Group Formation and the Cultural Division of Labor

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A structural theory of the relationship between class and status group formation is presented. The approach postulates, first, that differences in the solidarity of any objectively defined groups are independently determined by the extent of stratification among these groups and interaction within them. These expectations are confirmed by an analysis of variation in the solidarity of 17 American ethnic groups in 1970. Second, the relative importance of class as against status group divisions in societies as a whole is held to depend upon the degree of hierarchy and segmentation of their respective cultural divisions of labor. Supportive evidence is found in the examination of differences in the strength of class voting among five Australian states in 1964.

Perhaps the last important contribution to the theory of social stratification in industrial societies was made long ago by Max Weber. In the famous essay “Class, Status, and Party” Weber did a great deal more than merely revise existing Marxian categories of stratification. Instead he proposed, not for the first time but in the clearest terms, a radically different type of category for the analysis of stratification: the Stand or status group.

The validity of this category does not depend upon the conceptual adequacy of what Weber refers to as “class” in his essay. Since it has often been pointed out that his use of this term is quite different from Marx’s own (Giddens 1973), the matter need not be pursued here. The significance of the concept Stand is that it countenances a basis for group formation—and consequent stratification—that is analytically independent of the relations of production. This is a possibility that Marxian theory had seemed to preclude. True, the distinction between Klasse an sich and Klasse für sich gives the Marxian concept of class some analytic flexibility. But it is essential to recognize that the class principle bonds individuals into groups solely on account of their common position within the existing relations of production. By contrast, the aggregation principle for a status group is ultimately some kind of cultural commonality (Hechter 1976b). A status

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group typically includes individuals of different classes, whereas a class typically includes individuals of different status groups. Class and status thus provide separate bases of group formation in complex societies.

Each principle of group formation tends to be associated with a characteristic form of political mobilization. A society divided into two hostile classes is presumably ripe for revolution, but a society divided into two hostile status groups—nations, for example—is threatened by secession. The consequences of class mobilization are therefore quite different from those of status mobilization. In order to understand the social structural basis for diverse phenomena such as revolution and nationalism, class and status must be recognized to be the Castor and Pollux of any system of stratification.

What determines the strength of these different principles of group formation in industrial societies? This is a question that has seldom been raised—and hardly investigated empirically. Most writers have tended to look at the world through either class or status lenses. Those interested in class have assumed that status factors act to inhibit class formation; while those interested in status have assumed the inverse. This paper argues that the analysis of stratification in industrial societies is better served by discarding these unidimensional concepts and turning instead to a concept that incorporates each dimension into a new whole: the cultural division of labor.

Marx, the preeminent class theorist, recognized that status groups such as the medieval guilds and estates existed in feudal Europe. However, he felt that as industrial capitalism developed group formation would increasingly be based upon class. Most 19th-century sociologists agreed with him. Marx's expectation that the class structure of capitalist societies would be divided into two hostile camps has not been fulfilled. It is certainly possible to divide the population of a society like the United States into two categories, workers and employers (Wright and Perrone 1977), but this kind of dichotomy probably obscures more than it illuminates. The problem cannot be solved merely by elaborating the class structure to include more than two strata. Indeed, the most serious dilemma for the class theorists is that there is not much evidence that these categories are etched deeply into the consciousness of individuals. Hence these are classes in name alone rather than solitary social groups: Klasse an sich has not been generally transformed into Klasse für sich. Recent followers of Marx have hardly been oblivious to this fact, and some have tried to specify the obstacles to the formation of class consciousness (Ollman 1972).

But the problem goes somewhat deeper than this. It is all very well to argue that class consciousness is a fragile creature that must be carefully sheltered from cold drafts and pathogens as if it were a newborn infant. But what can the class approach make of the abundant evidence that group formation in mature capitalism persists on another basis entirely, that of cultural similarity? Since the class theorist is primarily attuned to hier-
archical distinctions in the division of labor, his instinct is to somehow reduce a status group phenomenon like ethnicity to one of class. Ethnicity, in this view, must be a disguised and denatured form of class consciousness (Leon 1970). This conception can be meaningful only if all the members of an ethnic group occupy the same class position. But this happens rarely: ethnic groups are typically composed of members of different classes. Why should there be more commonality between the bourgeoisie and proletariat of one group than of another? Polanyi has posed it well: “There is no magic in class interests that would secure to members of one class the support of members of other classes. Yet such support is an everyday occurrence” (1957, p. 153). The basic theoretical problem at once becomes evident: How can the variable significance of class in social forms be accounted for by class itself?

It should be clear that for the same reason analyses couched entirely in terms of status cannot be wholly satisfactory. Not only does class intrude upon status (as does status upon class), but there is evidence that the strength of status group cohesion shifts significantly across groups as well as historical eras. Thus status group sentiments such as ethnic identity cannot be usefully conceived to be universal and a-historical imperatives of social organization in general. Little can be gained by the invocation of primordial sentiments (Shils 1957; Geertz 1963) to account for changes in the salience of ethnicity in industrial societies.

