1997 to 2009.

In 2010, the UNDP replaced the HPI with its new Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI); by building up the index from the household level, the MPI takes into account that there are negative interaction effects when people have multiple deprivations—worse poverty than can be seen by simply adding up separate deprivations for the whole country, taking averages, and only then combining them. The first step in measuring poverty is to know which people are poor. In the multidimensional poverty approach, a poor person is identified through what is called the “dual cutoff method”: first, the cutoff levels within each of the dimensions (analogous to falling below a poverty line such as $1.25 per day if income poverty were being addressed), and second, the cutoff of the number of dimensions in which a person must be deprived (below the line) to be deemed multidimensionally poor.

In applied studies, we need proxy measures, called indicators, for each of the selected dimensions. The index’s creators report that they selected the three dimensions (health, education, and standard of living) and each of their corresponding indicators because they reflect problems often mentioned by the poor, they have been long considered important by the development community particularly as reflected in the Millennium Development Goals (see Chapter 1), and they are well established philosophically as human rights or basic needs; naturally, reliable data also had to be available for enough countries.

With respect to health, two indicators—whether any child has died in the family and whether any adult or child in the family is malnourished—are weighted equally (so each counts one-sixth toward the maximum possible deprivation in the MPI). Regarding education also, two indicators—whether not even one household member has completed five years of schooling and whether any school-age child is out of school for grades one through eight—are given equal weight (so again, each counts one-sixth toward the MPI). Finally, in
terms of standard of living, equal weight is placed on six deprivations (each counting one-eighteenth toward the maximum possible): lack of electricity, insufficiently safe drinking water, inadequate sanitation, inadequate flooring, unimproved cooking fuel, and lack of more than one of five assets—telephone, radio, television, bicycle, and motorbike or similar vehicle.

Calculating deprivation in this way, individuals in a family are then identified as “multidimensionally poor” when deprived by a “weighted sum” of 0.3 or more (3 out of 10 points as calculated in practice). For concreteness, a person would get a value of 33% and thus be considered poor by having a child in the family who is malnourished while at the same time the most educated person in the family received only three years of schooling. Or a multidimensionally poor person might live in a household that has experienced a child death and is also deprived in at least three of the six living standards indicators, which also sums to $1/6 + 1/18 + 1/18 + 1/18 = 1/3$, or 33%. Or they could live in a household that is deprived in the other three living standard indicators and in which there is a school-age child not attending school. But if there were no health or education deprivations, a person would have to be deprived in all six standard-of-living indicators to be deemed poor. Thus the MPI approach identifies the very poor by measuring a range of important household deprivations directly, rather than only indirectly through income, then building the index from household measures up to the aggregate measure. Rather than using already aggregated statistics in an index, the approach takes into account the multiplied or interactive harm done when multiple deprivations are experienced by the same individual or family. In essence, the approach assumes that an individual’s lack of capability in one area can to a degree be made up for by other capabilities—but only to a degree. (Put differently, capabilities are treated as substitutes up to a point but then as complements.) This greatly augments measures used previously.

Finally, the actual MPI for the country (or region or group) is computed; a convenient way to express the resulting value is the product of the headcount ratio $H_M$ (the percentage of people living in multidimensional poverty) and the average intensity of deprivation $A$ (the percentage of weighted indicators for which poor households are deprived on average). The adjusted headcount ratio $H_M A$ is readily calculated, and it also satisfies some desirable properties. One of these is dimensional monotonicity, meaning that when a person deemed poor becomes deprived in another indicator, he or she is deemed even poorer; this would not be the case if using the simple headcount ratio. Moreover, $H_M A$ is a special case of a broader class of multidimensional poverty measures developed by Sabira Alkire and James Foster; for example, with better data another of these measures may be used to show the severity of multidimensional poverty, analogous to $P_2$.12

The UNDP reports the MPI for 104 developing countries, based on the currently available data; some examples are given in Table 5.2. More countries may be added as data availability improves, but already the countries encompass nearly 78% of the world’s population. The index can range from 0 to 1. Slovenia and Slovakia receive an MPI of 0, the lowest possible value, indicating the least poverty, while the world’s most impoverished country for which data were available to compute a ranking, Niger, ranks 104th, with an MPI value of 0.642. Based on the thresholds just described, the report found there
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>MPI Value</th>
<th>MPI Rank</th>
<th>$H_M$ (proportion of poor)</th>
<th>$A$ (average intensity of deprivations)</th>
<th>$1.25 \text{ a Day}$ (proportion of poor)</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>$2 \text{ a Day}$ (proportion of poor)</th>
<th>Rank</th>
</tr>
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<td>93</td>
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<td>85</td>
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<td>0.642</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>0.927</td>
<td>0.693</td>
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</table>
were nearly 1.7 billion people living in what was termed “acute” poverty—several hundred million more than the estimated number living on income of less than $1.25 per day. At the broadest level, the results are not out of line with what one might expect; sub-Saharan Africa has the highest proportion of people living in poverty, and South Asia has the largest number of people living in poverty (almost twice as many as in Africa).

Only Niger had an MPI higher than 0.6. Seven other countries had an MPI higher than 0.5, all in sub-Saharan Africa: Ethiopia, Mali, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Somalia, Central African Republic, and Guinea. A further eight countries had MPIs between 0.4 and 0.5; all of these were African nations as well. The severity of poverty in Africa is also brought home by some of the findings. In Guinea, Mali, and Niger, more than 50% are poor and live in a household in which at least one child has died. In Mozambique, Guinea, Burundi, Mali, Ethiopia, Burkina Faso, and Niger, more than 50% live in a poor household where no one has completed five years of education.

The poorest non-African countries were Nepal (with an MPI of 0.350), Haiti (0.306), India (0.296), Bangladesh (0.291), Yemen (0.283), and Pakistan (0.275). But these six countries have a combined population of about 1.6 billion people. And 39% in India and 37% in Bangladesh live in a poor household where at least one child or woman is undernourished.

The results showed that knowing income poverty is not enough if our concern is with multidimensional poverty. For example, multidimensionally, Bangladesh is substantially less poor and Pakistan substantially poorer than would be predicted by these countries’ income poverty (this finding may be related to some of the comparisons in the case study in Chapter 2). In Africa, Ethiopia is far more multidimensionally poor and Tanzania much less so than predicted by income poverty. Most Latin American countries studied rank worse on multidimensional poverty than on income poverty, but Colombia’s income and MPI poverty ranks are about the same.

Different regions in the same country can have very different MPIs. Overall, the MPI for Kenya (whose regional HDI differences were examined in Chapter 2) is similar to that of India. But in Kenya, the MPI for Nairobi is close to that of Brazil. Central Kenya’s MPI is similar to that of Bolivia. And northeastern Kenya has a worse MPI even than Niger. There were also great inequalities across ethnic groups in Kenya, with 29% of the Embu considered multidimensionally poor, compared with a staggering 96% of the Turkana and Masai peoples. Great inequalities were also found in India, in which indigenous (“tribal”) peoples and low-ranked (“scheduled”) castes were far poorer than people from high-ranking castes. In the Delhi and Kerala regions, just 14 to 16% are MPI poor, but in Jharkhand and Bihar, 77 to 81% are MPI poor. Finally, changes in the MPI over time were examined for three countries: Ghana saw its MPI halved from 0.29 to 0.14; Bangladesh saw its MPI reduced by a more modest 22%; and in Ethiopia, the MPI fell by 16% in the periods studied.

As with all indexes, the MPI has some limitations. As mentioned, data are from the household rather than the individual level (such as whether any child of school age is out of school or whether any family member is undernourished). It does not fully distinguish between past and present conditions (because its measure is whether a child has ever died). It does not distinguish differences
within households (such as who may make use of the bicycle or whether the
undernourished individuals are females). Proxies are imperfect; for example,
nourishment does not capture micronutrient deficiencies. Sometimes a person
has to be labeled nondeprived if data are missing, so the numbers may under-
state poverty somewhat. Education considers only inputs such as enrolling or
attending for five years, not outputs such as being able to read. And the choice
of basic assets is questionable; for example, even where a radio and a simple
bicycle are present, a woman may have just one dress and the children may
sleep on a rough concrete floor.

No doubt there will be future improvements in the MPI. The MPI provides
a new and fundamentally important way to measure poverty, to help us un-
derstand how poverty levels differ across and within countries and also how
the dimensions (or composition) of poverty can differ greatly in different set-
tings. Ultimately, this should assist with better design and targeting of pro-
grams and policies and help us evaluate their performance more quickly and
effectively.

For now, because of the way living standards and human development
surveys are conducted, most of the usable data is at the household level, mak-
ing it difficult to “drill down” to the individual level. Household data are far
better than what used to be available; in fact, the availability of household
data has already had a substantial impact on improving the study of develop-
ment economics. It is a great improvement to be able to focus on what is hap-
pening at the family rather than the national level. Well-designed income
poverty measures such as \( P_2 \) will always be used for many purposes; but the
MPI is likely to help usher in an era in which multidimensional poverty is ex-
amined in most assessments.

The ACWI A final approach to accounting for the distribution of income in
assessing the quality of growth is to value increases in income for all individu-
als but to assign a higher weight to income gains by lower-income individuals
than to gains by higher-income individuals. Perhaps the best-known example
is the Ahluwalia-Chenery Welfare Index (ACWI), which is explained in Appen-
dix 5.2.

5.2 Poverty, Inequality, and Social Welfare

What’s So Bad about Extreme Inequality?

Throughout this chapter, we are assuming that social welfare depends posi-
tively on the level of income per capita but negatively on poverty and nega-
tively on the level of inequality, as these terms have just been defined. The
problem of absolute poverty is obvious. No civilized people can feel satisfied
with a state of affairs in which their fellow humans exist in conditions of such
absolute human misery, which is probably why every major religion has em-
phasized the importance of working to alleviate poverty and is at least one of
the reasons why international development assistance has the nearly univer-
sal support of every democratic nation. But it may reasonably be asked, if our
top priority is the alleviation of absolute poverty, why should *relative inequality*
be a concern? We have seen that inequality among the poor is a critical factor in understanding the severity of poverty and the impact of market and policy changes on the poor, but why should we be concerned with inequality among those above the poverty line?

There are three major answers to this question. First, extreme income inequality leads to economic inefficiency. This is partly because at any given average income, the higher the inequality, the smaller the fraction of the population that qualifies for a loan or other credit. Indeed, one definition of relative poverty is the lack of collateral. When low-income individuals (whether they are absolutely poor or not) cannot borrow money, they generally cannot adequately educate their children or start and expand a business. Moreover, with high inequality, the overall rate of saving in the economy tends to be lower, because the highest rate of marginal savings is usually found among the middle classes. Although the rich may save a larger dollar amount, they typically save a smaller fraction of their incomes, and they almost always save a smaller fraction of their marginal incomes. Landlords, business leaders, politicians, and other rich elites are known to spend much of their incomes on imported luxury goods, gold, jewelry, expensive houses, and foreign travel or to seek safe havens abroad for their savings in what is known as capital flight. Such savings and investments do not add to the nation’s productive resources; in fact, they represent substantial drains on these resources. In short, the rich do not generally save and invest significantly larger proportions of their incomes (in the real economic sense of productive domestic saving and investment) than the middle class or even the poor. Furthermore, inequality may lead to an inefficient allocation of assets. As you will see in Chapter 8, high inequality leads to an overemphasis on higher education at the expense of quality universal primary education, and this in turn begets still more inequality in incomes. Moreover, as you will see in Chapter 9, high inequality of land ownership—characterized by the presence of huge latifundios (plantations) alongside tiny minifundios that are incapable of supporting even a single family—also leads to inefficiency because the most efficient scales for farming are family and medium-size farms. The result of these factors can be a lower average income and a lower rate of economic growth when inequality is high.

