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Intergroup Conflict and British Colonial Policy

The Case of Cyprus

Adamantia Pollis

Nation-states are sustained through a multiplicity of institutional arrangements and through individual and group behavior appropriate to the framework of nationhood. Fundamentally, these are grounded in a cognitive structure and a system of norms and values that define the what and how of reality in such a way that an international order composed of sovereign nation-states is perceived as "natural" and normal. In turn, sovereign political authority is viewed as legitimate when its jurisdiction extends over and is restricted to those of one nationality. Thus, the rulers and the ruled are one and the same; government is of and for the people; the proper concern of government is the public welfare; and the national interest coincides with the interests of the members of the body politic.

The universalization of the ideology of nationalism and the concomitant efforts to create a social order founded on its precepts are the most striking features of the post-World War II era. The processes of modernization, including the formation of a nation-state, are com-

1 Little is known about the issue-consensus essential for the maintenance of a nation-state. The degree and range of consensus undoubtedly vary with ideological or structural factors deemed fundamental to each particular nation-state. In recent years the revival of nationalist movements within established modern nation-states, such as the French-Canadian movement, and the emergence of such "postnationalist" developments as the multinational corporation, student movements challenging the moral supremacy of the state, and attitudinal changes among the population in the European community reflecting a decline in ego-involvement with one's country, raise significant questions both with regard to the requisites for maintaining a nation-state and with regard to the processes of social change.

2 The term modernization has been used somewhat differently by various authors. For example, David E. Apter in The Politics of Modernization (Chicago, 1965), p. 67, uses development and industrialization as special aspects of modernization. This writer uses the term modernization to refer to the processes of social change in a society undergoing economic (industrialization) and political (nation-state) development.
plex and multidimensional and involve social change at every level. Many aspects of the modernization process have been investigated, including the interrelating of social, cultural, and political factors. The starting point of such analyses is frequently the disruptive impact on traditional societies of colonial rule or of other contacts with the developed countries. Analyses of colonial rule have dealt with a wide range of phenomena: the emergence of westernized elites; the development of cash-crop or trading economies; the superimposition of "western" political and legal forms on indigenous cultures; the forms, extent, and type of political experience gained under British, French, Dutch, or other rule; and the development or absence of administrative, judicial, or technical skills. There are, however, some crucial aspects of the colonial experience whose significance has often been overlooked.

The introduction of "western" concepts and their subsequent interaction with the indigenous conceptual scheme has produced a specifically Arab, Asian, African, or, more precisely, Egyptian, Burmese, Ghanian structuring of social reality. Accounts of the assimilation of nonindigenous political, economic, and cultural values and goals by colonial peoples abound. What has been overlooked, however, is the process by which the colonial administrators' perception of social reality with regard to group cleavages is frequently transmitted, albeit in reinterpreted form, to the colonial subjects. Thus, the British perception and understanding of existing or presumed intergroup conflict has been one variable that has structured and differentiated subsequent new nationalities. British colonial policy was often based on presumed significant cleavages among subject peoples along ethnic, tribal, religious, linguistic, or cultural lines. Consequently, colonial rule frequently fostered the conditions for the later eruption of intergroup conflict. Such conflicts arose either when demands for sovereignty by distinct nationalities became the focal issue, or, after the attainment of independence, with the outbreak of internal strife and even civil war, as was the case in Nigeria and in Pakistan.

The British and the Natives
British policy varied from colony to colony, depending upon such factors as direct and indirect rule, the particular national interests involved, the resources of the area, the period and condition under which the colony had been acquired, and the whims of individual governors. Un-

3 At times the British imported ethnic or religious groups, treated them differentially and thereby fostered intergroup conflict, e.g., Chinese in Malaya and blacks and Indians in Guiana.
underlying the diversity, however, was a consistent frame of reference stemming from a particular cognitive structure which governed understanding of social reality in colonial areas.

However diverse, colonial policies were predicated on similar assumptions. The significance of one's operative frame of reference is clearly evident when one contrasts the assumption underlying French policy—the assimilationist “mission civilatrice”—and that underlying British policy—preserving native culture. The French differentiated themselves from the “natives” in terms of cultural superiority and a higher level of civilization to which, however, all could aspire. To the British, cultural differences among peoples reflected innate qualities; their own superiority and distinctiveness could not be attained by Asian or African. Native customs, beliefs, and behavior being manifestations of innate qualities should, where possible, be preserved. An African or Asian could aspire to become a Frenchman, but never an Englishman.

The British not only attributed cultural differences to innate human qualities, but they perceived and comprehended social phenomena, including indigenous group cleavages, within a frame of reference markedly at variance with that of the African or Asian. Englishman and African might agree on a specific empirical phenomenon on, for example, the existence of a tribal chief; yet the meaning of this social fact and hence of social reality itself was not the same for ruler and ruled. Hence, it can be argued concurrently, depending upon one’s frame of reference, that the British strengthened or weakened the position of the tribal chief. Looked at in terms of the British legal and institutional framework, the chief’s position was strengthened since he became a governmental functionary to whom were delegated powers that he hitherto had not possessed, while the power of the tribal members to destool him was curtailed. Looked at in terms of the traditional tribal framework, the chief’s subjugation to a superior authority (the British), whose commands he must comply with and implement, and the reduction of his accountability to the tribal members, weakened his position, diminished his authority, and precipitated challenges to the legitimacy of that authority.

4 For overall studies on colonial policies and significant differences among them, see Stewart C. Easton, *The Rise and Fall of Western Colonialism* (New York, 1964), and S. N. Eisenstadt, *The Political Systems of Empires* (New York, 1963).


7 M. Fortes and E. E. Evans-Pritchard, *African Political Systems* (London,
Analysis of British policy solely in terms of a divide-and-rule concept is an oversimplification and ignores the underlying psychological and sociological processes operative for the British and for the colonial peoples. The psychological selectivity, governing the behavior of the British while enabling them to distinguish linguistic, religious, ethnic, cultural, and tribal differences, nevertheless provided an interpretation and an understanding often irrelevant to social reality. In some instances, the British created distinct perceptual categories where none had existed, such as black versus white. In some instances—Muslim versus Hindu, Tamils versus Sinhalese, Kikuyus versus Luos, and so on—differences existed, but the meaning and significance attributed to these distinctions by the British diverged significantly from the existent social reality as perceived by the colonial peoples. Thus, it is not sufficient to note only that the British stimulated the establishment of the Congress party to counteract the power of the Muslims, and then later the Muslim League to counteract the Hindus. Differences were given a meaning within a modern political framework, a framework relevant to the British structuring of social reality, but initially of no particular relevance to Hindus or Muslims.