The solution must be found at the contextual—not the individual—level. Several recent contextual approaches to the problem of ethnic divisions emphasize the differential stratification of ethnic groups within the labor market (Bonacich 1972; Edwards, Reich, and Gordon 1975; Cain 1976). Analysis of the labor market in industrial societies reveals the existence of two distinct sectors: a primary sector composed of relatively high-paying jobs with good working conditions and employment stability and a secondary sector composed of low-paying jobs with poorer working conditions and chronic instability of employment (Piore 1975, p. 126). Incumbents in these different sectors of the labor market may be seen to have different objective interests. They may even receive different wages for performing the same tasks (Bonacich 1972). The fact that certain groups (blacks, Hispanics, and some other minorities in the United States) are found predominantly in secondary employment sectors and often receive lower wages than white workers in the same jobs provides a ready explanation for political divisions between black and white workers: the groups taken as a whole have different economic interests. As will be argued, there is a substantial element of truth in this position. Yet the approach is evidently limited in other respects. If the solidarity of minority groups in the United States were merely a function of their location within a labor market segment (or a split labor market), those groups sharing the same labor market segment

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should be expected (on the basis of this theory) to coalesce in pursuit of their common interests. Now American blacks and Hispanics are disproportionately represented in the secondary labor market, but neither group seems willing to relinquish its separate identity, and efforts to unite them into "rainbow coalitions" have proven notoriously unsuccessful. The same kind of observation might be made of Jews and Episcopalians.

Mindful of some of these issues, writers on "plural societies" hoped to shed light on differential ethnic solidarity by using comparative analysis. However, for two reasons their approach did not lead to the discovery of principles of stratification having general significance for industrial societies. For the most part they studied Third World states and not industrial states at all. But there was another difficulty as well. Explanations in these comparisons and case studies tended to focus on institutional differences as causal factors, but these very differences between the units of comparison vitiated the likelihood that general theories of any kind might emerge.2

This paper proposes a way out of the morass caused by the application of each of these concepts to the stratification of culturally heterogeneous societies. The cultural division of labor offers a more complex perspective. A cultural division of labor occurs whenever culturally marked groups are distributed in an occupational structure. However, since the distribution of such groups can take many different forms, cultural divisions of labor vary with respect to their degrees of hierarchy and segmentation. Variations in these two parameters are critical in determining the relative importance of class as against status group formation in all societies. First I shall discuss the determinants of group formation in general; then I shall attempt to explain variation in the strength of status and class cleavages among different social formations.

DETERMINANTS OF GROUP FORMATION IN INDUSTRIAL SOCIETIES: THE CASE OF ETHNIC GROUPS

Before discussing the conditions determining the relative strength of class as against status group formation it is necessary to consider how groups of any kind are formed. There is a remarkable consensus about the answer to this question. The simplest type of group formation—the limiting case, never approached in reality—would occur among an unstratified set of individuals who are evaluated identically for any social purpose. In a homogeneous aggregation of this kind groups, or self-conscious collectivities having boundaries, will tend to form on the basis of existing networks of

2 The theoretically modest achievements of the pluralist approach have been admitted by one of the school's leading members: "Indeed, [pluralism] is not a theory at all, but simply a set of sensitizing concepts to aid us in studying the complex reality of multi-ethnic systems and to steer us away from our concern with the 'society-culture' as a closed system" (van den Berghe 1974, p. 870).
interaction. This means there will be a positive relationship between the intensity of interaction among a set of individuals and the degree to which group solidarity develops (for an important statement, see Homans 1950).

Differential rates of group formation can arise to the degree that spatial factors act as barriers to interaction. If an aggregate is spatially dispersed—peasants in a region of isolated farmsteads rather than nucleated settlements, for example—the general level of interaction within it will tend to be low, as will its degree of group solidarity. Second, distance and geographical factors, such as mountain ranges and other natural boundaries, act to make some individuals more peripheral to networks of interaction than others who are more centrally located. This will consequently produce different rates of group formation within an aggregate which is otherwise unstratified.

Once this assumption about the homogeneity of the aggregate is relaxed somewhat to allow for cultural diversity, a further constraint on interaction is produced. This is because cultural differences between individuals generally impose barriers to communication between them. Language is the most obvious of these cultural differences, but it is by no means the only one. The interpretation of meanings across cultural boundaries is invariably problematic. Thus group formation among equals is determined by interaction rates which, in turn, are affected by the spatial organization and cultural diversity of the aggregate.

Group formation within a stratified population, that is, among a set of individuals having differential ownership of or access to resources, is more complex. For the element of stratification per se introduces an entirely different rationale for the formation of groups in addition to one based on interaction processes. When individuals can be objectively categorized as privileged or nonprivileged, group solidarity may follow from this very categorization. Therefore among a set of stratified individuals group formation can also occur reactively: a boundary emerges between sets of privileged and nonprivileged individuals. Further, since interaction across this boundary heightens the perception of stratification, it is more apt to stimulate hostility than mutual accommodation (LeVine and Cambell 1972, p. 29). Hence, although interaction is a critical element in the formation of groups its effects vary in different circumstances. Among equally privileged individuals interaction promotes an inclusive corporate identification, whereas among differentially privileged individuals it spurs conflict and leads to the formation of two or more antagonistic groups.

These conclusions emerge clearly from research on small groups, but there is no reason to doubt that they hold in most macroscopic settings as well,

3 Note that by this definition groups may exist in the absence of formal organization. For the best discussion of the conditions under which groups of this kind can develop formal organization, see Olson (1968).
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In any complex society, then, patterns of group formation should depend on two separate kinds of factors: the degree to which particular aggregates are differentially stratified (with the caveat that this differential stratification must be commonly perceived) and the degree to which interaction within these aggregates is maximized. To the extent that these conditions fail to be met prospects for group solidarity are diminished.