The second reason to be concerned with inequality above the poverty line is that extreme income disparities undermine social stability and solidarity. Also, high inequality strengthens the political power of the rich and hence their economic bargaining power. Usually this power will be used to encourage outcomes favorable to themselves. High inequality facilitates rent seeking, including actions such as excessive lobbying, large political donations, bribery, and cronyism. When resources are allocated to such rent-seeking behaviors, they are diverted from productive purposes that could lead to faster growth. Even worse, high inequality makes poor institutions very difficult to improve, because the few with money and power are likely to view themselves as worse off from socially efficient reform, and so they have the motive and the means to resist it (see Chapter 2). Of course, high inequality may also lead the poor to support populist policies that can be self-defeating. Countries with extreme inequality, such as El Salvador and Iran, have undergone upheavals or extended civil strife that have cost countless lives and set back development
progress by decades. In sum, with high inequality, the focus of politics often tends to be on supporting or resisting the redistribution of the existing economic pie rather than on policies to increase its size (Chapter 11 examines these concerns in more detail).  

Finally, extreme inequality is generally viewed as unfair. The philosopher John Rawls proposed a thought experiment to help clarify why this is so. Suppose that before you were born into this world, you had a chance to select the overall level of inequality among the earth’s people but not your own identity. That is, you might be born as Bill Gates, but you might be born as the most wretchedly poor person in rural Ethiopia with equal probability. Rawls calls this uncertainty the “veil of ignorance.” The question is, facing this kind of risk, would you vote for an income distribution that was more equal or less equal than the one you see around you? If the degree of equality had no effect on the level of income or rate of growth, most people would vote for nearly perfect equality. Of course, if everyone had the same income no matter what, there would be little incentive to work hard, gain skills, or innovate. As a result, most people vote for some inequality of income outcomes, to the extent that these correspond to incentives for hard work or innovation. But even so, most vote for less inequality than is seen in the world (or in virtually any country) today. This is because much of the inequality we observe in the world is based on luck or extraneous factors, such as the inborn ability to kick a football or the identity of one’s great-grandparents.

For all these reasons, for this part of the analysis we will write welfare, \( W \), as

\[
W = W(Y, I, P)
\]  

where \( Y \) is income per capita and enters our welfare function positively, \( I \) is inequality and enters negatively, and \( P \) is absolute poverty and also enters negatively. These three components have distinct significance, and we need to consider all three elements to achieve an overall assessment of welfare in developing countries. (A similar framework can be applied to health and education.)

**Dualistic Development and Shifting Lorenz Curves: Some Stylized Typologies**

Gary Fields used Lorenz curves to analyze three limiting cases of dualistic development:

1. The *modern-sector enlargement* growth typology, in which the two-sector economy develops by enlarging the size of its modern sector while maintaining constant wages in both sectors. This is the case depicted by the Lewis model in Chapter 3. It corresponds roughly to the historical growth pattern of Western developed nations and, to some extent, the pattern in East Asian economies such as China, South Korea, and Taiwan.

2. The *modern-sector enrichment* growth typology, in which the economy grows but such growth is limited to a fixed number of people in the modern sector, with both the numbers of workers and their wages held constant in the traditional sector. This roughly describes the experience of many Latin American and African economies.
3. The *traditional-sector enrichment* growth typology, in which all of the benefits of growth are divided among traditional-sector workers, with little or no growth occurring in the modern sector. This process roughly describes the experiences of countries whose policies focused on achieving substantial reductions in absolute poverty even at very low incomes and with relatively low growth rates such as Sri Lanka, and the state of Kerala in southwestern India.

Using these three special cases and Lorenz curves, Fields demonstrated the validity of the following propositions (reversing the order just presented):

1. In the *traditional-sector enrichment* typology, growth results in higher income, a *more equal* relative distribution of income, and less poverty. Traditional-sector enrichment growth causes the Lorenz curve to shift uniformly upward and closer toward the line of equality, as depicted in Figure 5.7.

2. In the *modern-sector enrichment* growth typology, growth results in higher incomes, a *less equal* relative distribution of income, and no change in poverty. Modern-sector enrichment growth causes the Lorenz curve to shift downward and farther from the line of equality, as shown in Figure 5.8.

3. Finally, in the case of Lewis-type *modern-sector enlargement* growth, absolute incomes rise and absolute poverty is reduced, but the Lorenz curves will always cross, indicating that we cannot make any unambiguous statement about changes in relative inequality: It may improve or worsen.
Fields shows that if, in fact, this style of growth experience is predominant, inequality is likely first to worsen in the early stages of development and then to improve. The crossing of the Lorenz curves is demonstrated in Figure 5.9.
The explanation for the crossing in Figure 5.9 is as follows: The poor who remain in the traditional sector have their incomes unchanged, but these incomes are now a smaller fraction of the larger total, so the new Lorenz curve, $L_2$, lies below the old Lorenz curve, $L_1$, at the lower end of the income distribution scale. Each modern-sector worker receives the same absolute income as before, but now the share received by the richest income group is smaller, so the new Lorenz curve lies above the old one at the higher end of the income distribution scale. Therefore, somewhere in the middle of the distribution, the old and new Lorenz curves must cross.\footnote{18}

These three typologies offer different predictions about what will happen to inequality in the course of economic growth. With modern-sector enrichment, inequality would rise steadily, while under traditional-sector enrichment, inequality would fall steadily. Under modern-sector enlargement, inequality would first rise and then fall;\footnote{19} if this admittedly highly stylized process of development were occurring, we would not be concerned about the temporary rise in inequality because in addition to being temporary, it would be reflecting a process in which citizens are, one by one, achieving incomes above the absolute poverty line.\footnote{20}

These observations tell us that we have to qualify our conclusion that a rise in inequality is inherently bad. In some cases, inequality may increase on a temporary basis due to causes that will eventually make everyone better off and ultimately lower inequality. However, with modern-sector enrichment growth, the increase in inequality is not later reversed, and the poor do not escape their poverty.\footnote{21} So we need to be careful about drawing conclusions from short-run changes in economic statistics before we know more about the underlying changes in the real economy that gave rise to these statistics. The process of modern-sector enlargement growth suggests a possible mechanism that could give rise to Kuznets’s “inverted-U” hypothesis, so we turn to this question next.

**Kuznets’s Inverted-U Hypothesis**

Simon Kuznets suggested that in the early stages of economic growth, the distribution of income will tend to worsen; only at later stages it will improve.\footnote{22} This observation came to be characterized by the “inverted-U” Kuznets curve because a longitudinal (time-series) plot of changes in the distribution of income—as measured, for example, by the Gini coefficient—seemed, when per capita GNI expanded, to trace out an inverted U-shaped curve in some of the cases Kuznets studied, as illustrated in Figure 5.10.

Explanations as to why inequality might worsen during the early stages of economic growth before eventually improving are numerous. They almost always relate to the nature of structural change. Early growth may, in accordance with the Lewis model, be concentrated in the modern industrial sector, where employment is limited but wages and productivity are high.

As just noted, the Kuznets curve could be generated by a steady process of modern-sector enlargement growth as a country develops from a traditional to a modern economy. Alternatively, returns to education may first rise as the emerging modern sector demands skills and then fall as the supply of educated workers increases and the supply of unskilled workers falls. So while
Kuznets did not specify the mechanism by which his inverted-U hypothesis was supposed to occur, it could in principle be consistent with a sequential process of economic development. But as shown earlier, traditional- and modern-sector enrichment would tend to pull inequality in opposing directions, so the net change in inequality is ambiguous, and the validity of the Kuznets curve is an empirical question.

Disregarding the merits of the methodological debate, few development economists would argue that the Kuznets sequence of increasing and then declining inequality is inevitable. There are now enough case studies and specific examples of countries such as Taiwan, South Korea, Costa Rica, and Sri Lanka to demonstrate that higher income levels can be accompanied by falling and not rising inequality. It all depends on the nature of the development process.

Evidence on the Inverted-U Hypothesis  Let us look at data collected from 16 countries on the percentage shares in total national income going to different percentile groups (see Table 5.3). Though methods of collection, degree of coverage, and specific definitions of personal income may vary from country to country, the figures recorded in Table 5.3 give a first approximation of the magnitude of income inequality in developing countries. For example, we see that in Zambia, the poorest 20% (first quintile) of the population receives only 3.6% of the income, while the highest 10% and 20% (fifth quintile) receive 38.9% and 55.2%, respectively. By contrast, in a relatively equal developed country like Japan, the poorest 20% receives a much higher 10.6% of the income, while the richest 10% and 20% get only 21.7% and 35.7%, respectively. The income distribution of the United States, a relatively less equal developed country, is given for comparison in Table 5.3.

Consider now the relationship, if any, between levels of per capita income and degree of inequality. Are higher incomes associated with greater or lesser
inequality, or can no definitive statement be made? Table 5.4 provides data on income distribution in relation to per capita GNI for a sampling of countries, arranged from lowest to highest in terms of per capita income. What clearly emerges from Table 5.4 is that per capita incomes are not necessarily related to inequality. The very poorest countries, such as Ethiopia, may have low inequality simply because there is so little income. But even very poor countries such as Mozambique and Zambia have extremely high inequality by international standards. Although many high-inequality Latin American countries are found in the middle-income range, this range also includes countries such as Egypt and Indonesia, as well as eastern European countries, with low inequality. High-income countries do tend to be somewhat more equal than middle-income countries, but again, there is wide variation in inequality levels. In recent years, there has even been a tendency for inequality to rise in high-income countries and to fall at least somewhat in several Latin American countries.

Could the Kuznets curve that is seen in the data be a mere statistical fluke resulting from the fact that for extraneous historical reasons, most Latin American countries just happened to have both a middle level of income and a high level of inequality? And could a combination of both cross-sectional and longitudinal (time-series) data help resolve the question? Gary Fields and George Jakubson examined this question. Figure 5.11 on page 228, plots a combination of data from the 35 countries in Fields and Jakubson’s data set, where reliable estimates of the Gini coefficient have been available for various developing countries at different points in time. The inverted-U relationship, tracing the triangles, is a computer-generated parabola that best fits the data under standard statistical criteria. Observations on Latin American countries are circled: All of the

**TABLE 5.3 Selected Income Distribution Estimates**

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Lowest 10%</th>
<th>1st</th>
<th>2nd</th>
<th>3rd</th>
<th>4th</th>
<th>5th</th>
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highest-inequality countries in their data come from that region. Statistically, when the Latin American identity of the country is controlled for, the inverted U drawn in Figure 5.11 tends to disappear in this data set and others as well.23

So the question is, what happens over time? In Figure 5.12 on page 229, selected countries from the data in Figure 5.11 have been isolated. As can be seen, the data from Brazil, which have the label 1 in the diagram, do plainly show an inverted-U pattern. Data from Hong Kong and Singapore, in contrast, labeled 4 and 5 in the diagram, appear to reflect a U-shaped pattern. But when these separate experiences are merged into one picture, the eyes (and the computer) misleadingly trace an inverted U in the data taken as a whole. This reinforces the great importance of understanding what gives rise to the statistical patterns in the data rather than taking them at face value. Detailed longitudinal studies of developing countries similarly show a very mixed pattern. Juan Luis Lonondro found an inverted U for Colombia, but Harry Oshima found no particular pattern among several Asian countries.24

As a result of this work, the dominating influence of the “Latin America effect” has been strongly supported. In fact, for many countries, there is no particular tendency for inequality to change in the process of economic development. Inequality seems to be a rather stable part of a country’s socioeconomic makeup, altered significantly only as a result of a substantial upheaval or
systematic policies. East Asia achieved its relatively low inequality largely from exogenous forces: the U.S. occupation of Japan, the Nationalist takeover of Taiwan, and the expulsion of the Japanese from South Korea. In all three cases, land reform that had far-reaching effects on inequality was implemented (we examine land reform in Chapter 9). But inequality can be gradually reduced through well-implemented policies to promote pro-poor growth over time.