In the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires, the meaning, significance, and behavioral consequences of religious, ethnic, and cultural differences markedly altered in the nineteenth century as nationalist doctrines spread and legitimate political authority became equated with nationality. Similarly, a century later, tribal, racial, religious, ethnic, and cultural differences in Asia and Africa were redefined within a new conceptual framework as behavior came to be governed by the concept of nationality. As a result, these differences have acquired a political significance hitherto absent. British policies influenced—at that point in time when nationalist doctrines were being assimilated and reinterpreted in the light of local historical and cultural factors—the content and nature of intergroup conflict. As J. S. Furnivall has stated in his discussion of the effects of colonial policy in Burma:

1940), pp. 15–16. The author states that colonial rule “resulted in diminishing his (the paramount ruler’s) authority and generally increasing his power . . . .” In some areas the British established paramount chiefs where there was no indigenous precedent among segmented societies and gave them considerable power.


At the beginning of the century it was a commonplace to describe the Burman as tolerant of foreigners, though indifference was a more accurate description of his attitude. At that time such racial or class feeling as may have existed was limited to Europeans, who found Indians less attractive than Burmans, had little sympathy with Indian Nationalism, and to some extent were already apprehensive of Indian competition. But twenty years later, Burmans were held to feel a "natural antipathy" to Indians . . . .10

In the Ottoman Empire and in Syria, Eli Kedourie comments, by contrast to British perceptions, the "inhabitants for a thousand years considered themselves either Sunnis of Shi'ites or Druzes or Maronites or Greek Orthodox or Jews. Of course, they spoke Arabic, but this fact until very recent times was of no political consequence."11 Similarly, in the late nineteenth century, official British documents referred to the population in the colony of Cyprus as Greek and Turk, while the "Greeks" and "Turks" still referred to themselves, by and large, as Orthodox and Muslim, respectively.

It was only as westernized elites in colonial areas assimilated nationalist doctrines that they began not only to view themselves in terms of nationality, but also to define the boundaries of the emerging nationalities as defined, at least in part, by British perception of group cleavages. The British view of significant group divisions and British perception of social distance became important determinants of who was and who was not a member of a nationality group, with one difference: each developing nationality viewed itself as superior in some set of terms. Marshall Segall's empirical findings in his study of the acculturation process of Ugandians indicates that they do not assimilate negative attitudes toward Africans manifest by the dominant European group.12 Thus, when nationality becomes the reference group, one's relatedness to this reference group precludes acceptance of a demeaning view of self.13 By the same token, studies of social distance do indicate that the dominant group sets the norms regarding attitudes toward

13 This statement does not deal with the problem of subgroups within a nationality group, who do relate to that nationality reference group, but who do not possess, or are believed not to possess, all the essential characteristics of that nationality. Therefore, they may well develop a "sense of inferiority," e.g., the blacks in the United States until recently.
out-group members, whether within or without a sovereign political entity.\textsuperscript{14}

The foundations for intergroup conflict within newly sovereign states, therefore, were in part the result of British colonial policies. Competing elites, which view each other as alien, have emerged. Few studies have been made of this phenomenon, of its origin, of the polarization of the population, and of the resultant intergroup conflict. The Biafran civil war and the violence that created Bangladesh have dramatized the widespread phenomenon of competing elites within newly sovereign states. However, the conflict has been taken as a given; the genesis of such intergroup conflict—a genesis frequently attributable to British colonial policies—has by and large been ignored.

In overall terms British implementation of representative government in colonial areas illustrates clearly the process of politicization of presumed group cleavages which presaged future intergroup conflict. Assuming the existence of antagonistic communal groups, the British introduced rudimentary forms of representation according to which each group was entitled to separate and distinct representation in order to protect its rights. British scholars continuously speak of “plural” societies in which “the basic unit of representation has to be the racial or cultural community, instead of the territorial constituency. The communities may have the same territorial subdivisions but the bond of loyalty and the franchise are communal” \textsuperscript{15} (emphasis added). This British interpretation of “plural” societies was often to become in later years the sine qua non for granting independence to British colonies in the form of “partnership” or “multiracialism.” The discrepancy between this British view of “pluralism” and the pluralism of democratic societies, which presupposes a consensus integrating all subgroups along certain dimensions of commonalities, seems to have been overlooked.

Thus, initially apolitical differences were institutionalized within the formal structure of a modern state. Once ethnic, racial, religious, or tribal differences had been institutionalized, the alternative—the breakdown of separate communal identifications and integration of communal groups into one nationality—was no longer psychologically feasible.


That alternative would have necessitated selectively searching out commonalities transcending differences; but this process was precluded by the accentuation and solidification of uncommon elements to which primary significance had been attributed. British concern for the representation of communal groups in legislative councils (whether appointive, elective, or mixed) to protect minority group rights (as distinct from individual rights), the adoption of separate electoral rolls and proportional representation, the creation of separate administrative and political structures for communal groups—forms initiated early in colonial practice, frequently perfected, occasionally abandoned at the time of independence—exacerbated intergroup conflict and militated against the evolution of a nationality encompassing diverse groups. It is evident that the politicization of the peoples of Malaysia, India, Cyprus, Ceylon, Kenya, and so forth within a basically British perceptual framework set the conditions for intergroup conflict within each one of these countries.

The remainder of this article will be an analysis of British colonial policy relevant to group cleavages in only one former colony, Cyprus. Since, as indicated earlier, the overall pattern was similar in other colonial areas and since similar psychological and sociological processes were operative, it may be inferred that similar developments took place in many British colonies in Africa, the Middle East, and Asia.

Great Britain's announcement of the independence of Cyprus in August 1960 was accompanied by self-laudatory comments on her success in achieving partnership between two hostile groups. The failure, at least in the case of Cyprus, of Britain's policy of partnership or multiracialism was evidenced in the eruption of communal violence in December 1963, less than four years after independence. By and large, the strife has been attributed to the traditional enmity between Greeks and Turks, which the provisions of the Cypriot constitution, designed to establish a working relationship between the two communities, had failed to eradicate.