At this level of generality these propositions should apply to any arbitrarily defined sets of individuals. Thus, they should be capable of explaining variation in the cohesiveness of classes, status groups (including ethnic groups), age grades, or even the sexes. The discussion that follows will illustrate how these principles of group formation can be employed to account for variations in the solidarity of objectively defined ethnic groups in American society. Such groups are composed of individuals sharing one or more cultural markers. Whereas any perceptible sign or marker may take on significance for patterns of interaction within societies, the most important cultural markers are language, religion, and skin color.4

Ultimately, the determinants of group formation in any society must be found empirically. The answers can presumably be elicited by examining patterns of stratification and interaction in workplaces, neighborhoods, institutions, and voluntary associations of all kinds. Whereas it is theoretically possible to obtain information of this quality at the national level, the expense of generating it is prohibitive.

The approach adopted here offers a simplified means of estimating these patterns for industrial societies as a whole in the absence of complete data. The division of labor is emphasized for two reasons. First, in industrial societies an individual's occupation gives the clearest indication of his overall position in the stratification system. Second, social relations within the workplace will determine much about the course of interaction in other spheres of social life as well. This is only partially due to the fact that many of the waking hours of most people are spent in workplaces of one kind or another. Occupations also directly shape interaction patterns by influencing residential location (through rents, in the first instance [Hawley 1950, p. 282], and through proximity to the workplace, in the second) and by promoting divergent styles of life and social identities (Kohn 1969, pp. 165–88).

The first factor affecting the strength of group solidarity is the position of the group in the stratification system. In general, the lower its position, the greater the probability that its members will come to think of them-

4 In an ingenious series of small group experiments Tajfel (1970, 1974) succeeded in creating in- and out-group distinctions among subjects on the basis of the slenderest objective differences between them—for example, whether subjects preferred paintings by Klee or Kandinsky. From these experimental results he concluded that social categorizations of all kinds are easily stimulated.
workers have occupied low-ranking positions in a particular group, the psychic significance of membership in that group will tend to recede or to disappear altogether. This can be illustrated easily in the case of ethnic groups. The range of life chances available to white Anglo-Saxon Protestant males in the United States is virtually limitless: no significant occupations—or other rewards—are denied to anyone solely on account of his membership in this category. Because of this, individual success or failure cannot easily be attributed to any characteristics of the category as a whole. The life chances of such persons may well be affected by other characteristics—by differences in their class or geographical origins, for instance—but they are not at all affected by this ethnic one. This is a situation encouraging individualistic orientations to action rather than the collectivistic orientations implied by having a strong ethnic identity.

However, the situation is reversed among groups clustered in the lowest reaches of the stratification system. In societies having an egalitarian ideology it is rather difficult for persons in disadvantaged ethnic groups to imagine that poverty has befallen them entirely by chance. To do so would be an admission of collective inferiority. It is far more likely that such individuals will sense a connection between their own position in the stratification system and that of the group as a whole. Perhaps they will come to think their material disadvantage occurs precisely on account of their ethnic distinctiveness. Often they will not have far to look for evidence supporting this perception because discrimination abounds against all such groups. There are two possible reactions to this dilemma. Some may attempt to conceal their ethnic origins, redefining them if necessary. Others, for whom escape is impossible or undesirable, will tend to identify on the basis of their ethnic distinctiveness; many will come to consider themselves members of a corporate group having similar interests. This sense of corporateness is the mark of high group solidarity.

But this does not mean that all ethnic groups achieving high position in the stratification system necessarily have low solidarity. Such groups may have quite different rates of intraethnic interaction. Even among high-ranking groups other distinctions emanating from the occupational structure may serve to encourage or to inhibit the strength of intragroup interaction, and therefore solidarity. This is because there are many different kinds of occupations at each level of the stratification system. Miners and textile workers may both belong to low-ranking occupations, but differences in the

However, this is not likely to be the case in situations where individuals are assigned to occupations solely on an ascriptive basis. In a society like 19th-century India, for example, members of a high-ranking caste are no less likely to be solidary than those of a low-ranking one because membership in each category is equally determinative of individual life chances. Similarly, in medieval western Europe there is no reason to suspect the feudal nobility to be any less solidary than the dependent peasantry.
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nature of each task, its ecological setting, and the conditions of labor are all important in determining the degree of solidarity that should emerge in each group (Kerr and Siegel 1954). The prospects for group formation among a population of miners would doubtless be greater than those among a population divided equally between miners and textile workers.

For this reason it is essential to consider the extent to which given groups are clustered in particular occupational niches. This differential clustering will be termed the occupational specialization of a group. Highly specialized ethnic groups have stereotypical occupations. At the extreme, information about an individual’s ethnicity would enable a stranger to predict his occupation. In industrial societies, however, occupational specialization is always a matter of degree. Other differences aside, an occupationally specialized ethnic group is more likely to develop solidarity than one that is unspecialized (Barth 1969; Cohen 1969; Hannerz 1974; Yancey, Ericksen, and Juliani 1976). This is principally due to two factors. First, occupations can be an important domain for intragroup interaction. Personal relations within the work setting tend to reinforce the sense of ethnic similarity, as experience is shared through a common cultural idiom. In such circumstances, associations of workers—be they trade unions or professional societies—take on a heavily ethnic flavor. Second, occupations tend to have distinct economic interests. Thus, to the extent that an occupation is monopolized by a particular ethnic group that group will have material interests in common.