Growth and Inequality

Having examined the relationship between inequality and levels of per capita income, let us look now briefly at the relationship, if any, between economic growth and inequality. Figure 5.13 on page 230 provides long-run data covering the mid-1960s and the mid-1990s. The chart reflects the well-known fact that low-inequality East Asia grew rapidly and high-inequality Latin America and Africa grew very slowly. It also shows that changes in inequality, as measured by Gini coefficients, were small within each of these regions between the 1960s and the 1990s. During these periods, per capita growth in East Asia averaged 5.5% while that of Africa declined by 0.2%, yet both Gini coefficients remained essentially unchanged. Once again, it is not just the rate but also the character of economic growth (how it is achieved, who participates, which sectors are given priority, what institutional arrangements are designed and em-

Character of economic growth The distributive implications of economic growth as reflected in such factors as participation in the growth process and asset ownership.
phasized, etc.) that determines the degree to which that growth is or is not reflected in improved living standards for the poor. Clearly, it is not necessary for inequality to increase for higher growth to be sustained.

### 5.3 Absolute Poverty: Extent and Magnitude

Like so much in economic development, the critical problem of eradicating absolute poverty is one of bad news and good news—of a glass that may be seen as either half empty or half full.

It is extremely difficult to arrive at a tight estimate of the extent of global poverty at any point in time. Major World Bank reports issued within a couple of years of each other have provided estimates of the dollar-a-day headcount that differ by tens of millions of people. This reflects the difficulty of the task. Another difficulty is determining the most appropriate cutoff income for extreme poverty. The $1-a-day line was first set in 1987 dollars, and for years the standard was $1.08 in 1993 U.S. purchasing power parity. In 2008, the equivalent line was reset at $1.25 at 2005 U.S. purchasing power. This (along with improved estimates of prices faced by the poor) resulted in an increase in the estimated number of the poor but did not change the conclusion that the number in poverty has been

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**FIGURE 5.12** Plot of Inequality Data for Selected Countries

falling markedly since 1990, most conspicuously due to progress in China. Even as updated to today’s dollars, the poverty line is to some degree arbitrary (although it has corresponded roughly to what many developing countries use and is at least related to expenditures of people who barely meet minimum nutrition).

In its 2010 *World Development Indicators*, the World Bank estimated that the number of people living in extreme ($1.25-a-day) poverty was approximately 1.4 billion in 2005. This gave a headcount ratio of just over 18%, reflecting the steady progress against poverty of recent years; in 1987, over 28% of the world’s people lived below this same poverty line. The World Bank’s current estimates of the trends of poverty reduction are reported in Figure 5.14. There has been very substantial progress in reducing the still enormous numbers of
people living in extreme poverty at $1.25 per day. The number living on less than $2 per day has remained relatively stable.  

The incidence of extreme poverty is very uneven around the developing world. Household survey–based estimates are regarded as the most accurate ways to estimate poverty incidence. Table 5.5 provides some survey-based poverty estimates by region at the $1.25 and $2 poverty lines. As can be seen, poverty incidence is very high in both South Asia, with about 40% below $1.25 per day, and in sub-Saharan Africa, with 51% below. But poverty severity is far higher in sub-Saharan Africa, with a squared poverty gap index $P_2$ (in percentage terms) at 11.05, far above that of South Asia at 3.64. Table 5.6 provides estimates for some specific countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America at the $1.25 and $2 poverty lines. It can be seen that about 44% of India’s 2004 rural population lived below the $1.25-a-day poverty line, while almost 80% lived on less than $2 per day. In contrast, less than 36% of its urban population lived on less than $1.25 per day, although about 66% still lived on less than $2 per day.

Research suggests that approximately one-third of all people who are poor at any one time are chronically (always) poor. Andrew McKay and Bob Baulch provided a well-regarded “guesstimate” that about 300 to 420 million people were chronically poor at the $1-per-day level in the late 1990s. The other two-thirds are made up of families that are vulnerable to poverty and become extremely poor from time to time. These may be divided between families usually poor but occasionally receiving enough income to cross the poverty line and families usually nonpoor but occasionally experiencing a shock that knocks them temporarily below the poverty line. Chronic poverty is concentrated in India, where the largest numbers are found, and in Africa, where the severity of poverty among the chronically poor is greatest.

Problems of the poorest of the poor pose particular challenges. Ultra-poverty differs from conventional poverty in terms of depth (degree of deprivation), length (duration of time), and breadth (the number of dimensions, such as illiteracy and
malnutrition). The mutual reinforcement among the different dimensions of poverty can potentially result in multiple mutually reinforcing poverty traps. This makes ultrapoverty a more difficult problem to address than conventional poverty, which can more often be redressed with simpler solutions such as microfinance (see Chapter 15) plus business training. The chronic nature and severity of ultra-poverty also make short-term policies more problematic. Poverty innovators such as Fazel Hasan Abed have concluded that conventional programs have often not reached the ultra-poor. An income-based definition of ultrapoverty is living on half the dollar-a-day poverty line, or 54 cents per day in 1993 dollars. According to IFPRI estimates, 162 million people live below this stark income level, generally with malnutrition and other destitute conditions. The IFPRI study concluded:

poverty just below $1 a day has fallen faster than poverty below 50 cents a day, suggesting that it has been easier to reach those living closer to the dollar-a-day line rather than those living well below it. . . . The slow progress of poverty reduction for the world’s most deprived indicates the presence of poverty traps, or conditions from which the poorest individuals or groups cannot emerge without outside assistance.27

Some NGOs responded to this problem, such as BRAC’s Targeting the Ultra-Poor Program described in the case study for Chapter 11 and Grameen’s Beggars Program, introduced in the case study for Chapter 15.

The prospect for ending poverty depends critically on two factors: first, the rate of economic growth—provided it is undertaken in a shared and sustainable way—and second, the level of resources devoted to poverty programs and the quality of those programs.

**Growth and Poverty**

Are the reduction of poverty and the acceleration of growth in conflict? Or are they complementary? Traditionally, a body of opinion held that rapid growth is
## Poverty Incidence in Selected Countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Per Capita Monthly Income (2005 PPP)</th>
<th>Headcount Ratio (%)</th>
<th>Poverty Gap (%)</th>
<th>Squared Poverty Gap (%)</th>
<th>Gini Index (%)</th>
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<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>2005</td>
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### Incidence at $2 a Day; Poverty Line at 60.84

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<th>Poverty Gap (%)</th>
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*Preliminary data.
bad for the poor because they would be bypassed and marginalized by the structural changes of modern growth. Beyond this, there had been considerable concern in policy circles that the public expenditures required for the reduction of poverty would entail a reduction in the rate of growth. The concerns that concentrated efforts to lower poverty would slow the rate of growth paralleled the arguments that countries with lower inequality would experience slower growth. In particular, if there were redistribution of income or assets from rich to poor, even through progressive taxation, the concern was expressed that savings would fall. However, while the middle class generally has the highest savings rates, the marginal savings rates of the poor, when viewed from a holistic perspective, are not small. In addition to financial savings, the poor tend to spend additional income on improved nutrition, education for their children, improvements in housing conditions, and other expenditures that, especially at poverty levels, represent investments rather than consumption. There are at least five reasons why policies focused toward reducing poverty levels need not lead to a slower rate of growth.

First, widespread poverty creates conditions in which the poor have no access to credit, are unable to finance their children’s education, and, in the absence of physical or monetary investment opportunities, have many children as a source of old-age financial security. Together these factors cause per capita growth to be less than what it would be if there were greater equality.

Second, a wealth of empirical data bears witness to the fact that unlike the historical experience of the now developed countries, the rich in many contemporary poor countries are generally not noted for their frugality or for their desire to save and invest substantial proportions of their incomes in the local economy.

Third, the low incomes and low levels of living for the poor, which are manifested in poor health, nutrition, and education, can lower their economic productivity and thereby lead directly and indirectly to a slower-growing economy. Strategies to raise the incomes and levels of living of the poor would therefore contribute not only to their material well-being but also to the productivity and income of the economy as a whole. (These issues are considered further in Chapter 8.)

Fourth, raising the income levels of the poor will stimulate an overall increase in the demand for locally produced necessity products like food and clothing, whereas the rich tend to spend more of their additional incomes on imported luxury goods. Rising demand for local goods provides a greater stimulus to local production, local employment, and local investment. Such demand thus creates the conditions for rapid economic growth and a broader popular participation in that growth.

Fifth a reduction of mass poverty can stimulate healthy economic expansion by acting as a powerful material and psychological incentive to widespread public participation in the development process. By contrast, wide income disparities and substantial absolute poverty can act as powerful material and psychological disincentives to economic progress. They may even create the conditions for an ultimate rejection of progress by the masses, impatient at the pace of progress or its failure to alter their material circumstances. We can conclude, therefore, that promoting rapid economic growth and reducing poverty are not mutually conflicting objectives.

That dramatic reductions in poverty need not be incompatible with high growth is seen both in case studies and in the cross-national comparisons of data. Countries where poverty has been reduced the most tend to have had
sustained growth; at the same time, growth does not guarantee poverty reduction. Over the past 30 years, China has experienced the highest growth rate in the world and also the most dramatic reductions in poverty. The headcount of the poor in China fell from 634 million in 1981 to 128 million in 2004, with the corresponding headcount ratio falling from 64% to 10%. This did not occur merely as a result of high growth. Policies actively encouraged modern-sector enlargement. Moreover, China has worked with the World Bank and other development agencies to improve its poverty reduction programs and has built on its long-standing efforts to provide at least minimal education and health care for its people as a firm foundation for long-term progress. Although the plight of many peasants has worsened in recent years, especially in interior regions, and inequality has greatly increased, the positive overall results of China’s efforts to fight extreme poverty are apparent. Recent dramatic reductions of poverty in Vietnam have followed a similar pattern.

Richer countries strongly tend to have low levels of absolute poverty. Through one means or another—the availability of employment and entrepreneurship opportunities and greater public and NGO assistance—people who live in rich countries tend to escape from poverty. Among developing countries, there is evidence that countries with faster overall rates of per capita income growth also tend on average to have faster rates of per capita income growth among those in the bottom quintile of the income distribution, though the proportions vary widely. While we cannot passively count on even sustainable growth by itself to end absolute poverty, ending poverty can be greatly facilitated through wise and shared stewardship of the various resources provided by growth.32

Certainly, the relationship between economic growth and progress among the poor does not by itself indicate causality. Some of the effect probably runs from improved incomes, education, and health among the poor to faster overall growth (as suggested by some of the arguments listed previously). Moreover, as we have noted, poverty reduction is possible without rapid growth. But whatever the causality, it is clear that growth and poverty reduction are entirely compatible objectives.