The Cypriot constitution, however—and in fact the entire complex of political, economic, and social institutions, albeit rooted in the separation of the Muslim and Eastern Orthodox religious communities—was nevertheless the culmination of more than eighty years of British rule. The British politicization of separate religious communities was implemented in a multiplicity of specific policies which increasingly segregated the two communities, at the individual, group, and institutional levels. Such policies worked against the evolution of a Cypriot nationality as a possible reference group and favored the development of separate relatedness to the Greek and Turkish national-
ities. Similarly precluded was the possibility of the formation of a "Greek" nationality in which "non-Greek" elements would have been absorbed.

Communal Relations and Ottoman Rule
A brief look at intergroup relations under the Ottoman Empire, of which Cyprus was a part until the British take-over in 1878, will provide the essential foundations for the analysis and evaluation of British policies and their consequences.

Cyprus was conquered from the Venetians in 1571 and incorporated into the overall administrative framework of Ottoman rule. Diverging from their pattern on the Greek mainland, the Ottomans transferred population to Cyprus, whose inhabitants had decreased during the previous era. The new settlers came from several sources: granting of fiefs for service in war; Turks of the original conquering army who stayed on; transfer, primarily from Anatolia, of peasants under financial strain; brigands or nomads of one kind or another; and a limited number of workers skilled in mineral refining. Most of these became settlers, augmenting an already partly Arab-Muslim population dating back to the Byzantine era by Muslims; some of the latter were and some were not of Turkish ethnic descent.

There are conflicting estimates as to the composition of the Cypriot population during the Ottoman era. In the eighteenth century, some writers, including Kyprianos, the historian of Cyprus, stated that the number of Muslims exceeded the Christians. In the course of the nineteenth century, however, the number of Christians began increasing proportionally. The British census of 1881 estimated the population at 136,629 Greeks, 46,389 Turks, 691 English, and 2,400 other. In addition to a minority of Arabic-speaking Maronite-Catholics, mostly from Lebanon (now Syria), and Armenians, who arrived near the end of the nineteenth century, the island's population included a Muslim-

17 Hill, ibid., pp. 31–36, cites all the various estimates of population in the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries, including those of Archimandite Kyprianos for 1764 and 1777 in which he tended to place the Muslim as a larger population than the Christian.
19 At one time, the most numerous on the island, next to the Orthodox, their numbers declined steadily. See J. Hackett, *A History of the Orthodox Church of Cyprus* (London, 1901), pp. 527–28. For variations of the Maronites in Cyprus (including use of the Greek language) from the Maronites in Syria and Lebanon, see Edward Bowron, "The Maronites in Cyprus," *The Eastern Churches Quarterly*, II (January 1937), 10–12.
Christian sect called Linobambakoi. They were reputedly descendants of European Catholics from the pre-Ottoman era, their religion a mixture of Islam and Christian Orthodoxy. By the end of World War II, they had all but disappeared. One may speculate that the legal compulsion to choose between the Muslim and the Orthodox communities accelerated the process of disappearance.21

There is considerable evidence of extensive intermarriage between Orthodox and Muslim and some indication of conversion from Islam to orthodoxy during the nineteenth century. In addition, the prevalence among contemporary Greek Cypriots of names of Turkish derivation lends credence to the view that the Muslim and Orthodox communities were not the closed communities that they have subsequently become.

The unity of religious and civil authority that underlay Ottoman treatment of non-Muslim subjects conferred upon the Greek Patriarch of Constantinople—and, in the case of Cyprus, upon the Autocephalous Archbishop of Cyprus—ecclesiastical and lay jurisdiction over the entire population. Except for the initial conquering stages and the later years during which nationalist movements emerged within the Empire, the Ottomans were mainly interested in the Christians as a source of revenue, as a pool of children from which to recruit into the palace service and the Janissary corps (a practice which became very sporadic by the seventeenth century), and in some areas as a source of land grants to Muslim military leaders or other noteworthy personages.

The political functions of the Ottoman rulers vis-à-vis their subjects were limited and, in turn, little was expected in the way of loyalty or relatedness to the state. For the most part, the subjects remained autonomous and governed their own affairs. And as the Orthodox church in Constantinople regained the power and influence it had been losing during the Byzantine Empire, so, too, the Orthodox church in Cyprus regained the power it had lost during centuries of Catholic rule. One observer was led to comment that the archbishop exercised more authority than the pashas, and that the machinery of government was becoming centered on him.23 The power which the archbishop wielded began diminishing somewhat during the nineteenth century as

20 Some consider them to be crypto-Christians; see Hackett, p. 535.
22 Achilles C. Aimilianides, “The Evolution of the Law Concerning Mixed Marriages in Cyprus,” Cypriote Studies, II (1938), 197–236 (in Greek, Leukosia, Cyprus) is an excellent, highly legalistic analysis of marriages across religious lines throughout Cypriot history. In speaking of Muslim-Christian intermarriages, the author states “that intermarriage took place there can be no doubt.” Ibid., p. 209.
23 Hackett, p. 198.
a result of Ottoman reforms. The Tanzimat reforms of the Ottoman Empire in the mid-nineteenth century, designed to reassert the power of the central authority, introduced changes into the millet system. The power of the ecclesiastical hierarchy was reduced and lay representation was increased in order to draft constitutions to govern the non-Muslim millets.24

During Ottoman rule, the communal nature of group relatedness was along religious lines and in no way related to any notions of nationality or nationalism. This latter fact is substantiated by documents and petitions as late as the nineteenth century which refer to the population as Orthodox or Muslim. The word “Greek” did, however, begin making its appearance after the Greek revolution for independence. The prevailing attitude toward the Ottoman system, as well as the absence of any conceptions of nationality or of inevitable enmity between Greeks and Turks, finds expression in a statement made by Albert Lybyer regarding a mother’s reaction to the recruitment of children for the Janissary corps: “. . . at the same time, she might hope to see him one day in the possession of great wealth and power” and “. . . many parents were glad to have their sons chosen, knowing that they would thus escape from grinding poverty, receive a first-rate training suited to their abilities, and enter upon the possibility of a great career.”25

The reference group of the mass of the Cypriot population was undoubtedly contiguous with their membership groups, which consisted of the extended family, the village, and the local church or mosque. Religious affiliation constituted a reference group extending beyond face-to-face relationships, but it held a low order or priority. Although reference groups were largely circumscribed by face-to-face relationships, their boundaries were in terms of social position. Thus, a peasant did not consider himself the same as the tax collector or the bishops or the pashas. In turn, the ruling elite viewed themselves as different from the peasants. Members of neither socioeconomic group considered themselves members of a larger group to which they owed loyalty. Religion, as mentioned above, does not seem to have had much behavioral relevance, despite the philosophic enmity between Christendom and Islam. A Greek writer, much concerned with proving the dominance of Greek nationalism, nevertheless writes:

24 Although not specifically on Cyprus, see the discussion of the millet reforms in Roderick H. Davison, Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 1856–1876 (Princeton, 1962), esp. chap. 4.
... a sharp differentiation was taking place in Cypriote society. There were, on the one hand, the peasants, Greeks and Turks, subject to ruinous taxation and, on the other, oppressive bureaucracy with its swarms of tax farmers and collectors. The interests of the latter, whether they were Christians or Mohammedans, were bound up with those of the persecutors and oppressors, and the bishops, who were seen as part and parcel of this economic order and who were obviously enjoying considerable wealth and lived in grand style, would naturally be included among them.26

There were numerous incidents in which the Muslim and Orthodox populations joined together in opposition to increased tax burdens. When traditional expectations as to legitimate tax exertions were exceeded, discontent typically erupted into violence. Perhaps the most famous incident was the killing in 1764 by both Muslims and Christians of the newly appointed governor of the island, Chil Osman, in response to his decision to double the tax.27 In turn, the orthodox religious hierarchy's indifference to their peasant coreligionists has been frequently commented upon. An Italian traveler in the eighteenth century noted, "the poor subjects might very often be saved from oppression if their archbishop were not from policy, and sometimes from personal interest, ready to lend himself to the exactions of Muhasset, so that they are often abandoned by the very person who ought to take their part." 28

During Ottoman rule, therefore, it appears that the cleavages between the ruling elite (both Muslim and Christian), the peasantry (both Muslim and Christian), and a limited middle sector of local tax gatherers torn between the two were more basic than the institutional and religious differences between Muslims and Christians. With respect to the mass of the population, the similarities among them—commonalities upon which a future common nationality could have been based—seemed to have far exceeded religious cleavages. No traveler or observer in Cyprus, even in the nineteenth century, has commented on significant cultural differences. In fact, many observers were struck by the indifference with which Muslim and Christian (other than the Linobambaki) used each others' places of worship and the extent to which

26 Alastos, p. 280.
ostensibly religious holidays were intermixed. As for Greek versus Turk, the Turks did not view themselves as Turkish until the beginning of the twentieth century, at first to distinguish themselves from the Arabs and later from the Greeks. In Cyprus itself, the "Turks" seemed to be unaware of this designation until well into this century. Although a hierarchical and authoritarian pattern of rule existed within the religious communities, there was also an incipient notion of representation on the local level with villages frequently electing their head men (demogerontes, arhontes, or muhtars) and their municipal councils. Significantly, in light of subsequent developments setting up separate communal representation for Turks and Greeks in each village, elections during the Ottoman era were not rigidly separated between Muslims and Orthodox. A large number of villages were and are mixed. The Greek Communal Chamber itself concedes that 42.9 percent of the villages were mixed in 1960, a high figure considering that 77 percent of the population is listed as Greek. Only in the later years of Ottoman rule, as a result of the Tanzemat reforms, was the archbishop, head of the orthodox millet, indirectly chosen by an electoral college composed of Christian communal representatives.

The commonalities that define membership in a particular nationality vary from one nationality to another. Language may or may not be considered an essential ingredient, yet it frequently assumes significant proportions, as witnessed by the use of Hebrew in Israel and by the dissensions that revolve about language groupings in India. The historical development of language in Cyprus is particularly interesting. By the medieval period, the Cypriot dialect with its Greek roots had developed quite distinctively, largely due to isolation from mainland Greece.

29 A number of British travellers in the nineteenth century, both in official and unofficial capacities (cf. Sir Samuel White Baker, *Cyprus as I Saw It in 1879* [London, 1879]) make few, if any, distinctions between Muslims and Orthodox.

30 Dankwart A. Rustow, "Politics and Islam in Turkey, 1920–1955" in Richard N. Frye, ed. *Islam and the West* (The Hague, 1957). See his footnote 1 which discusses the designation of Muslim, particularly in areas bordering the Greek population as late as the 1920s.

31 Among the Muslims in the Ottoman Empire, only in the early twentieth century did questions of Turkish versus Ottoman or Muslim identity arise. See Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, 2d ed. (London, 1968), esp. chap. 5, for an excellent discussion of the operative reference groups for the population of the Ottoman Empire. According to Lewis, it was with the formation of the Turkish Society in Istanbul in 1908 that the use of the name "Turk" began, and that the Turkish movement acquired its first platform (p. 349).

32 Hill, vol. 4, p. 10.

33 *Statistical Abstract of 1964* (Ministry of France, Cyprus.)

34 Mondry Beaudouin, *Etude du Dialecte Chypriote: Moderne et Médieval* (Paris, 1884). The author traces the development of the language, including the
It was influenced in addition by the languages of the various rulers of the island, especially Turkish. By the nineteenth century, the language bore little resemblance in terms of comprehensibility to either demotiki or katharevousa. There was no logical, rational reason why the Cypriot dialect could not have developed into a language of its own, just as several languages have sprung from Latin, particularly since Cypriot grammars and dictionaries were being published in the nineteenth century.

Since a Cypriot nationalist movement integrating both “Greeks” and “Turks” did not develop, the literature ignores the incipient formation in Cyprus of a literary movement, which existed as late as the 1930s. A few commentators lament the gradual loss of the distinctive “Cypriot” language and its replacement by Greek and Turkish. This Cypriot dialect constituted the common language of the island, spoken by both Muslims and Christian Orthodox. Turkish Cypriots spoke, and some still speak, this dialect in addition to a Turkish dialect.

All in all, it would seem that as the principle of nationality replaced religion as the legitimate organizing principle of society, there was nothing inherent in the nature of intergroup relations between Orthodox Christian and Muslim during the Ottoman Empire to have foreordained or predetermined the emergence of separate Greek and Turkish nationalities.

Shift from Orthodox versus Muslim to Greek versus Turk

When the British acquired control over Cyprus in 1878, Turkish nationalism had not yet emerged in the Ottoman Empire, let alone among the Muslims on that island. If anything, the controversies in the Ottoman Empire still focused primarily on Islamism versus Ottomanism as the use of non-Greek words, in the dialect of the nineteenth century and presents an analysis in terms of syntax, and the like.