The causes of occupational specialization among ethnic groups in industrial societies are largely unexplored (but for one attempt, see Fauman 1968). Strangely, this is less true for preindustrial societies. Comte once noted that in all societies where a moral tradition is the sole preserver of ideas and practices it is inevitable and necessary for fathers to transmit their occupations to their sons (see Bouglé 1971, pp. 36–37). In any complex handicraft industry, nothing is more precious than technical education. Religious minorities (Jews in Christian Europe; Armenians in the Ottoman Empire) sometimes are licensed to engage in occupations that are denied to those of the majority faith. But neither of these considerations has much effect in contemporary industrial societies. It is likely that occupational specializations developed in societies of large-scale immigration because of a complex calculus of factors including the distribution of opportunities at the time of the group’s entry, the level of skill of the immigrants, the structure of kinship and social organization in the place of origin, and policies addressed toward particular groups by the state or organized labor (see Glazer 1958, pp. 138–46). Ethnicity itself can cause specialization since the kinds of jobs people get is in part a function of whom they know. But the task of unraveling these elements lies ahead.

6 A recent study of patterns of job recruitment among a sample of professional, technical, and managerial “workers” finds that a major determinant of getting a job is an
Once an occupation becomes ethnically specialized—particularly a relatively valued occupation—it is likely to be monopolized by the group for some time to come. The control over job information is crucial for the maintenance of occupational specialization. And once an ethnic group attains a monopoly over a relatively valued occupation, incentives are provided for future generations to identify with the group and thereby to resist assimilation.

Thus, the position of any kind of group in the stratification system and the extent of its occupational specialization should independently affect the degree of its solidarity. Each factor refers to a type of social structural niche which leads to particular kinds of group interests. Arguments have been advanced to suggest that the lower the position of any objectively defined group in the stratification system, the higher its resulting solidarity will be; and the greater its occupational specialization, the higher its resulting solidarity.

These ideas can be tested by using a simple three-variable model. The solidarity of each ethnic group is the dependent variable, while the independent variables are the position of the ethnic group in the system of stratification, and the extent of its occupational specialization. This test uses data on 17 ethnic groups drawn from the 1970 Public Use Samples of the United States census. These comprise 1% representative samples drawn from census interview schedules for the persons and the households, respectively, of the entire American population.

For the purpose of studying ethnic group formation these data have some important advantages as well as significant limitations. The most obvious advantage is the size and representativeness of the sample. This makes it possible to study many groups which are too small to be analyzed in the most extensive sample surveys. While this test is necessarily cross-sectional, projects are now under way at several universities to create comparable Public Use Samples for previous censuses, beginning in the 19th century. When these data have been collected, it will be possible to trace the evolution of contemporary patterns of group formation in great detail. The methods employed here can be applied—with minor modifications—to the individual's access to relevant networks—through personal contact—which leads to information about where jobs are and how they may be acquired. The author concludes that "information in any society is both costly and valuable; there is no reason why it should be expected to flow easily unless there is direct compensation or a personal tie" (Granovetter 1974, p. 99). To the extent that ethnic groups make up friendship networks (see Laumann 1973) in given localities, occupational specialization is likely to be enhanced by these processes. This is because information costs will be generally lower among individuals within such ethnic groups than between them. The ethnic boundary is quintessentially an information boundary, as research on linguistic code switching has shown (Blom and Gumperz 1971). Thus "ascription involves using an existent, pre-established structure as a resource rather than creating a new specialized structure for the same purpose" (Mayhew 1969).

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analysis of similar problems in earlier Public Use Samples. However, the representativeness of the sample is achieved at some cost. As in all census data, there is very little information on the respondents’ parents, and none at all on their religion. It is only possible to identify racial minorities and those who tend to be first- or second-generation immigrants. All told these groups constitute 37% of the American population.

Ethnic groups were defined for a subsample of all employed males \( (N = 56,000). \) To include data on the largest possible number of ethnic groups three separate cultural markers have been considered: race, mother tongue, and (in the case of English and French speakers) national origin. The final list of 17 was selected so as to maximize the number of distinct groups while preserving their internal homogeneity as much as possible (see table 1).8

The first task is to find an indicator of each group’s position in the stratification system. Although there has been a long-standing debate about the most appropriate measures of stratification, few options are available when analyzing census data. This is because the census collects much information about occupations but none at all about classes—at least about classes in Marxian terms. Yet there is undoubtedly a healthy correlation between measures of stratification based on class and those based on occupational criteria. For this reason the mean occupational prestige of each group can serve as an adequate indicator.9 These means vary considerably, from 27 (for the blacks) to 48 (for Yiddish speakers). Yet it would be wrong to assume that low ranking groups have a much greater tendency to be clustered in a single stratum of the labor market, and consequently have greater solidarity on this account, than groups of high rank. The rather high standard deviations for these means attest to the fact that there is considerable stratification within each of these groups.10

The indicator of occupational specialization measures the extent to which the set of occupied males in each cultural group deviates from being ran-

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7 In order to eliminate the confounding effects of sex on occupational attainment, the analysis was confined to males.