5.4 Economic Characteristics of High-Poverty Groups

So far we have painted a broad picture of the income distribution and poverty problem in developing countries. We argued that the magnitude of absolute poverty results from a combination of low per capita incomes and highly unequal distributions of that income. Clearly, for any given distribution of income, the higher the level of per capita income, the lower the numbers of the absolutely poor. But higher levels of per capita income are no guarantee of lower levels of poverty. An understanding of the nature of the size distribution of income is therefore central to any analysis of the poverty problem in low-income countries.

But painting a broad picture of absolute poverty is not enough. Before we can formulate effective policies and programs to attack poverty at its source, we need some specific knowledge of these high poverty groups and their economic characteristics.33
Rural Poverty

Perhaps the most valid generalizations about the poor are that they are disproportionately located in rural areas, that they are primarily engaged in agricultural and associated activities, that they are more likely to be women and children than adult males, and that they are often concentrated among minority ethnic groups and indigenous peoples. Data from a broad cross section of developing nations support these generalizations. We find, for example, that about two-thirds of the very poor scratch out their livelihood from subsistence agriculture either as small farmers or as low-paid farmworkers. Some of the remaining one-third are also located in rural areas but engaged in petty services, and others are located on the fringes and in marginal areas of urban centers, where they engage in various forms of self-employment such as street hawking, trading, petty services, and small-scale commerce. On the average, we may conclude that in Africa and Asia, about 80% of all target poverty groups are located in the rural areas, as are about 50% in Latin America. Some data for specific countries are provided in Table 5.7.

It is interesting to note, in light of the rural concentration of absolute poverty, that the majority of government expenditures in most developing countries over the past several decades has been directed toward the urban area and especially toward the relatively affluent modern manufacturing and

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Whether in the realm of directly productive economic investments or in the fields of education, health, housing, and other social services, this urban modern-sector bias in government expenditures is at the core of many of the development problems that will be discussed in succeeding chapters. We need only point out here that in view of the disproportionate number of the very poor who reside in rural areas, any policy designed to alleviate poverty must necessarily be directed to a large extent toward rural development in general and the agricultural sector in particular (we will discuss this matter in detail in Chapter 9).

Women and Poverty

Women make up a substantial majority of the world’s poor. If we compared the lives of the inhabitants of the poorest communities throughout the developing world, we would discover that virtually everywhere, women and children experience the harshest deprivation. They are more likely to be poor and malnourished and less likely to receive medical services, clean water, sanitation, and other benefits. The prevalence of female-headed households, the lower earning capacity of women, and their limited control over their spouses’ income all contribute to this disturbing phenomenon. In addition, women have less access to education, formal-sector employment, social security, and government employment programs. These facts combine to ensure that poor women’s financial resources are meager and unstable relative to men’s.

A disproportionate number of the ultra-poor live in households headed by women, in which there are generally no male wage earners. Because the earning potential of women is considerably below that of their male counterparts, women are more likely to be among the very poor. In general, women in female-headed households have less education and lower incomes. Furthermore, the larger the household, the greater the strain on the single parent and the lower the per capita food expenditure.

A portion of the income disparity between male- and female-headed households can be explained by the large earnings differentials between men and women. In addition to the fact that women are often paid less for performing similar tasks, in many cases they are essentially barred from higher-paying occupations. In urban areas, women are much less likely to obtain formal employment in private companies or public agencies and are frequently restricted to illegal, low-productivity jobs. The illegality of piecework, as in the garment industry, prevents it from being regulated and renders it exempt from minimum-wage laws or social security benefits. Even when women receive conventional wage payments in factory work, minimum wage and safety legislation may be flagrantly ignored. Similarly, rural women have less access to the resources necessary to generate stable incomes and are frequently subject to laws that further compromise earning potential. Legislation and social custom often prohibit women from owning property or signing financial contracts without a husband’s signature. With a few notable exceptions, government employment or income-enhancing programs are accessible primarily if not exclusively by men, exacerbating existing income disparities between men and women.

But household income alone fails to describe the severity of women’s relative deprivation. Because a higher proportion of female-headed households
are situated in the poorest areas, which have little or no access to government-sponsored services such as piped water, sanitation, and health care, household members are more likely to fall ill and are less likely to receive medical attention. In addition, children in female-headed households are less likely to be enrolled in school and more likely to be working in order to provide additional income.

The degree of economic hardship may also vary widely within a household. We have already discussed the fact that GNI per capita is an inadequate measure of development because it fails to reflect the extent of absolute poverty. Likewise, household income is a poor measure of individual welfare because the distribution of income within the household may be quite unequal. In fact, among the poor, the economic status of women provides a better indication of their own welfare, as well as that of their children. Existing studies of intrahousehold resource allocation clearly indicate that in many regions of the world, there exists a strong bias against females in areas such as nutrition, medical care, education, and inheritance. Moreover, empirical research has shown that these gender biases in household resource allocation significantly reduce the rate of survival among female infants. This is one reason why recorded female-male sex ratios are so much below their expected values, primarily in Asian countries, that 100 million girls and women are said to be “missing.” The favor shown toward boys in part reflects the fact that men are perceived to have a greater potential for contributing financially to family survival. This is not only because well-paying employment for women is unavailable but also because daughters are often married to families outside the village, after which they become exclusively responsible to their in-laws and thus cease contributing to their family of origin.

The extent of these internal biases is strongly influenced by the economic status of women. Studies have found that where women’s share of income within the home is relatively high, there is less discrimination against girls, and women are better able to meet their own needs as well as those of their children. When household income is marginal, most of women’s income is contributed toward household nutritional intake. Since this fraction is considerably smaller for men, a rise in male earnings leads to a less than proportionate increase in the funds available for the provision of daily needs. It is thus unsurprising that programs designed to increase nutrition and family health are more effective when targeting women than when targeting men. In fact, significant increases in total household income do not necessarily translate into improved nutritional status (see Chapter 8). The persistence of low levels of living among women and children is common where the economic status of women remains low. Box 5.1 provides some views of the poor on gender relations.

Women’s control over household income and resources is limited for a number of reasons. Of primary importance is the fact that a relatively large proportion of the work performed by women is unremunerated—for example, collecting firewood and cooking—and may even be intangible, as with parenting. Women’s control over household resources may also be constrained by the fact that many women from poor households are not paid for the work they perform in family agriculture or business. For example, in Mexico, it has been estimated that 22.5% of women in the agricultural sector and 7.63% of women in the nonagricultural sectors work full time without pay. These figures are
greatly understated in that they do not include women who work part time in family production. It is common for the male head of household to control all funds from cash crops or the family business, even though a significant portion of the labor input is provided by his spouse. In addition, in many cultures, it is considered socially unacceptable for women to contribute significantly to household income, and hence women’s work may remain concealed or unrecognized. These combined factors perpetuate the low economic status of women and can lead to strict limitations on their control over household resources.

Development policies that increase the productivity differentials between men and women are likely to worsen earnings disparities as well as further erode women’s economic status within the household. Since government programs to alleviate poverty frequently work almost exclusively with men, they tend to exacerbate these inequalities. In urban areas, training programs to increase earning potential and formal-sector employment are generally geared to men, while agricultural extension programs promote male-dominated crops, frequently at the expense of women’s vegetable plots. Studies have shown that development efforts can actually increase women’s workload while at the same time reduce the share of household resources over which they exercise control. Consequently, women and their dependents remain the most economically vulnerable group in developing countries.

The fact that the welfare of women and children is strongly influenced by the design of development policy underscores the importance of integrating women into development programs. To improve living conditions for the poorest individuals, women must be drawn into the economic mainstream. This would entail increasing female participation rates in educational and
training programs, formal-sector employment, and agricultural extension programs. It is also of primary importance that precautions be taken to ensure that women have equal access to government resources provided through schooling, services, employment, and social security programs. Legalizing informal-sector employment where the majority of the female labor force is employed would also improve the economic status of women.

The consequences of declines in women’s relative or absolute economic status has both ethical and long-term economic implications. Any process of growth that fails to improve the welfare of the people experiencing the greatest hardship, broadly recognized to be women and children, has failed to accomplish one of the principal goals of development. In the long run, the low status of women is likely to translate into slower rates of economic growth. This is true because the educational attainment and future financial status of children are much more likely to reflect those of the mother than those of the father. Thus the benefits of current investments in human capital are more likely to be passed on to future generations if women are successfully integrated into the growth process. And considering that human capital is perhaps the most important prerequisite for growth, education and enhanced economic status for women are critical to meeting long-term development objectives. (We examine these issues in greater detail in Chapter 8.)

As feminist development economists have often expressed it, official poverty programs cannot simply “add women and stir.” Women-centered poverty strategies often require us to challenge basic assumptions. The harsher conditions for women and women’s crucial role in a community’s escape from poverty mean that involvement of women cannot be left as an afterthought but will be most effective if it is the first thought—and the consistent basis for action—when addressing poverty.

**Ethnic Minorities, Indigenous Populations, and Poverty**

A final generalization about the incidence of poverty in the developing world is that it falls especially heavily on minority ethnic groups and indigenous populations. We pointed out in Chapter 2 that some 40% of the world’s nation-states have more than five sizable ethnic populations, one or more of which faces serious economic, political, and social discrimination. In recent years, domestic conflicts and even civil wars have arisen out of ethnic groups’ perceptions that they are losing out in the competition for limited resources and job opportunities. The poverty problem is even more serious for indigenous peoples, whose numbers exceed 300 million in over 5,000 different groups in more than 70 countries.36

Although detailed data on the relative poverty of minority ethnic and indigenous peoples is difficult to obtain (for political reasons, few countries wish to highlight these problems), researchers have compiled data on the poverty of indigenous people in Latin America.37 The results clearly demonstrate that a majority of indigenous groups live in extreme poverty and that being indigenous greatly increases the chances that an individual will be malnourished, illiterate, in poor health, and unemployed. For example, the research showed that in Mexico, over 80% of the indigenous population is poor, compared to 18% of the nonindigenous population. Table 5.8 shows that similar
situations exist in countries such as Bolivia, Guatemala, and Peru (not to mention Native American populations in the United States and Canada). Moreover, a 2006 World Bank study confirmed that all too little progress is being made. Whether we speak of Tamils in Sri Lanka, Karens in Myanmar, Untouchables in India, or Tibetans in China, the poverty plight of minorities is as serious as that of indigenous peoples.

Poor Countries Finally, it should be noted that the poor come from poor countries. Although this may seem like a trivial observation, it is actually a useful note of optimism. The negative relationship between poverty and per capita income suggests that if higher incomes can be achieved, poverty will be reduced, if only because of the greater resources that countries will have available to tackle poverty problems and the growth of civil society and the voluntary sector. Unfortunately, as noted earlier, a high level of absolute poverty can also retard a country’s growth prospects. Moreover, many of the poorest countries in sub-Saharan Africa experienced outright declines in per capita income throughout the 1980s and 1990s and in some cases during the first decade of this century. Among those that are growing, at current growth rates it would take decades to reach the levels of income at which poverty tends to be eradicated. After all, Brazil, which has been solidly middle-income for decades, still has 8% of its population living on less than $1.25 per day. Income poverty, malnutrition, low school attendance, and child labor in Brazil finally showed a substantial decline after the turn of this century, when antipoverty and social safety net programs were greatly expanded (see the case study at the end of Chapter 1). We can conclude that higher national incomes greatly facilitate poverty reduction, while at the same time, poverty still needs to be addressed directly.