35 Ibid., pp. 24–26. See also Pavlos Ksioutas, “Foreign Words in Our Language,” Cypriote Studies, 1 (1937, in Greek), pp. 133–74. The author pleads for a compilation of all relevant material on the Cypriot language, since “the language for many well-known reasons is daily being lost.” His article is a supplement to existing works, particularly in adding Cypriot words of non-Greek origin that have not been included in other compilations.

36 Demotiki refers to the popular language—the spoken Greek, whereas Katharevousa refers to literary Greek. Since the nineteenth century a controversy has raged in Greece over which of these two forms should prevail.

37 Ksioutas refers to numerous earlier dictionaries and grammars of the Cypriot language.

38 The publication Cypriote Studies seems to have been one of the main vehicles predicated on the notion that Cyprus qua Cyprus had distinct features which distinguished it from all other countries.
foundations for a modernized state. Turkish nationalism can hardly be dated prior to the Young Turk revolution of 1908, if then. On the other hand, Greek nationalism had emerged a century earlier, and the Greek nationalist revolution of 1821 ended with the formation of an independent Greek state in 1830. The Megali (Great) Idea—the Greek nationalist ideology—including Cyprus among Greece’s various irredentist claims.

During the Greek war of independence, 1821–28, the Ottoman authorities executed Archbishop Kyprianos of Cyprus and several other bishops for alleged complicity in the Greek revolution of 1821; but the evidence does not substantiate complicity. Even though the present day Greek Cypriots have made the archbishop a hero and a martyr for the Greek cause, the fact remains that both he and the Patriarch of Constantinople were adamantly opposed to the Greek war of independence. In fact so opposed was the church hierarchy to the revolution that the revolutionary heroes were excommunicated.

The irredentist movement in Cyprus, enosis, originated largely in Greece itself in the latter part of the nineteenth century, when patriotic committees encouraged Greeks to go to Cyprus in a variety of capacities. Concomitantly, however, a limited number of educated Orthodox on the island began to view themselves as Greek and to talk of eventual union with Greece.

Although there was some agitation for union with Greece on the part of individual Cypriots around the turn of the century, the first clear evidence of some kind of nationalist movement was the uprising against the British in 1931. The impetus for that uprising was economic discontent, but much of it was channeled by the nationalists into demands for union with Greece. Yet the nationalist movement at this time, like nationalist movements generally in their formative stages, had several conflicting strands, including one that argued for a distinctive Cypriot nationality. By the 1950s, and the organization of the

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40 Hackett, pp. 227–29. The author feels that the uprising in Greece was a ruse used by the Turkish pashas to justify their execution and hence reduce the power of the Orthodox hierarchy.
41 See S. Spyridakis, A Brief History of Cyprus (Nicosia, 1963), pp. 60–61.
42 For the position of the religious hierarchy in Constantinople (Istanbul) on the Greek revolution of 1821, see Adamantia Polis, “The Megali Idea” (Ph.D. diss., Johns Hopkins University, 1958).
43 Some scholars claim that the first secondary school was one founded by Archimandrite Kyprianos in 1812 (see Alastos, p. 28 and Hackett, p. 227). Others state that when the British took over in 1878 there was only one secondary school, the “Idadi” for Muslims in Nicosia. See William W. Weir, Education in Cyprus (Cyprus Larnaca, 1952), p. 55.

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underground guerrilla movement known as EOKA in 1955, the dominant nationalist movement in Cyprus had become Greek Cypriot. Its main goal was unification of Cyprus with the motherland "Greece." As is well known, the "Turkish" Cypriot population was indifferent to the movement for enosis until after 1954.

Many requisites existed for the development of a Cypriot nationalist movement that did not differentiate between Greeks and Turks. A multiplicity of common factors bound the Christian and Muslim populations, including a ready-made common history, independent of and distinctive from that of Greece. The commonalities, including history, culture, and language, were more clearly evident in Cyprus than among the peoples of other new nation-states.

The trend toward the evolution of a distinctive Cypriot language has been mentioned earlier. This development, however, was reversed in the course of the nineteenth century—a reversal for which the British can claim considerable credit. In 1878, the number of schools was minimal: seventy-six Christian and sixty-four Muslim elementary schools and one high school founded by Archbishop Kyprianos in the early nineteenth century. The schools were controlled by the religious authorities, and their curricula were primarily religious.

The British embarked upon a policy designed to reduce illiteracy; by 1918 they had succeeded not only in expanding the number of schools to 729 elementary schools and a number of secondary schools, but also in achieving some secularization of the curriculum. With the establishment of a public educational system (albeit under the facade of local control, since teachers' salaries were paid out of local funds), they instituted a policy which probably accounts more than any other single factor for the assimilation of notions of Greek versus Turkish nationality among the populace. The British began to encourage the importation of teaching personnel from Greece and Turkey respectively. They established two Boards of Education—one Turkish and the other Greek—each controlling its respective school system. The texts for the Greek schools required the approval of the Ministry of Education in Greece and material written by Cypriot authors similarly had to be approved by the Greek Ministry. As stated earlier, the language of the "orthodox" population differed so markedly from that spoken by Greeks in Greece proper that it was not mutually comprehensible.

44 Weir, pp. 54–56.
46 Beaudoin.
47 Weir's discussion of the changes initiated in 1933 are dispersed throughout his book.
The result was that the children of the island learned languages alien to them and were socialized into believing, as their parents had not, that they were Greeks and Turks, respectively. Hence, they were enemies.

There was nothing to prevent the British from creating a unified school system free of the authority of the religious institutions and of the Ottoman and Greek education ministries. Language instruction could well have been "Cypriot," which was spoken by both the Muslims and Orthodox—a not impossible task particularly in light of the gradual evolution of a Cypriot literature. As it was, the school systems became the major structure for the dissemination of nationalist doctrines, a task admittedly facilitated by the centrality of Orthodoxy in the concept of Greek nationality. It is not at all surprising that, as demands for independence on the island spread in the twentieth century—first among the Greeks—Greek Cypriots should have come to view the "Turks" as alien. This was how the British perceived them in relationship to the Greeks, and how the Greeks from the mainland saw them. The introduction by the British of educational reforms and increased governmental control over the schools during 1933–35 did not materially alter the content of instruction in areas significant to nationalism, but did introduce measures and courses at the secondary level which facilitated the formation of a "westernized" elite.