8 In the case of one group, composed of individuals with Scandinavian mother tongues, aggregation was necessary due to small sample sizes. Other small groups that could not justifiably be aggregated (Russian, Lithuanian, and Ukrainian language groups among others) were not included in the analysis. Nearly 63% of this sample, Caucasians having English as a mother tongue and both parents born in the United States, is treated as unidentifiable here (and is not included in the following analyses) since third- and fourth-generation Americans of many different ancestries are included in this category.

9 This analysis uses an index of occupational prestige based upon the method devised by Duncan (1961) but specifically adapted to the occupational categories of the 1970 census by Temme (1975).

10 Thus, it is quite conceivable that for individuals within each group education (and other factors) may well determine occupational achievement. The present discussion is, of course, concerned with the stratification of groups.
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domly distributed among the occupational categories.\footnote{This measure is defined as follows:}

\[ X_1 = 10 \left[ \sum_{i}^{441} \left( \frac{N_{ij}}{N_j} - \frac{1}{K} \right)^2 \right] \]

where \( N_{ij} \) is the number of individuals in cultural group \( j \) employed in occupation \( i \); \( N_j \) is the total number of individuals in cultural group \( j \), and \( K = 441 \).

\[ \text{TABLE 1} \]

\textbf{CHARACTERISTICS OF ETHNIC GROUPS, 1970}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ETHNIC GROUP</th>
<th>OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALIZATION</th>
<th>OCCUPATIONAL PRESTIGE</th>
<th>TERRITORIAL CONCENTRATION</th>
<th>INDEX OF ENDOGAMY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( M ) ( SD )</td>
<td>( N^* )</td>
<td></td>
<td>( N^\dagger )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Black</td>
<td>0.138</td>
<td>26.74 14.65</td>
<td>2.93</td>
<td>4,756</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Asian</td>
<td>0.155</td>
<td>35.85 19.63</td>
<td>11.84</td>
<td>415</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. British</td>
<td>0.129</td>
<td>41 10 17.14</td>
<td>3.86</td>
<td>821</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Irish</td>
<td>0.118</td>
<td>38.78 16.47</td>
<td>5.43</td>
<td>470</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Other English speaking</td>
<td>0.149</td>
<td>40.82 16.91</td>
<td>3.38</td>
<td>2,476</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. French-Canadian</td>
<td>0.126</td>
<td>37.16 14.41</td>
<td>4.24</td>
<td>700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. German</td>
<td>0.160</td>
<td>38.33 16.60</td>
<td>4.30</td>
<td>2,326</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Scandinavian</td>
<td>0.178</td>
<td>37.85 16.34</td>
<td>4.60</td>
<td>659</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Italian</td>
<td>0.126</td>
<td>36.52 15.20</td>
<td>6.28</td>
<td>1,692</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Yiddish speaking</td>
<td>0.370</td>
<td>47.62 17.94</td>
<td>11.60</td>
<td>689</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Polish</td>
<td>0.116</td>
<td>36.18 14.92</td>
<td>4.74</td>
<td>1,025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Czech</td>
<td>0.199</td>
<td>37.34 16.60</td>
<td>3.84</td>
<td>191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Slovak</td>
<td>0.126</td>
<td>37.30 15.79</td>
<td>6.93</td>
<td>209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Hungarian</td>
<td>0.111</td>
<td>37.25 17.62</td>
<td>3.35</td>
<td>181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Greek</td>
<td>0.273</td>
<td>39.56 16.30</td>
<td>4.13</td>
<td>178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Dutch</td>
<td>0.225</td>
<td>39.14 18.08</td>
<td>3.78</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Hispanic</td>
<td>0.153</td>
<td>28.92 15.80</td>
<td>4.91</td>
<td>1,795</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unidentifiable</td>
<td>0.101</td>
<td>36.47 16.87</td>
<td></td>
<td>36,231</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other nonwhite</td>
<td>0.145</td>
<td>27.99 15.25</td>
<td></td>
<td>243</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian-Ukrainian</td>
<td>0.130</td>
<td>39.09 17.27</td>
<td></td>
<td>192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuanian</td>
<td>0.193</td>
<td>40.49 16.16</td>
<td></td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuban</td>
<td>0.211</td>
<td>34.13 17.24</td>
<td></td>
<td>126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-English-speaking white</td>
<td>0.116</td>
<td>38.34 17.34</td>
<td>1,001</td>
<td>307</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>35.95 16.95</td>
<td>56,600</td>
<td>41,505</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


\* Refers to the total number of employed (or occupied) males enumerated in each ethnic category. All variables in cols. 1-4 are calculated from this baseline.

\dagger The total number of married males (employed or not) enumerated in each ethnic category. It is used to create the endogamy variable.

\$ Includes Swedish, Danish, Norwegian, and Finnish mother tongues.