5.5 Policy Options on Income Inequality and Poverty: Some Basic Considerations

Areas of Intervention

Developing countries that aim to reduce poverty and excessive inequalities in their distribution of income need to know how best to achieve their aim. What kinds of economic and other policies might governments in developing...
countries adopt to reduce poverty and inequality while maintaining or even accelerating economic growth rates? As we are concerned here with moderating the size distribution of incomes in general and raising the income levels of people living in poverty, it is important to understand the various determinants of the distribution of income in an economy and see in what ways government intervention can alter or modify their effect. The main focus of this section is on the relationship between income inequality and poverty. We examine the effects of policies and programs involving nonincome aspects of poverty in the subsequent chapters in Part Two—particularly with respect to health, nutrition, and education in Chapter 8.

We can identify four broad areas of possible government policy intervention, which correspond to the following four major elements in the determination of a developing economy’s distribution of income.

1. **Altering the functional distribution**—the returns to labor, land, and capital as determined by factor prices, utilization levels, and the consequent shares of national income that accrue to the owners of each factor.

2. **Mitigating the size distribution**—the functional income distribution of an economy translated into a size distribution by knowledge of how ownership and control over productive assets and labor skills are concentrated and distributed throughout the population. The distribution of these asset holdings and skill endowments ultimately determines the distribution of personal income.

3. **Moderating (reducing) the size distribution at the upper levels** through progressive taxation of personal income and wealth. Such taxation increases government revenues that decrease the share of disposable income of the very rich—revenues that can, with good policies, be invested in human capital and rural and other lagging infrastructure needs, thereby promoting inclusive growth. (An individual or family’s **disposable income** is the actual amount available for expenditure on goods and services and for saving.)

4. **Moderating (increasing) the size distribution at the lower levels** through public expenditures of tax revenues to raise the incomes of the poor either directly (e.g., by conditional or unconditional cash transfers) or indirectly (e.g., through public employment creation such as local infrastructure projects or the provision of primary education and health care). Such public policies raise the real income levels of the poor above what their personal income levels would otherwise be, and, as will become clear in later chapters, can do so sustainably when they build the capabilities and assets of people living in poverty.

### Altering the Functional Distribution of Income through Relative Factor Prices

Altering the functional distribution is a traditional economic approach. It is argued that as a result of institutional constraints and faulty government policies, the relative price of labor in the formal, modern, urban sector is higher than what would be determined by the free interplay of the forces of supply and demand. For example, the power of trade unions to raise minimum wages...
to artificially high levels (higher than those that would result from supply and demand) even in the face of widespread unemployment is often cited as an example of the “distorted” price of labor. From this it is argued that measures designed to reduce the price of labor relative to capital (e.g., through market-determined wages in the public sector or public wage subsidies to employers) will cause employers to substitute labor for capital in their production activities. Such factor substitution increases the overall level of employment and ultimately raises the incomes of the poor, who have been excluded from modern-sector employment and typically possess only their labor services. Put differently, artificially increased modern-sector wages reduce the rate of modern-sector enlargement growth, thus harming the poor. (For details of this analysis, see Appendix 5.1.)

However, in recent years, some scholars and practitioners, particularly from the developing world, argue that the impact of minimum wages on poverty is more nuanced in theory and practice, particularly when the possibility of income sharing among the poor is accounted for. In India, the Self-Employed Women’s Association argues that minimum wages have beneficial effects even on informal-sector workers. And research by Darryl McLeod and Nora Lustig concludes that higher minimum wages are correlated with reductions in poverty. Thus actual impacts may vary, depending on local circumstances. These qualifications are particularly relevant for relatively low-skill and informal activities, such as garment stitching, beedi-rolling and incense rolling, in which workers have commonly held very low bargaining power, often due to monopsony, if not extramarket forces.

In addition, often the price of capital equipment is “institutionally” set at artificially low levels (below what supply and demand would dictate) through various public policies such as investment incentives, tax allowances, subsidized interest rates, overvalued exchange rates, and low tariffs on capital goods imports such as tractors and automated equipment relative to tariffs set on consumer goods. If these special privileges and capital subsidies were removed so that the price of capital would rise to its true “scarcity” level, producers would have a further incentive to increase their utilization of the abundant supply of labor and lower their uses of scarce capital. Moreover, owners of capital (both physical and financial) would not receive the artificially high economic returns they now enjoy.

Because factor prices are assumed to function as the ultimate signals and incentives in any economy, correcting these prices (i.e., lowering the relative price of labor and raising the relative price of capital) would not in general only increase productivity and efficiency but also reduce inequality by providing more wage-paying jobs for currently unemployed or underemployed unskilled and semiskilled workers. It would also lower the artificially high incomes of owners of capital. Removal of such factor-price distortions would therefore go a long way toward combining more growth, efficiently generated, with higher employment, less poverty, and greater equality (a more detailed analysis is presented in Appendix 5.1).

We may conclude that there is much merit to the traditional factor-price distortion argument and that correcting prices should contribute to a reduction in poverty and an improved distribution of income. How much it actually contributes will depend on the degree to which firms and farms switch to
more labor-intensive production methods as the relative price of labor falls and the relative price of capital rises. These are important empirical questions, the answers to which will vary from country to country. Moreover, recent research would suggest that a close study of local conditions is needed before concluding that all minimum wages cause increases in poverty in all circumstances.

Modifying the Size Distribution through Increasing Assets of the Poor

Given correct resource prices and utilization levels for each type of productive factor (labor, land, and capital), we can arrive at estimates for the total earnings of each asset. But to translate this functional income into personal income, we need to know the distribution and ownership concentration of these assets among and within various segments of the population. Here we come to what is probably the most important fact about the determination of income distribution within an economy: The ultimate cause of the unequal distribution of personal incomes in most developing countries is the unequal and highly concentrated patterns of asset ownership (wealth) in these countries. The principal reasons why 20% of their population often receives over 50% of the national income (see Table 5.3) is that this 20% probably owns and controls well over 90% of the productive and financial resources, especially physical capital and land but also financial capital (stocks and bonds) and human capital in the form of better education and health. Correcting factor prices is certainly not sufficient to reduce income inequalities substantially or to eliminate widespread poverty where physical and financial asset ownership—and education—is highly concentrated.

It follows that the second and perhaps more important line of policy to reduce poverty and inequality is to focus directly on reducing the concentrated control of assets, the unequal distribution of power, and the unequal access to educational and income-earning opportunities that characterize many developing countries. A classic case of such redistribution policies as they relate to the rural poor, who comprise 70% to 80% of the target poverty group, is land reform. The basic purpose of land reform is to transform tenant cultivators into smallholders who will then have an incentive to raise production and improve their incomes. But as we explain in Chapter 9, land reform may be a weak instrument of income redistribution if other institutional and price distortions in the economic system prevent small farm holders from securing access to much needed critical inputs such as credit, fertilizers, seeds, marketing facilities, and agricultural education. Similar reforms in urban areas could include the provision of commercial credit at affordable rates (rather than through traditional, high-interest moneylenders) to small entrepreneurs (microcredit—for details, see Chapter 15 and the case study on the Grameen Bank at the end of that chapter) so that they can expand their business and provide more jobs to local workers.

In addition to the redistribution of existing productive assets, dynamic redistribution policies could be gradually pursued. For example, governments at least in developing countries that are growing could facilitate the transfer of a certain proportion of annual savings and investments to low-income groups
so as to bring about a more gradual and perhaps politically more acceptable redistribution of additional assets as they accumulate over time. This is what is often meant by the expression “redistribution from growth.” Whether such a gradual redistribution from growth is any more possible than a redistribution of existing assets is a moot point, especially in the context of very unequal power structures. But some form of asset redistribution, whether static or dynamic, seems to be a necessary condition for any significant reduction of poverty and inequality in most developing countries.

Human capital in the form of education and skills is another example of the unequal distribution of productive asset ownership. Public policy should therefore promote wider access to educational opportunities (for girls as well as boys) as a means of increasing income-earning potential for more people. But as in the case of land reform, the mere provision of greater access to additional education is no guarantee that the poor will be better off unless complementary policies—for example, the provision of more productive employment opportunities for the educated—are adopted to capitalize on this increased human capital. The relationship among education, employment, and development is discussed further in Chapter 8.

People living in poverty tend to have common problems, but the prevalent forms of deprivation and social exclusion can differ considerably even across regions within a country. Policymakers need to have a strong knowledge base. Essential to the process is a means to find out and utilize what the poor know about their own conditions of poverty. Practitioners stress that the more that people living in poverty are engaged in setting the agenda, the more effective programs to increase their assets and capabilities tend to be. But attention must be given to different segments of the local poor communities, as different priorities are often found between men and women, between ethnic groups, and between castes.

**Progressive Income and Wealth Taxes**

Any national policy attempting to improve the living standards of the bottom 40% must secure sufficient financial resources to transform paper plans into program realities. The major source of such development finance is the direct and progressive taxation of both income and wealth. Direct **progressive income taxes** focus on personal and corporate incomes, with the rich required to pay a progressively larger percentage of their total income in taxes than the poor. Taxation on wealth (the stock of accumulated assets and income) typically involves personal and corporate property taxes but may also include progressive inheritance taxes. In either case, the burden of the tax is designed to fall most heavily on the upper-income groups.

In reality in many developing countries (and some developed countries), the gap between what is supposed to be a progressive tax structure and what different income groups actually pay can be substantial. Progressive tax structures on paper often turn out to be **regressive taxes** in practice, in that the lower- and middle-income groups often end up paying a proportionally larger share of their incomes in taxes than the upper-income groups. The reasons for this are simple. The poor are often taxed at the source of their incomes or expenditures (by withholding taxes from wages, general poll taxes, or **indirect taxes**...
levied on the retail purchase of goods such as cigarettes and beer). By contrast, the rich derive by far the largest part of their incomes from the return on physical and financial assets, which often go unreported. They often also have the power and ability to avoid paying taxes without fear of government reprisal. Policies to enforce progressive rates of direct taxation on income and wealth, especially at the highest levels, are what are most needed in this area of redistribution activity. (See Chapter 15 for a further discussion of taxation for development.)

**Direct Transfer Payments and the Public Provision of Goods and Services**

The direct provision of tax-financed **public consumption** goods and services to the very poor is another potentially important instrument of a comprehensive policy designed to eradicate poverty. Examples include public health projects in rural villages and urban fringe areas, school lunches and preschool nutritional supplementation programs, and the provision of clean water and electrification to remote rural areas. Direct money transfers and subsidized food programs for the urban and rural poor, as well as direct government policies to keep the prices of essential foodstuffs low, represent additional forms of public consumption **subsidies**.

Direct transfers and subsidies can be highly effective, but they need to be designed carefully. Four significant problems require attention. First, when resources for attacking poverty are limited—as they always are—they need to be directed to people who are genuinely poor. Second, it is important that beneficiaries not become unduly dependent on the poverty program; in particular, we do not want to give the poor less incentive to build the assets, such as education, that can enable them to stay out of poverty. But a “safety net” can also be valuable to encourage the poor to accept a more entrepreneurial attitude toward their microenterprises. This is much more possible when the poor do not fear that their children will suffer terrible consequences if their small businesses fail. Third, we do not want to divert people who are productively engaged in alternative economic activities to participate in the poverty program instead. Finally, poverty policies are often limited by resentment from the nonpoor, including those who are working hard but are not very far above the poverty line themselves.