Typically, the British claimed that they ruled through established institutions—an argument given added strength by the claim that they merely administered the island for the Ottomans until 1914 when they annexed it. However, the ostensibly minor changes introduced by British rule and the conceptual framework within which these were formulated (illustrated by the earlier discussions on educational policy) gradually redefined the nature of group identity from Muslim and Christian to Turk and Greek and further segregated the two communities. Perceived differences were extended from the religious sphere to all areas of life. Encouragement was thus given the formation of an apartheid mentality that precluded the perception of similarities or commonalities even where they existed, while making differences separating the two groups psychologically relevant.

In 1882, the British introduced an advisory Legislative Council of twelve elected members and six British officials appointed by the High Commissioner. The establishment of the Legislative Council apparently

48 It should never be denied that the Greek Orthodox Church and the Greek Board of Education strongly opposed any increased British control over the educational system and that they argued for the necessity of preserving Greek education.

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meant that democratic representative political institutions were introduced. But to view these councils as a beginning step toward representative government distorts empirical reality, not only in Cyprus but in all colonies in which communal representative organs were set up.

The British operated simultaneously in terms of two irreconcilable principles. On the one hand, they created representative legislative bodies, in which majority rule was to operate; on the other, they strengthened and institutionalized a nondemocratic communal social system. Majority rule presupposes a political community integrated in terms of commonalities. Within this context, each voter functions both autonomously and within subgroups, but a legislator represents a constituency composed of a certain number of individuals within a given geographical area. In Cyprus, however, representative institutions were superimposed on religiously defined communal groups whose members did not traditionally view as appropriate their participation in the political decision-making process. Thus, the role of representatives in the British legislative councils was that of liaison between partly politicized religious communities and the political authorities—the British. Consequently, the function of the “representative” did not differ materially from that of priests in the days when Cyprus was under Ottoman rule.

The British thus strengthened identification within each community, sharpened the cleavages between them, and drew the communities into political relationships perhaps relevant for a modern nation-state, but irrelevant to the previously existing communal social order and to the premises which sustained it. Thus, a social order composed of a Muslim and Orthodox governing elite was gradually redefined into two vertically divided religious groups; and this was further redefined into two antagonistic nationality groups—Greeks and Turks. There were no policies instituted to create even the structural requisites of a unified community.

Of the twelve elected members of the Legislative Council, nine were to be Greek elected by the “Greeks” on the island and three Turkish chosen by the “Turks.” After the island became a Crown Colony in 1924 as a result of the provisions of the Treaty of Lausanne, Greek representation was increased to twelve, proportional to their population, while Turkish representation remained unchanged. The Turkish inhabitants, or at least their elite or spokesmen, objected to the larger Greek representation.49 Since the notion of representation was a communal one, the Turkish plea for equal representation with

the Greeks contained considerable merit. It can be argued that one man, one vote is irrelevant if one is representing a communal entity, just as it is in the representation of states to international bodies and of counties in state legislative bodies.

The official British representation on the Legislative Council was always equal to the Greek representation, with the British assuming that any tie vote between the Greek and British representatives would be resolved in the latter's favor by the Turks.\(^5\) This presumption of deep-seated enmity between the Turks and Greeks was invalid in many instances, particularly in the earlier years of British rule before the nationalist cleavages between Greeks and Turks became firmly entrenched.

Equally significant in sharpening the cleavages between the two communal groups, particularly at the grass-roots level, were the repeated attempts of the British to segregate the groups at the village level. In 1882, the British enacted a Municipal Councils Law which provided for elected councils even in those villages where they had not existed previously.\(^5\) Council membership was to be distributed proportionally between the Islamic and Christian populations in a village. Members were of course to be elected by their coreligionists. This law was never effectively implemented, however. But in 1958, during negotiations to end the rebellion and grant independence, a British Order in Council authorized the preparation of separate electoral rolls; and "in accordance with the spirit of the decision whereby the communities were encouraged to order their own communal affairs," the governor was directed, "where local circumstances made this possible," to "authorize the establishment of separate Greek and Turkish Municipal Councils."\(^5\)

While ostensibly working within the traditionally existing framework, British policy—political, educational, and judicial—in area after area sharpened the divisions between the Muslim and Orthodox communities, extended their control and regulation over their members, redefined them in terms of nationalities, and located them within a modern political context. After the 1931 uprising, the constitution for Cyprus was suspended, although municipal elections and municipal councils were retained. This did not alter the conceptual framework in terms of which the British ruled Cyprus, however. The culmination of British

\(^5\) One member of the Colonial Office commented, "Whether it is wise to rely on the permanent hostility between the two sections of the population to carry into effect the policy of the Government is a matter of opinion." Ibid., p. 106.


policy may be seen in the provisions of the Constitution of 1960 which the British hailed for its equitable and just treatment of both Greeks and Turks.

**Two Sovereignties—No Supremacy**
The 1960 constitutional structure institutionalizes and legalizes at all levels, from the individual to the national, two separate political communities—the Greek and the Turkish. Its provisions, ranging from mandatory individual membership in one of the two communities to the separateness built into ostensibly national institutions, militates against the emergence of any characteristics at the institutional, group, or individual level that could facilitate the development of a Cypriot nationality, of loyalty to Cyprus, and hence of national integration, or, alternatively, of a conception of “Greekness” that could incorporate the Turks. The Cypriot social system operates as if it were two separate and closed systems initially and tenuously bound together in a shaky alliance within the organizational structure of the “national” level. By now, even this tenuous alliance is in shatters.

The Constitution as adopted was more than a concession to the spirit of compromise between two antagonistic groups, with Great Britain as arbiter. In part, British policy followed the classic “divide and rule” tactic. Sir Anthony Eden’s statement in 1955–56 that the Turkish government “should speak out, because it was the truth that the Turks would never let the Greeks have Cyprus,” was followed by British insistence that both the Greek and Turkish governments participate in negotiations for a treaty arrangement that was to include agreement on a constitution for Cyprus. As late as 1953, Turkish Foreign Minister Fuad Köprülü was stating that his government did not believe there was a Cyprus question. Until then, Turkish leaders voiced little interest in developments in Cyprus. But more fundamentally, the ability of Great Britain to exploit the antagonisms between Greek and Turkish Cypriots and to draw in the respective national governments was rooted in long-standing policies in Cyprus. The Constitution may have been structured in terms of the realities of Greco-Turkish relations, but these realities were largely a British creation.