\textit{Note.—Data are for males only.}
rently listed in the United States, the categorization used here is detailed enough to point up the truth of certain stereotypes about ethnic employ-
ment.12 Blacks are overrepresented as janitors; Asians as farm laborers, cooks and waiters, and gardeners. Hispanics are disproportionately employed as farm laborers and unskilled urban laborers. The Irish are more likely to be policemen than any other group; the Italians to be barbers. Eastern European groups are found especially as skilled industrial workers; Germans, Scandinavians, Czechs, and Dutch are overrepresented as farmers, while Yiddish-speaking Jews are concentrated in management, sales, medicine, and accountancy. However, there are also some less obvious findings. The French-Canadians in this sample are most specialized in management. Although Asians are likely to be employed in restaurants, they also have a niche in electrical engineering, and Hungarians are overrepresented as designers.

Last, ethnic group solidarity must be indicated by the strength of senti-
ments binding individuals into a collectivity; it alludes to the quality of rela-
tions existing among individuals sharing certain cultural markers. In the absence of attitudinal data, the measurement of group solidarity must be deduced from behavioral evidence. There is general consensus that endogamy is the ultimate measure of the salience of boundaries for intergroup relations (Merton 1941; Schumpeter 1955; Bromley 1976), and this rea-
soning has been adopted here. Ethnically endogamous groups are less open to interethnic interaction than exogamous ones, and there is ample evidence of a negative association between exogamy and ethnic identity among American males (see, for example, Alba 1976).13

12 Even so, this measure underestimates the actual occupational specialization of Amer-
ican ethnic groups. This is because the census does not provide enough detailed infor-
mation for more accurate estimates. Some of this detail may be illustrated from a survey of the occupations of Japanese Americans resident in the western United States who were placed in detention camps in the spring of 1942. Although the Japanese operated only 3.9% of all farms in California and harvested 2.7% of all cropland harvested, they produced 90% or more of the following crops: snap beans for marketing; celery, spring and summer; peppers; strawberries. They produced 50%-90% of the following: arti-
chokes; snap beans for canning; cauliflower; celery, fall and winter; cucumbers; fall peas; spinach; tomatoes. Finally, they produced from 25%-50% of the following:

13 An adequate measure should take into account the proportions of each group in the popula-
tion as well as its age-sex composition (see Price and Zubrzycki 1962; Romney 1971). For the purpose of testing the models of ethnic solidarity here, however, a com-
monly used index of endogamy that controls only for differential group size is employed (Savorgnan 1950; Hutchinson 1957; Lieberson 1963). The measure is derived from a different population from that used to create the previous measures, namely, the set of
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The zero-order correlation matrix for these variables (table 2) reveals that endogamy is moderately correlated with occupational prestige \((r = -0.534)\), but appears unrelated to occupational specialization. In general, the more specialized groups have occupations of higher prestige \((r = 0.549)\). The significance of the occupational-specialization variable emerges only in the regression equation. When the rate of endogamy is regressed on both occupational specialization and the mean prestige score, fully 73% of the variance is explained (table 3). Further, the signs of the regression coefficients are in the predicted directions. Thus, the greater the occupational specialization of a group, the greater its rate of endogamy when the effects of prestige are controlled. Conversely, the greater the occupational prestige of a group, the less its rate of endogamy when the effects of specialization are controlled. While mean occupational prestige has a somewhat stronger effect on variation in endogamy \((b = -0.973)\), the effect of occupational specialization is also potent \((b = 0.800)\). If endogamy is accepted as a de-

**TABLE 2**

**RELATIONSHIP OF GROUP FORMATION VARIABLES \((N = 17)\)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Zero-Order Correlations</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Mean occupational prestige</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Occupational specialization</td>
<td>0.549</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Index of endogamy</td>
<td>-0.534</td>
<td>0.266</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TABLE 3**

**DETERMINANTS OF ENDOGAMY: EFFECT OF OCCUPATIONAL STRUCTURE VARIABLES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>(b)</th>
<th>(B^*)</th>
<th>(F)</th>
<th>Significance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mean occupational prestige</td>
<td>-0.973</td>
<td>-0.054</td>
<td>34.678</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupational specialization</td>
<td>0.800</td>
<td>2.786</td>
<td>23.421</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note. - \(R^2 = 0.733, F = 19.191, \text{significance} = .000, N = 17.\)*

* Unstandardized regression coefficient.

married couples in the 1% sample (thus, including males without any occupation). Since differences in endogamy are based upon a population of married couples, the effects of differential age-sex composition among the groups should be small. Hence potential error creeps into the analysis from at least two separate directions. First, there are differences in the populations used to create the independent variables and the dependent variable. Second, the sample may include recent immigrants to the United States, but there is no way to determine whether any given marriage occurred outside the country—for example, in the country of emigration. It should therefore be expected that the most recent groups to immigrate in large numbers will have inflated rates of endogamy. For all of these reasons, even in the unlikely event that this were a perfectly specified and complete model, it could not be expected wholly to predict the variation in endogamy among these different groups.

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cent indicator of the salience of group boundaries, any explanation of ethnic
group solidarity must include both of these parameters. Each is important
quite apart from the effects of the other. Attention has already been drawn
to the salience of boundaries between ethnic groups having similar positions
within the stratification system. An important reason for the tenuousness of
"rainbow coalitions" among racial minorities in the United States is eluci-
dated by this analysis: blacks and Hispanics are specialized in very different
occupations.

It must be stressed that this simple structural explanation of ethnic
solidarity was made without reference to a host of factors often held respon-
sible for its development—territorality, institutional completeness, and the
cultural legacies of particular groups, among others. There is little doubt
that these factors play an important role in the determination of ethnic
solidarity; it will be seen that territoriality even has causal significance.
Most, however, are probably dependent on a group's position in the occupa-
tional structure.