When a subsidy of goods consumed by the poor is planned, it should be targeted to the geographic areas where the poor are found and should emphasize goods that nonpoor people do not consume. This helps conserve resources for the program and minimizes efforts by nonpoor people to benefit from the program. For example, nutritional supplements can be provided for any woman who brings her baby to the neighborhood poverty program center located in villages and neighborhoods with a high incidence of absolute poverty. Although more affluent mothers could use the program, few would risk the stigma of venturing into the poorer villages and neighborhoods, let alone the center itself. The nutritional supplements help poor mothers and their small children stay healthy and thus help break the cycle of poverty.

In addition, it may be useful to impose a work requirement before food aid is provided. This is done in the well-known Bangladesh Food for Work Program.
and in the Maharashtra Employment Guarantee Scheme in India. More recently, the government of India has introduced a nationwide scheme to guarantee 100 days of employment to at least one family member each year; early reports suggest that the program has provided substantial benefits. In programs such as these, the poor are put to work building infrastructure, such as roads from outlying areas (where the poor live) to market towns, that will ultimately benefit the poor and others in the region. Although the administrative costs are generally higher and the skills of the workers significantly lower than would be the case with a commercially procured construction contract, in many cases these valuable infrastructure projects would never be tackled at all in the absence of the program. The high work requirement and very modest payment discourage the nonpoor from participating, thus conserving resources. This characteristic is known as the “screening” function of workfare programs. These requirements also help preserve the program’s political sustainability: When people see that the poor are getting “a hand up rather than a handout,” the programs tend to attract wider public support.

In sum, we can say that workfare, such as the Food for Work Program, represents a better policy than welfare or direct handouts when the following criteria are met:

• The program does not reduce or seriously undermine incentives for the poor to acquire human capital and other assets.

• There are greater net benefits of the work output of the program.

• It is harder to screen the poor without the workfare requirement.

• There is lower opportunity cost of time for poor workers (so the economy loses little output when they join the workfare program).

• There is higher opportunity cost of time for nonpoor workers (so they won’t avail themselves of the benefits).

• The fraction of the population living in poverty is smaller (so the extra costs of a universal welfare scheme would be high).

• There is less social stigma attached to participating in a workfare program, so that the poor do not suffer undue humiliation or even be deterred from seeking the help that their families need (otherwise, a discreet welfare transfer may be preferable to a highly visible workfare scheme).39

The poor often have low bargaining power in their communities and while it is difficult politically to increase this power, well-designed programs can accomplish this indirectly by providing improved “outside options” such as guaranteed public employment programs when they are needed.

We will be continuing our examination of policies for poverty reduction throughout the remainder of this text. Appropriate agricultural development policies represent a crucial strategy for attacking poverty because such a high fraction of the poor are located in rural areas and engaged in agricultural pursuits. Strategies for agricultural development are examined in Chapter 9. In addition, the poor in urban as well as rural areas suffer from degraded environmental conditions, which lowers opportunities for economic growth.
and also worsens the health of the poor; these problems are examined in Chapter 10.

Another set of viable policies involve targeted poverty programs to increase the capabilities and human and social capital of the poor. An important example centers on helping the poor develop their microenterprises, on which a large fraction of the nonagricultural poor depend for their survival. It has been found that credit is the binding constraint for many of these tiny firms. By building up the working capital and other assets of microenterprises, the poor can improve their productivity and incomes. The microfinance strategy for accomplishing this goal, as exemplified by the Grameen Bank of Bangladesh, is examined in Chapter 15. In addition, relatively new approaches to attacking poverty focus on an integrated approach to achieving higher incomes together with improved education, health, and nutrition among the poor, notably, conditional cash transfer (CCT) programs that transfer incomes to poor families conditional on behaviors such as keeping their children in school; these approaches are considered in Chapter 8 and its case study. Finally, strategies to assist the development of the urban informal sector are examined in Chapter 7.

5.6 Summary and Conclusions: The Need for a Package of Policies

To summarize our discussion of alternative policy approaches to the problems of poverty and inequality in development, the need is not for one or two isolated policies but for a “package” of complementary and supportive policies, including the following four basic elements.40

1. A policy or set of policies designed to correct factor price distortions (underpricing capital or overpricing modern-sector skilled wages) so as to ensure that market or institutionally established prices provide accurate signals and incentives to both producers and resource suppliers. Correcting distorted prices should contribute to greater productive efficiency, more employment, and less poverty. The promotion of indigenous technological research and development of efficient, labor-intensive methods of production may also be valuable. (For a further analysis of factor price distortions see Appendix 5.1.)

2. A policy or set of policies designed to bring about far-reaching structural changes in the distribution of assets, power, and access to education and associated income-earning (employment) opportunities. Such policies go beyond the realm of markets and touch on the whole social, institutional, cultural, and political fabric of the developing world. But such fundamental structural changes and substantive asset redistributions, whether immediately achieved (e.g., through public-sector interventions) or gradually introduced over time (through redistribution from growth), will increase the chances of improving significantly the living conditions of the masses of rural and urban poor.

3. A policy or set of policies designed to modify the size distribution of income at the upper levels through the enforcement of legislated progressive
taxation on incomes and wealth and at the lower levels through direct transfer payments and the expanded provision of publicly provided consumption goods and services, including workfare programs. The net effect is to create a social “safety net” for people who may be bypassed by the development process.

4. A set of targeted policies to directly improve the well-being of the poor and their communities, that goes beyond safety net schemes, to offer programs that build capabilities and human and social capital of the poor, such as microfinance, health, education, agricultural development, environmental sustainability, and community development and empowerment programs, as described throughout this text. These can be carried out either by government or by nongovernmental organizations through local and international support.

While providing a focus on ending extreme poverty and mitigating harmful inequality, such policies can be designed to encourage and accelerate inclusive economic growth targeted at the poor, while keeping in mind the inherently multidimensional nature of poverty. Key examples include growth-supporting investments in education, nutrition, health, and infrastructure that raise the incomes of those in the bottom deciles of the income distribution. Chapters 2 through 4 considered the sources of economic growth and basic policies to identify constraints and maintain growth that benefits people living in poverty. Additional supporting trade, macro, and financial policies are examined in more detail in Chapters 13 through 15. But when it is not inclusive, growth by itself is insufficient to eliminate extreme poverty, at least in any time frame that a nation—let alone people living in poverty—would find acceptable. So encouragement of inclusive growth goes hand in hand with active policies and programs to reduce poverty and to prevent nonpoor people from falling into poverty.

Though the task of ending extreme poverty will be difficult, it is possible, if we can only muster the will. As noted by James Speth, the executive director of the United Nations Development Program, “Poverty is no longer inevitable. The world has the material and natural resources, the know-how and the people to make a poverty-free world a reality in less than a generation. This is not woolly idealism but a practical and achieveable goal.”

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Case Study 5

Institutions, Inequality, and Incomes: Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire

Ghana’s development has exceeded expectations—at least after many disappointments. Côte d’Ivoire (CIV) started with many apparent advantages, but on many economic measures, Ghana has closed the development gap that existed between itself and CIV at independence.

It is recommended to read Chapters 2 and 5 in conjunction with this case. These country illustrations provide further interpretation of the more general research discussed in those chapters.

A Natural Comparative Case Study
Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire (CIV) border each other in West Africa. Their land area is similar in size at 92,456 square miles (239,450 km²) and 124,502 square miles (322,458 km²), respectively. Their populations are also similar, with 23.8 million people in Ghana and 21.4 million in Côte d’Ivoire in 2009. Becoming independent within three years of each other and also sharing similar geographies, these adjoining countries make for a natural comparison. One of the most striking differences is that Ghana was part of the British Empire from 1821 to 1957, and Côte d’Ivoire was a French colony from 1842 until 1960. (Note however that full colonial rule took a long time to become established throughout the territories of these countries; the French were still fighting to extend their presence into the early years of the twentieth century.)

How did these colonial histories matter? Did their influences extend after independence, affecting later development policies for good or ill? Or have other, internal factors been more decisive? Can this help us to better understand why it is so challenging to sustain high growth, eliminate poverty and hunger, and to achieve the other Millennium Development Goals?

The experiences of a half century after independence illustrate some of the opportunities for and threats to development. This case study raises thought-provoking questions and presents the types of information one would weigh in addressing this and other comparative country studies. This case illustrates how the frameworks and many-country statistical studies of Chapters 2 and 5 can be applied to understanding development experiences in comparative perspective. The richness of culture and nuances of complex political histories are abstracted to feature some broad approaches and findings in development economics in a short space. Readers are encouraged to explore these leading African nations in detail.

Poverty and Human Development
As reported in the UNDP’s 2009 Human Development Report, Ghana is considered a medium human development country, with an HDI of 0.526, while Côte d’Ivoire is considered a low human development country with an HDI of 0.484. In the 1990 report, when the HDI was introduced, the numbers were 0.393 for CIV and 0.360 for Ghana. Both made progress, but Ghana much more so. On the new HDI introduced in the 2010 report CIV ranks 149th (at 0.397), while Ghana ranks 130th (at 0.467). And the 2009 HDR Human Poverty Index (see note 11) for Côte d’Ivoire was 0.374, ranking 29 places lower in the country rankings based on human poverty than income poverty (the fraction under $1.25 per day). This suggested that what the UNDP termed human poverty is relatively worse in CIV than even its income poverty would
suggest. Ghana’s HPI was significantly better, at 0.281 (with its ranking as predicted by its income poverty).

The UNDP’s new Multidimensional Poverty Measure Index (MPI) is even more revealing. Ghana’s MPI is 0.140, giving it a ranking of 57, which is the same country ranking that Ghana holds on the fraction of population living on less than $1.25 a day. In contrast, CIV’s MPI rank is much lower at 78 with a value of 0.320—more than double the level of Ghana—and substantially worse than predicted by CIV’s income poverty ranking. CIV is about halfway between the best performer (Slovakia and Slovenia at 0.000) and the worst performer (Nigeria at 0.642); but Ghana’s score is well under a quarter of the way from no poverty to the poverty level of Niger.

These outcomes would have surprised many who wrote at the time of independence. In 1960, Ghana had a real GDP per capita of just $594, far behind Côte d’Ivoire’s $1,675; but in 2007 according to the Penn World Table, Ghana had reached $1,653—a gain of 278% and nearly enough to close its original deficit—while CIV increased to $2,228, a modest gain of just 33% after 47 years. Ghana has reached current parity with CIV on life expectancy; in 1960, life expectancy in CIV was 51 to Ghana’s 46; but in 2007, each had a life expectancy of 57. In 2008, under-5 mortality was 114 in CIV and a still high but significantly lower 76 in Ghana. Aysit Tansel shows that by 1987, Ghana was well ahead of CIV in mean years of schooling by each gender and across age groups. Today the adult literacy rate is 65.0% in Ghana versus 48.7% in CIV. Highly credible information on the extent of extreme poverty in these countries is difficult to find, but it is not doubted that at the time of independence, poverty was far higher in Ghana. Using 1987 surveys, the World Bank put dollar-a-day poverty at just 3.28% in CIV that year but 46.51% in Ghana; as of 2010, its most recent comparable figure for Ghana (from a 1998 study) is 36% and for CIV (2002) is 16%. It appears that over time, poverty has fallen in Ghana and risen in CIV. Progress in both countries is small in comparison to East Asia; but the differences between these countries are significant. How can we begin to understand such differences? Sometimes even recent changes in the patterns of development can have long historical roots, and we consider this first.