55 Frances Noel-Baker (M. P., Swindon), ibid., p. 1655.
The signatories to the London and Zurich agreements of 1959, which became effective as of 1960, were Greece, Turkey, Great Britain, and Cyprus. They included three treaties and a draft Constitution for Cyprus. Among the provisions were guarantees for British bases and the right of Greece and Turkey to station troops on the island.\textsuperscript{57} By 1960, the reality that Britain had presupposed even in the late nineteenth century had become the living reality of the island; Greeks and Turks populated Cyprus and constituted separate communal groups. Any possibility of future moves to integrate the two communities and work toward the creation of a Cypriot nationality and a Cypriot state became virtually impossible as the result of the agreements. The 1960 Constitution created a constitutional order further polarizing the two communities by institutionalizing and legalizing them, and by giving each community powers that were tantamount to sovereignty. At the same time, no provisions were made for any institutional structures geared toward facilitating integration. The development of common institutions or associations, even on a voluntary basis, was largely precluded by the underlying assumption of the treaties, namely, that Cyprus was partly Greek and partly Turkish, an assumption that was implemented in granting to both Greece and Turkey legal international rights on the island, including that of stationing troops.

The Constitution provides two sets of parallel political institutions—one governing the Greek community, the other the Turkish.\textsuperscript{58} At the national level—where the same political institutions ostensibly govern both communities—separate representation was retained, and the representatives of each community were given such powers as to enable and encourage the thwarting of national decision-making.\textsuperscript{59}

Article 1 of the Constitution provides for a Greek president and a Turkish vice-president, elected separately by their respective communities. In fact, the ethnicity of all elected officials, chosen separately by the Greeks or the Turks who are registered in separate electoral rolls, is specified in the Constitution. Although ostensibly functioning within a unified executive and a unified legislature, the Greek and Turkish members constitute subgroups with power and authority greater than that exercised by the body as a whole. Thus, the president and the vice-president can separately exercise a final veto (with few limitations)

\textsuperscript{58} The following pages are based on an analysis of the Constitution of Cyprus adopted in August 1960.
\textsuperscript{59} A good study of the contemporary Cypriot political system dealing extensively with the political elite is found in Christos Leonidas Doumas, "The Problem of Cyprus" (Ph.D., diss., University of California, Los Angeles, 1963).
on decisions involving foreign affairs, defense, and security. Although
no absolute veto exists with regard to the national budget and to deci-
sions made by the Council of Ministers, both the president and the
vice-president, independently, can return bills, orders, and decrees for
reconsideration or appeal to the Constitutional Court, whose decisions
are final.

Similarly, the president and vice-president of the House of Repre-
sentatives are elected by the Greek and Turkish members respectively,
who in turn have been elected by the Greek and Turkish communities.
The whole notion of majority rule breaks down in the legislative body
as a result of the provisions that the enactment of certain legislation—
particularly that involving taxation, municipalities, and the electoral
law—requires separate majorities of Greek and Turkish representatives.

The constitutional requirement of separate representation for Greeks
and Turks in the legislative and executive branches, and the specifica-
tion of the ethnic composition of those bodies applies also to the
judiciary, the civil service, the security forces, and to subordinate po-
itical units. The Supreme Constitutional Court consists of one Greek,
one Turkish, and one neutral judge (President of the Court) who is
neither Greek, nor Turkish-Cypriot, nor a citizen of Greece or Turkey.
This Cypriot Court is probably unique in being charged with the respon-
sibility, upon request by one of several public officials, of determining
whether the decisions and actions of the Council of Ministers and the
House of Representatives are discriminatory against either the Greek
or Turkish community.60 No criteria as to what constitutes discrimina-
tion are indicated, but they are obviously to be derived from without
and beyond the Constitution. The underlying premise seems to be that
the conflict of interest between the two communities transcends, and
will and should continue to transcend, any common loyalty to the state;
hence it necessitates standards of judgement other than those provided
for in the Constitution.

The highest court of appeals is also composed of three judges—one
Greek, one Turkish, and one neutral. In both civil and criminal cases,
Greek Cypriots are to be tried before Greek judges and Turkish Cypriots
before Turkish judges.61 This dual administration of law negates the
very notion and feasibility of the impartial application of the law, and
presumes that a judge conceives of himself first as a Greek or Turk,

60 It should be pointed out that the British “neutral” judge resigned shortly
after his appointment.
61 In introducing a British legal system in 1883, the British nevertheless began
requiring that at least one of the justices sitting on any court be Muslim, one
Christian, and one British. The separate legal structures sharpened as the years
went on.
and only secondarily as a judge. Comparable provisions on compositon, appointive powers, and so on, govern the Public Service Commission, public service employees, the police and gendarmerie. The standard ratio of personnel distribution is seven Greeks to three Turks.

Any analysis of the constitutional provisions for decision-making in Cyprus would be invalid if it assumed that Cyprus has a political system comparable at least in some dimensions to the political system of a modern state. In fact, Cyprus has two distinct political systems—the Greek and the Turkish—and each community is governed by its respective Communal Chamber which is independent of the "national" political institutions already discussed. The Communal Chambers constitute the legitimate political authority. They are armed with extensive taxing powers and can legislate on matters related to personal status as well as on educational, cultural, and economic affairs. In addition to their executive offices, they can establish their own court systems to interpret and enforce their laws. These courts cannot imprison or use "measures of constraint" to compel compliance, however; in such cases, appeal must be made to the national courts.

The central government is not supreme, even constitutionally, since either community can block decisions through its national representatives. Furthermore, the behavior of the members of the Communal Chambers is governed by their relatedness to Greece or Turkey. Nowhere is this reflected more clearly than in the two educational systems, one modelled on that of Greece, the other on that of Turkey. The curriculum of the Greek schools, taught in Greek of course, extols Greek national history and "proves" the Greekness of Cyprus, while the curriculum in the Turkish schools is similarly structured in terms of Turkish nationalism. The Turkish Cypriots seem in fact to have retained a greater measure of control over their curricula than have the Greek Cypriots, since Turkish Cypriot textbooks still put forward the concept of Turkish nationalism as defined by Kemal Atatürk and have not adopted the modifications in later Turkish textbooks. By contrast the Greek Ministry of Education recently sent to Cyprus, over the opposition of President Makarios, textbooks for classroom use that attack President Makarios on the grounds that he is betraying the Greek cause and Greece. Consequently, the function of a national educational system—particularly essential for new nations—of socializing in terms of the values of the Cypriot nation and in developing loyalty to the nation-state is totally lacking. In its place are two educational systems engendering loyalty to Greece and to Turkey, respectively.