The model is more successful in accounting for solidarity in some of these
groups than others. Analysis of the residual values from the regression equa-
tion reveals that the endogamy rate among Asians, Yiddish speakers, blacks,
and Italians is significantly underestimated by this equation, indicating that
solidarity among these groups is not simply a function of their position in the
occupational structure: territorial concentration has an independent effect.
The greater the territorial concentration of an ethnic group, the more likely
its intragroup interaction and therefore its solidarity. When a measure of
the territorial concentration of ethnic groups in counties is added to the
stepwise regression equation,14 89% of the variance in endogamy rates is
explained—an increase of 16% (table 4; see also table 1). The residual
values for Asians, Yiddish speakers, and Italians are considerably reduced
by the addition of the territorial variable. The residual for blacks, however,
remains high since they are so dispersed geographically. Despite their lack
of territorial concentration (when counties are taken as the unit of analysis)
blacks are extremely segregated residentially—a dimension this crude eco-
logical variable cannot tap. National estimates of the respective residential

14 This measure was developed by Thomas Hall from a combination of two geographi-
cal units: county groups (N = 149) and individual counties. A cross-tabulation of
ethnic groups by county groups was produced from the census tape. Each county group
containing more than 2% of all ethnic groups was broken down into its constituent
counties. This combination of county groups and counties yielded 244 distinct areal
units. The measure of territorial concentration is based only on those cells (in the cross-
tabulation of ethnic groups by areal units) containing 2% or more of each ethnic group.
The cumulative percentage of each group contained in these cells was then divided by
the total number of cells meeting the 2% criterion. The resulting measure is the mean
percentage per cell for cells containing 2% or more of an ethnic group.
TABLE 4
DETERMINANTS OF ENDOGAMY: EFFECT OF OCCUPATIONAL STRUCTURE VARIABLES AND TERRITORIAL CONCENTRATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>$b$</th>
<th>$B^*$</th>
<th>$F$</th>
<th>Significance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mean occupational prestige</td>
<td>-1.046</td>
<td>-0.54</td>
<td>90.026</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupational specialization</td>
<td>0.656</td>
<td>2.287</td>
<td>33.320</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Territorial concentration</td>
<td>0.465</td>
<td>0.040</td>
<td>19.209</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note.—$R^2 = .892, F = 35.838$, significance = .000, $N = 17$.
* Unstandardized regression coefficient.

The territorial variable is by far the weakest of these three determinants of endogamy. This suggests that the territoriality of a group may be in part a function of its position in the occupational structure (for some evidence supporting this position, see Guest and Weed [1976]). Thus, to a remarkable degree, the predicted relationships are borne out in this test.

ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ETHNIC AND CLASS IDENTITY

The previous section presented a simple structural account of group formation in a context where only one type of group membership, ethnicity, was considered. It argued that the solidarity of a group is increased to the extent that both intergroup stratification and intragroup interaction are maximized. But this is an unduly simplified picture. Group formation in industrial societies is complicated by the fact that individuals must choose between several identities, and these identities may be more congruent or less so. Just as every individual may be assigned to a particular ethnic group on the basis of such markers as language, religion, or skin color, so he may be assigned to many other kinds of groups on the basis of different criteria. Most important, each member of an ethnic group is simultaneously a member of a particular class.

Classes are comprehensive groups made up of individuals having a common relationship to the means of production. They are quite limited in number and are hierarchically ordered. By definition classes have antagonistic material interests and, presumably, a sharp social boundary separates them (Ossowski 1963, pp. 135–36). Like any other groups, classes may be more or less self-conscious. The social structural (as against ideological or political) conditions leading to the development of class consciousness should be similar to those promoting any other type of group consciousness. Thus it should be expected that the greater the material and social distance between proletariat and bourgeoisie, the greater the probability that the proletariat as a whole will be class conscious. This is one of the central arguments in
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The Communist Manifesto. And the greater the intensity of interaction within the proletariat, the greater its resultant solidarity. Hence Marx placed great emphasis on the ecological obstacles to class consciousness among French peasants in The 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte: these are seen to impose barriers to communication among individuals otherwise having the potential to form a single corporate group.

If any individual identifies primarily with others having a similar relation to the means of production he may be said to be class conscious. If, on the other hand, he identifies primarily with others bearing similar cultural markers, irrespective of their relationship to the means of production, he may be said to be ethnically conscious. The question therefore arises: what determines which of these potential bases of association is relatively stronger?

Patterns of both stratification and interaction play a role here. To the extent that group formation occurs through interaction processes, class formation will predominate if most interaction occurs within classes and between ethnic groups. (For the purposes of argument, only two types of group formation are considered here. The situation is complicated by the addition of more types, but it is not fundamentally changed.) On the other hand, ethnicity will be favored if most interaction occurs within ethnic groups and between classes. It follows that neither will be favored if interaction occurs within classes and ethnic groups simultaneously.

Similarly, if an individual perceives his class origin to be more important for the determination of his life chances than his ethnicity, he is more likely to be class than ethnically conscious. Correlatively, if his ethnicity appears to be more important than his class origins in this respect, his ethnic identity will be more salient. Of course the respective weight of these independent factors in the establishment of ethnic and class identities remains to be determined empirically.