**Factors in Comparative Development**

**The Colonial Impact and the Legacy of Institutions**

The Portuguese built a fortress on the coast of Ghana in 1482 and named it Elmina (“The Mine”). Later, the British named this area the Gold Coast, as it was known until independence in 1957. Côte d’Ivoire (Ivory Coast) received its name from the French. These names apparently reflect how the colonial powers viewed the territories: as “coasts” rather than nations; as commodities for trade rather than people, or simply as a mine. The colonialists’ priority of resources over people could not have been more obvious. Ghana suffered earlier and more from the impact of the slave trade. But Côte d’Ivoire also suffered ill treatment, including a brutal campaign by the French to subdue the “interior” in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and impose forced labor. How do we understand this terrible colonial experience and its possible aftermath? Settler mortality was stunningly high in these two countries, each with an estimated 668 deaths per 1,000 per year, among the highest in the study of Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (AJR); for comparison, the rate was just 15.5 in South Africa.* (Conclusions of research cited here are based on multi-country statistical analysis not on case studies; we are taking such research as a starting point for issues to consider when conducting more in-depth comparative case studies).

**Institutional Quality**

The expectation is that inherited institutions should be particularly bad in these two countries because colonialists would have had little incentive to protect property rights, encourage investment, or allow broad access to economic opportunities or political participation; instead, in stark terms, the incentive was to steal or have others steal for you.

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*According to the AJR dataset, which is based on the work of the historian Philip Curtin, the other highest-mortality colonies were Togo, Gambia, Mali, and Nigeria. By contrast, the death rate was just 14.9 in Hong Kong, and 17.7 in Malaysia and Singapore. (Settler mortality is well-established as an instrument for early institutions, and we examine two countries with identical settler mortalities giving attention to additional elements.) Some observers view CIV as having a more dependent relationship with France, while Ghana diversified more its international relations.
In their data for current institutional quality, the “average protection against expropriate risk” was 6.27 in Ghana and 7.00 in CIV, compared to a range from 3.50 in the Democratic Republic of Congo (known as Zaire at the time) to 10.00 in the United States—better, though not spectacularly better, investor protection. But a range of recent studies give higher marks to Ghana. Although all-country rankings of institutional quality should be used with caution, as they can contain subjective elements; when a group of independently produced indicators with different focuses all point in the same direction, they become suggestive (though still never substituting for careful country-specific appraisal). Regarding corruption perceptions, according to Transparency International, Ghana ranked 69th and CIV 154th out of 180. Regarding “ease of doing business,” the World Bank–International Finance Corporation 2010 rankings of 183 countries listed Ghana as 92nd (7th in sub-Saharan Africa) and CIV as 168th (32nd in the region). Regarding democracy, the Economist listed Ghana (ranked 94th of 167) as a mixed system and CIV (ranked 134th) as authoritarian. And on current property rights protections, a ranking sponsored by the Wall Street Journal and Heritage Foundation placed Ghana 50 on a scale of 100 and CIV just 30. Critics point out limits and flaws of these sources, but they are consistent and do conform to a common observation that institutional quality has gotten worse in CIV and improved in Ghana. So this, too, must be better understood. Is it because things had gotten so bad in Ghana that reform became the only option?

Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization Another feature associated in the economics literature with low incomes and growth is ethnolinguistic fractionalization, with some social scientists also pointing out the potential dangers of religious fractionalization. In fact, both countries are fairly highly fractionalized, but CIV more so. Both countries have an Akan majority (45% in Ghana and 42% in CIV) and many smaller groups. In Ghana, the population is 69% Christian and 16% Muslim, but in CIV, adherents are much more evenly divided, with 39% Muslim and 33% Christian. Although scholars debate the proper way to measure fractionalization, seven main measures are used, with CIV higher on six, in some cases substantially higher. CIV was torn by civil war in 2002 that has split the country, and the opportunistic use of fractionalization by political figures is an important factor.

Population Patterns of population growth are often considered an important aspect of development as discussed in Chapter 6. At independence in 1960, the population of CIV was just 3.6 million, so it grew about 5½ times by 2007. In contrast, Ghana’s population was already nearly 7 million in 1960, so it grew by less than 3½ times in the same period. Even now, the total fertility rate is a high 4.0 in Ghana but significantly higher at 4.9 in CIV, with one extra birth per woman. While just 8% of married women of childbearing age use modern contraceptives in CIV, 17% do in Ghana—still a small fraction but more than twice the incidence of CIV (the gap remains, at 24% to 13%, when considering both traditional and modern methods). High birth rates generally hinder economic development. Faster population growth is associated with slower per capita income growth and slower improvement in other development indicators; lower fertility increases family incentives and resources for education. But the geographic distribution of population does not seem to have particularly strong political implications. For example, Jeffrey Herbst classifies both Ghana and CIV as among just 7 of 40 sub-Saharan African countries with a “neutral political geography.”

Extreme Inequality As explained in Chapter 5 (and introduced in Chapter 2), extreme inequality can retard the development process. The World Bank estimates that in 1987, the Gini was .354 in Ghana and .404 in CIV. By 2002, the Gini in CIV was estimated at .484, a substantial rise, and .408 in Ghana, a significant though more modest rise. As

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†For example, according to the 1997 basic Easterly-Levine (ELF) measure, CIV was rated 0.86 and Ghana 0.71, with the range in Africa from a low of 0.04 for Burundi to 0.9 for Congo and Uganda. On the widely cited 2003 Alesina et al. alternative measure, CIV is 0.82 and Ghana 0.67 in a range from 0. to 0.93. These are the usual baseline measures used by development economists, but the one measure of the seven points in the other direction: the 1999 measure of Fearon, on which CIV is 0.78 and Ghana 0.85.
Frances Stewart wrote, inequalities—economic, social, and political—can make nations vulnerable to severe conflict when they coincide with ethnic or “cultural” differences, in which case “culture could become a powerful mobilizing agent that can lead to a range of political disturbances” (see Chapter 14). Arnim Langer points out that the combination of relatively high and rising inequality in CIV coupled with rising ethnic tensions (that political actors had deliberately made worse) led to the conflict that broke out there in the early 2000s.

Common Law versus Civil Law? As a former British colony, Ghana’s legal system is based on common law, while the legal system in Côte d’Ivoire is based on French civil law. Since the late 1990s, the view that common law legal systems provide a better foundation than civil law systems for the development of the financial system has been very influential. Authors in this literature such as Rafael La Porta and his colleagues argue either that common law better protects property rights, better enforces contracts, offers more predictability, or that it is better able to adapt to changes in economic conditions. Investment is generally necessary for economic growth (Chapters 3 and 4), and the development of an effective financial system encourages investment (Chapter 15). Some evidence supports the prediction that civil law countries will experience less financial development and lower rates of investment. But differences between French and British institutions besides the legal system may be important.

French versus British Rule? The British Empire is commonly considered to have preferred indirect rule, relying on its ability to dominate local traditional political systems rather than to create new ones (possibly related to common law tradition). In contrast, the French are said to have tended to employ direct rule of their colonies, introducing their own centralized administrative structures, perhaps related to their own legal and historical traditions. Tactics might well have been similar regardless of the colonizer if conditions strongly favored central rule or indirect rule. But where starting conditions were similar in both colonies and when local advantages of either centralization or decentralization are not strong, a centralized French strategy and a decentralized British strategy may plausibly be expected.

The evidence does reflect a more decentralized rule in British Ghana and more centralized rule in French Côte d’Ivoire. But if centralized rule is then transmitted to the postcolonial regime, the result can be a state with too few checks and balances. Decentralized rule, in contrast, provides better incentives and checks against large-scale government corruption (see Chapter 11). The postcolonial record is complex but shows continued strong tendencies toward centralization in CIV, although the aftermath of civil strife increases uncertainty about the future course (indeed there is some risk that CIV may face a prolonged period as a failed state). As Catherine Boone notes in her richly detailed study of both countries, the case of Ghana is subtle with initial but far from fully successful postcolonial government attempts at more centralization, probably in part to wrest a larger share of agricultural revenues, but in 1992 there was a reinstatement of at least a ceremonial role—and unofficially a much larger role—for chiefs and other traditional village governance. This built on long traditions that were not systematically undermined under the British the way they were under the French.

Education Some scholars consider education of central importance in explaining economic growth; Edward Glaeser and coauthors even argue that improved education can result in improved institutions. Educational attainment was abysmal in both nations at the time of independence. One of the most striking postcolonial differences between the countries is the higher level of educational attainment in Ghana, where there have been greater investments in education. In early years after independence there was strong policy attention to providing basic education in some of the poorer areas in Ghana. In 2010, according to UNDP statistics the mean years of schooling was more than twice as high in Ghana (at 7.1), than in CIV (at 3.3). Education is intrinsically valuable as reflected in the HDI; it has apparently been a factor in faster growth and may even figure in later institutional improvements. Ghana has also had recent success scaling up basic health insurance.
Development Policies

Policies in Ghana  Both nations started as (and still are) largely agrarian economies, with over half of the labor force working in rural areas. But the two countries have had somewhat different policy trajectories. The general scholarly view is that in the first quarter century after independence, Ghana chose many poorly conceived and often corrupt interventionist policies. Early policies have been described as oriented toward urban industry, with import substitution to replace manufactured imports with locally produced ones (see Chapter 12). One policy associated with the early rule of Kwame Nkrumah through 1966 was an emphasis on basic education, which may have left an enduring legacy through difficult subsequent swings. After disastrous policies and extreme instability including coups in the mid-1960s to early 1980s, Ghana underwent a policy transformation to become a favorite country of liberalization promoters in the World Bank and elsewhere in the 1980s. A reason given for large-scale reform in Ghana (and in explaining other countries as well) is that things got so bad that there became no choice but to embrace reform; naturally, when according to local conditions things become so bad that continued resistance to change is futile, something changes—perhaps not always for the better. Ghana became a classic example for proponents of the controversial view that duress “causes” reform. A criticism, to paraphrase Dani Rodrik, is that it is not clear how much duress is enough to “cause” reform; and as a result, it is not very convincing when analysts simply claim that a reform did not happen because the situation must not have been bad enough. By the early 1990s, World Bank analysts such as Ishrat Husain were pointing to Ghana as a country that had been doing a better job at following and implementing more of its recommended market-friendly policies than countries such as Côte d’Ivoire.

The development process is complex and rarely proceeds linearly. In Ghana, there was relative deterioration from independence until the early 1980s; much of its economic growth took place from the mid 1980s to the present. For example, cocoa had long been an important part of Ghana’s economy, but it went into decline when state marketing boards (described in Chapter 9) limited the price farmers received for cocoa, so as to subsidize industrialization. After farmers were allowed to receive a much higher price, and technical assistance was offered, output greatly increased particularly in two spurts in the late 1980s and early 2000s. Fertilizer use and improved varieties have diffused among farmers (diffusion in Ghana for the case of pineapples is examined in Findings Box 9.1 in Chapter 9). Cocoa growing now provides a basic livelihood for over 700,000 farmers in Ghana.

In contrast, CIV experienced relatively faster growth in the 1960s and 1970s and then decline from 1980 to present (recently more pronounced due to civil conflict). Institutions that appear to perform serviceably for two decades can have underlying weaknesses that later emerge—for example politicians treat weaknesses as a political opportunity or the system proves to have too little flexibility as new challenges emerge.