In recent years, the Turkish and Greek governments have both further extended their control over their respective communities. The
Turkish army is training young Turkish Cypriots and the Greek regime controls most facets of Greek Cypriot life. The Cypriot National Guard, Cyprus’ only armed force and now exclusively Greek Cypriot, is manned exclusively by Greek army officers from the mainland who are loyal to Premier Papadopoulos. The Papadopoulos regime recently stated that Greece is the center of Hellenism and that Makarios should subordinate himself to the Greek government.

While national integration is a multidimensional phenomenon, the formal framework is usually fairly easy to establish. Central institutions are national in scope, both in terms of their jurisdiction over a defined territorial area, and in terms of representing all the citizens within the state. As is evident from earlier discussion, the Cypriot constitutional framework, both in its institutional structure and its underlying premises on the nature of the polity, has created two autonomous political systems. Communal cleavages are thus exacerbated and accentuated.

The kinds of cleavages built into the political institutions permeate the entire social fabric and are constitutionally sanctioned. The very jurisdiction of the Communal Chambers over cultural, educational, and charitable activities, sports organizations, and cooperatives; the encouragement of subsidies from the Greek and Turkish governments for their own education, cultural, athletic, and charity activities on Cyprus; and the encouragement given to the employment of Greek and Turkish nationals in the educational institutions of the island—all these are determinants of the structure and values of the social system and set the stage for intergroup conflict. The communications media are similarly segregated between Greek and Turkish. The state-owned radio and television broadcasting system divides its presentations in terms of the seven-three ratio. The press is likewise separate; both Greek and Turkish newspapers and periodicals are virulent in their efforts to perpetuate intercommunal strife.

Voluntary organizations, in fact the entire private sphere, is as segregated as are the public institutions. Political parties, trade unions, professional and agricultural associations are divided along ethnic lines. Interestingly, the membership of AKEL, the powerful Communist organization of Cyprus, is limited to Greek Cypriots. No organization exists, to the author’s knowledge, that includes both Greeks and Turks. Joint participation in any activity or common membership in any organization has been gradually eliminated. Indicative of the increasing segregation of Greeks and Turks is the termination of competitive sports

63 For the formation of AKEL in 1941 and its early activities, see Hill, p. 435; for the ambivalent role of AKEL in the enosis movement, see Doumas.
between them, and the exclusion of members of the other ethnic groups from their teams—a situation that did not prevail even during the period of violent EOKA activity by the Greek Cypriots against the British, prior to independence. Whereas both Greek and Turkish teams functioned earlier in terms of ground rules relevant to the sports activities, such games began disintegrating into minor Greco-Turkish wars. Interethnic competition in sports was consequently abandoned even before the outbreak of communal violence in December 1963.

An underlying premise of the Cypriot political system is the legitimacy of the two communities; this prescribes an individual’s group membership and defines his loyalties. Despite constitutional guarantees of individual rights, their meaningfulness is considerably circumscribed in light of the priority given to communal “rights,” and in view of the prior claim of communal membership. Major problems in new nations include the breaking down of traditional group loyalties, the instilling of primary loyalty to the nation-state, the fostering of individual relatedness to the nation-state, and the spread of nationality as the principal reference group. No developments have taken place in Cyprus—at the political, sociological, or psychological level—that reveal the presence of any operative processes leading toward the formation of a nation-state or even toward the reduction of intergroup conflict. Any “natural” emergence of groups or organizations with common transcommunal goals, stemming from common economic or other interests, is extremely difficult in light of the constitutional requirement that the entire population function within their respective communities. The Constitution specifies the criteria by which determination of membership in the community shall be made and, in effect, prohibits the existence of an individual outside his ethnic group. The Armenians and Maronites, in turn, are forced by constitutional edict to opt for membership in one or the other of the two communities.

The gradual development of two politicized communal groups in Cyprus, culminating in the institutionalization in the Constitution of 1960, led almost inexorably to the communal violence of December 1963.64 Ever since then the communities have become even further segregated. President Makarios is constitutional head of the Cypriot national government, but his authority is limited to the Greek-Cypriot community, whereas Vice-President Denktash lives in the Turkish sector and leads the Turkish-Cypriot community. The separation is further symbolized by the barbed wire that geographically divides the Greek

and Turkish communities in urban centers, although not in villages, and the control by the Turkish of areas of the island that are off limits to Greek Cypriots. Incipient moves within Cyprus for the reestablishment of communication between the Greeks and Turks, and the apparent changing attitudes among some of the Greek Cypriot political leadership to favor independence rather than enosis, does not, as yet, find much support in the social fabric of the country nor in the constitutional order. The extension of President Makarios’ term of office in February 1973 for another five years and the failure of Grivas, for the moment at least, to mount a massive fanatic enosis movement, nevertheless may be indicative of some attitudinal changes among the Greek Cypriots.

It is evident that Cyprus does not have the institutional requisites, nor does its population have the individual behavioral patterns, necessary for forming or maintaining a nation-state. The emergence of two nationalities, in turn, was greatly facilitated by British policies which utilized the social system that prevailed prior to British rule, but redefined and reinterpreted it in such fashion that the emergence of separate Greek and Turkish nationalism on the island seems to have been inevitable. The intergroup conflict imbedded in the constitutional system founded on communalism has significance and implications for all former colonial areas where communal representation and separate electoral rolls, dating from British colonial policy, have been incorporated in their constitutional structure.

That the Greco-Turkish ruling elite of independent Cyprus may have desired to preserve the independence of Cyprus is evident in the data presented by Doumas, pp. 243 ff. It is beyond the scope of this article to deal with current developments related to Cyprus, such as the renewal of intercommunal talks. The solution will probably be imposed by Greece, Turkey, and the United States and will involve the double partition of the island or “de facto” partition in the form of “federation.” It is perhaps worth mentioning that Greek Cypriot negative attitudes toward dictatorial rule and the strength of the Greek Cypriot Communist Party, AKEL, seem to be bringing about attitudinal changes among the Greek Cypriot population. That they are identifying much less strongly with enosis accounts for Grivas’ failure so far to obtain massive support.