Policies in Côte d’Ivoire  CIV, in contrast, is widely viewed as having started down a more market-based, export-oriented path in a way that should have helped the rural agricultural sector, where most of the population and most people living in poverty were located. But this did not prevent elites from extracting what they could from the rural areas. In fact, there were a number of policy lurches. An apparently favorable tactic may have been an early policy of effectively trying to keep all the ethnic groups engaged in and benefiting from growth in the national economy. There were large migrations into CIV, for example, including the forced labor brought into CIV from Burkina Faso (Upper Volta) by the French in the early 1940s. A more ethnically based politics in the late 1990s is viewed by specialists in the politics of CIV as helping precipitate the disaster of regional and ethnic conflict in the 2000s. Besides colonial rule having strongly negative effects, close Côte d’Ivoire dependence on one nation (France) may have been a hindrance to its growth and economic and political development over the long run. For Ghana, diversification of foreign relationships is one of the candidates for explaining its relative success.

Enduring Questions  By 1990, Ghana was already being deemed a “success story” by the World Bank and others. Is it because the nation followed the right policies? But even if so, what explains why Ghana chose good policies and CIV did not? CIV
fell into a period of severe conflict in 2002–2007; many lives were lost, and resources continue to be diverted into managing the problems, with perceptions of prospects still damaged. French military involvement reflected France’s ongoing unique relationship with CIV. In contrast, Ghana has so far remained stable. Why? And can it continue to remain stable? It remains to be seen how well Ghana comes through its recent discovery and production of oil. In principle, new resources can help reduce poverty, directly and indirectly. But for many countries, a “resource curse” has resulted from political conflict over resource revenues, and an overspecialized or even “hollowed out” economy (see Chapter 14).

Business scholars emphasize company leadership. Have leadership differences mattered for development of these countries? Socialist Kwame Nkrumah constructively supported education but diverted resources from cocoa exports to local industry, leading to economic disaster; under duress, socialist Jerry Rawlings embraced market-oriented policy reforms that led to short-term pain but long-term gain. Subsequent leaders have been pragmatic and at least done relatively little harm and perhaps some good. CIV’s capitalist President Felix Houphouet-Boigny, backed by France (“Françafrique”), seemed early on to be leading his country to economic success but stole billions from the public purse and led the country to ruin while clinging to power for 33 years until his death in 1993. Subsequent leadership has impressed few observers. Of course extraordinary leadership in government or of civil society can play a decisive role in the course of development—think of Nelson Mandela in South Africa, or Muhammad Yunus in Bangladesh. But in ordinary experience, is leadership the key, or is it underlying institutions? Or popular movements? Education? Imported ideas and technology? These remain enduring questions, and answers may depend on local circumstances.

As an examination of just two countries to illustrate more general evidence in the literature, it cannot be concluded beyond doubt that institutions set up by Britain in Ghana and France in Côte d’Ivoire had a dominant effect on the successes and failures of these nations in subsequent poverty reduction and economic growth. But there is support for factors identified in the large-sample statistical studies introduced in Chapter 2, notably institutions, inequality, and at least indirectly education. Colonial institutions apparently had negative effects, and within colonization the degree of decentralization under colonial rule apparently also mattered. The reemergence of more decentralized governance in Ghana since 1992 may be related to less damaging British governance practices in this respect. At the same time, history was not destiny; Ghana has made progress not well predicted by instruments for colonial institutions. Nor are things necessarily bleak for CIV. Institutions and inequality are highly resistant to change. But the global trend is toward continued progress on human development, and other African nations such as Rwanda have made enormous economic strides that were very difficult to imagine just a few years earlier. Meanwhile, the standoff following contaminated presidential elections in 2010 confirmed that institutions remained weak in CIV. The optimistic reading was that this time the international community could play a constructive role in facilitating improvements in the underlying institutions.

Sources

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CHAPTER 5  Poverty, Inequality, and Development

Concepts for Review

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Questions for Discussion

1. Most development economists now seem to agree that the level and rate of growth of GNI and per capita income do not provide sufficient measures of a country’s development. What is the essence of their argument? Give some examples.

2. Distinguish between size and functional distributions of income in a nation. Which do you conclude is the more appropriate concept? Explain your answer.

3. What is meant by absolute poverty? What measures of income poverty are favored by development economists? How do these measures differ from the UNDP’s Multidimensional Poverty Index? Why should we be concerned with the measurement of poverty in developing nations?

4. What are the principal economic characteristics of high-poverty groups? What do these characteristics tell us about the possible nature of a poverty-focused development strategy?

5. Describe Kuznets’s inverted-U hypothesis. Discuss the conceptual merits and limitations of this hypothesis for contemporary developing countries.

6. In the text, when we examined statistics from a wide range of developing countries. We found that growth does not guarantee poverty reduction; while higher income is clearly associated with less poverty, economies can even reach upper-middle-income status but continue to struggle with a quite high incidence of extreme poverty. What does this tell us about the importance of the character of a nation’s growth process and about its institutional structure?

7. What is the relationship between a Lorenz curve and a Gini coefficient? Give some examples of how Lorenz curves and Gini coefficients can be used as summary measures of equality and inequality in a nation’s distribution of income.

8. “The major determinant of a country’s income distribution is its distribution of productive and income-earning assets.” Explain the meaning of this statement, giving examples of different kinds of productive and income-earning assets.

9. Are rapid economic growth (as measured by either GNI or per capita GNI) and a more equal distribution of personal income necessarily conflicting objectives? Summarize the arguments both for and against the presumed conflict of objectives, and state and explain your own view.

10. How might inequality lead to faster growth or development? How might it lead to slower growth or development?

11. Is progress being made in the fight against poverty? Why or why not?

12. What types of poverty policies have proved effective?
13. Economic growth is said to be a necessary but not sufficient condition to eradicate absolute poverty and reduce inequality. What is the reasoning behind this argument?

14. Outline the range of major policy options for altering and modifying the size distribution of their national income. Which policies do you believe are absolutely essential? Explain your answer.

Notes and Further Reading

1. The Lorenz curve is named for Max Otto Lorenz, an American economist who in 1905 devised this convenient and widely used diagram to show the relationship between population groups and their respective income shares.

2. A more precise definition of perfect equality would take into account the age structure of a population and expected income variations over the life cycle of all households within that population. See Morton Paglin, “The measurement and trend of inequality: A basic revision,” American Economic Review 65 (1975): 598–609.


4. For more details on this and an alternative exposition of inequality properties, see Amartya Sen and James E. Foster, On Economic Inequality expanded ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997).

5. The sum of all workers’ marginal product must equal total gross national income (GNI). Mathematically, GNI is simply the integral of the marginal product curve between 0 and $L_E$. This is because the marginal product function is the derivative of the GNI curve: $\text{GNI} = f(L, \bar{K})$; $\text{MP}_L = f'(L)$.

6. If measured poverty is always strictly lower after such transfers, this property is called strong monotonicity. The headcount ratio satisfies monotonicity but not strong monotonicity.


8. For proof that Equation 5.4 follows from Equation 5.3, see Foster, Greer, and Thorbecke, “A class of decomposable poverty measures,” Cornell University Discussion Paper No. 242, 1981.

9. It is similar in spirit to the Sen index, $S = (H/N)(\text{NIS} + (1 - \text{NIS})G_p)$, where $G_p$ stands for the Gini coefficient among the poor. For the technical details and derivations of the $P_2$ and $S$ poverty measures, see Sen and Foster, On Economic Inequality, pp. 165–194, and ibid.


11. The HPI measured three deprivations—of life (as the percentage of people unlikely to live beyond 40 years of age), of basic education (as the percentage of adults who are illiterate), and of overall economic provisioning (as the percentage of people without access to safe water plus the percentage of children underweight for their age), giving them equal weight in a manner analogous to the original HDI. The 2009 HDR report ranked 135 countries from lowest to highest HPI and found this could differ substantially from income poverty rankings and the old HDI ranking. Since the HPI value indicates the proportion of the population adversely affected by the three deprivations, a higher HPI reflects greater deprivation. In the report, Côte d’Ivoire ranked 29 places higher (worse) in the country rankings based on income poverty than on human poverty; Morocco ranked 50 places higher; Iran, 44 higher; Algeria, 19 higher; Ethiopia, 30 higher. The implication is that human poverty is worse in these countries than headcount ratio income poverty measures indicate. In contrast, some of the countries that perform better on the human poverty ranking include Nigeria, 11 places lower; Ghana, 18 lower; Madagascar, 14 lower; Bolivia, 21 lower; and Tanzania, 37 lower. The MPI is strongly preferred
because it aggregates up from the household level and allows for interactions of poverty dimensions; an index like the HPI might be used because it is familiar, can be applied to a larger number of countries, and can be extrapolated further back in time and at more frequent intervals.


18. Ibid., p. 52.

19. This can perhaps be visualized most easily by considering a traditional economy in which everyone is “equally poor,” each claiming their share of, say, 50 cents per day. If the absolute poverty line is $1.25 per day, all are in absolute poverty. Then modernization begins, and the modern sector absorbs workers one by one, where the wage is, say, $2 per day. Starting from the line of perfect equality, the Lorenz curve bows out more and more until nearly half the people are in the modern sector. At that point, as more go to the modern sector, the Lorenz curve is less bowed in until finally everyone has been absorbed into the modern sector, and all once again have equal incomes but now at a higher level of $2 per day. In the process, all of the people have been pulled out of poverty. (Try this as an exercise, plotting the Lorenz curves as this process takes place for an eight-person economy.) This exercise is adapted from Fields, ibid.

20. In fact, some would go further and say that an increase in relative inequality is not objectionable as long as everyone has a higher income, even though the rich get a larger share of the gains, even in proportion to their larger starting income. This situation is called “first-order stochastic dominance” in the literature. However, even in this case, incomes might be increased even more with less inequality.

21. Of course, in real economies, all three of these growth typologies may take place at the same time, and the net result may be little or no change in inequality. Or in more unfortunate cases, with economies with negative growth, like many of those in sub-Saharan Africa in the 1980s and 1990s, there may be modern- and traditional-sector impoverishment, accompanied by a shrinking modern sector.


23. The parabola plotted results from an ordinary least-squares regression. For details on the derivation of Figures 5.11 and 5.12, see Fields, *Distribution and Development*, ch. 3. Fields (pp. 42–43) reports results showing that in using a country fixed-effect specification, the estimated inverted-U flips to an estimated U-pattern.

24. Ibid., p. 35.


32. A well-known study is David Dollar and Aart Kraay, “Growth is good for the poor,” *Journal of Economic Growth* 7 (2002): 195–225. They find that on average, incomes of the bottom 20% grow about as fast as the overall average. However, critiques of the generality of this claim of rough proportionality have been summarized by the University of Manchester Chronic Poverty Research Center in its *Chronic Poverty Report* 2004/05: “It does not allow for variation around the average (which is known to be significant), it uses a relative concept of poverty, the data set used has been criticized, it does not consider poverty depth, and researchers using different econometric methods with the same data have produced contradictory findings.” Clearly it is possible and sometimes does occur that inequality can increase with growth enough to offset any gains for the poor, including some cases in which rapid growth increases the incentive and opportunity of theft of natural resources from poor communities. The essential point is that growth is not guaranteed to automatically end absolute poverty or do so in an acceptable time frame, so targeted policies are generally also needed.


36. The International Fund for Agricultural Development provides basic statistics and links to key resources on indigenous peoples and development at http://www.ifad.org/pub/factsheet/ip/e.pdf.