In the discussion which follows an attempt will be made to discover the relative importance of class as against ethnic identity among the 17 American ethnic groups. Owing to the absence of any attitudinal measures the analysis will perform be based on patterns of class and ethnic endogamy. There is little doubt that this provides rather indirect evidence of class and ethnic identity. Yet there are also grounds to believe that endogamy is a decent, if imperfect, indicator of both ethnic and class boundaries. Endogamy has been used previously to indicate the strength of ethnic boundaries, but it can serve the same purpose in the case of class boundaries. Thus it has been found that British workers with wives of white-collar origins have lower rates of participation in working-class voluntary associations, and less class awareness, than their comrades who married within the working class (Goldthorpe et al. 1969, pp. 112–13, 159–60).

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The data on ethnic endogamy presented above shed no light on the relationship between ethnic and class identity within these groups. One way to learn about this is to ask whether each group of males chooses its wives from similar class or ethnic backgrounds. Since marriage represents more than a casual alliance between families, it opens new avenues for primary interaction, avenues that are to some degree obligatory (especially among the working class). Each group's willingness to cross ethnic or class lines in its marital behavior should reveal something about the salience of these respective categories as social boundaries.

Measurement problems continue to complicate the picture. The Public Use Samples do not provide information on fathers' occupations for either the male or female respondents. Hence estimates of class origin must be made. Since father's occupation is rather strongly correlated with both son's (Blau and Duncan 1967, p. 169) and daughter's (Treiman and Terrell 1975, pp. 179–80) educational attainment, the latter variable can reasonably stand as a proxy. Table 5 compares the probabilities of homogamous marriages on both class and ethnic dimensions. Despite the indirectness of the class measure the results are strikingly unambiguous. Whereas rates of ethnic endogamy vary among the groups all the way from .99 to .16, about

TABLE 5
EFFECTS OF CLASS AND ETHNIC ORIGIN ON MARITAL CHOICE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ETHNIC GROUP</th>
<th>Probabilities of</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ethnic Endogamy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Class Endogamy*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ethnic and Class</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Class Endogamy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ethnic and Class</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Class Endogamy*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ethnic Endogamy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Exogamy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Exogamy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>.985</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>.877</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic</td>
<td>.777</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yiddish speaking</td>
<td>.601</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greek</td>
<td>.519</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italian</td>
<td>.478</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French-Canadian</td>
<td>.411</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dutch</td>
<td>.405</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polish</td>
<td>.395</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German</td>
<td>.350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungarian</td>
<td>.336</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech</td>
<td>.313</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovak</td>
<td>.310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scandinavian</td>
<td>.270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irish</td>
<td>.215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other English</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>speaking</td>
<td>.207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British</td>
<td>.155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unidentifiable</td>
<td>.857</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Indicated by level of educational attainment of the respective couples. The categories are based on highest grade achieved—16 and above, 12–15, 11 and under.
two-thirds of the males in each group are likely to choose a spouse from the same class background. Yet this does not indicate the relative importance of either factor as a social boundary because the effects of class and ethnicity are confounded. Columns 3–6 disentangle these effects by portraying patterns of marital choice in each group as a series of four separate probabilities. These are the probability that a marriage occurs within the same class and ethnic group (col. 3); the probability that it occurs across both class and ethnic lines (col. 4); the probability that it crosses ethnic lines alone (col. 5); and the probability that it crosses class lines alone (col. 6).

Insofar as marital choice affects an individual's class or ethnic identity, class endogamy should facilitate class identity, whereas ethnic endogamy should facilitate ethnic identity. Hence columns 3 and 4 are of no use in determining which of these factors is stronger among the various groups. Columns 5 and 6, however, do provide some evidence of the relative permeability of class as against ethnic boundaries. The probability that cross-ethnic marriage occurs among individuals of the same class rises dramatically from the blacks (.010) to the British (.527). On the other hand, the probability that cross-class marriage occurs among individuals within the same ethnic group falls in a continuum from the blacks (.320) to the British (.054). Thus there is a strong positive relationship between a group's overall level of ethnic endogamy and its preference for marriages across class as against ethnic lines. To illustrate: blacks are 30 times more likely to marry across class than ethnic lines whereas the British group is nearly 10 times more likely to engage in cross-ethnic than cross-class marriages.

Altogether these findings indicate that individuals in ethnically exogamous groups are more likely to interact along class than along ethnic lines. It may reasonably be argued that on this account they are more likely to develop class identities and thus will be more open to the ideology of class consciousness than are individuals from ethnically endogamous groups. The relationship between class and ethnic identity among these groups is therefore to some degree a competitive one.

CLASS AND ETHNIC CLEAVAGES AT THE SOCIETAL LEVEL:
THE ROLE OF THE CULTURAL DIVISION OF LABOR

Heretofore the ethnic group has been taken as the unit of analysis in order to explore the determinants of group solidarity. Now the focus shifts to a higher level of analysis—that of the social formation as a whole. The task

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15 It is worth emphasizing that differences in the overall rates of ethnic endogamy cannot wholly be accounted for either by the group's position in the stratification system (see table 4), or—at the individual level—by holding educational attainment constant. The probabilities of ethnic endogamy among males with 16 or more years of education vary all the way from .14 to .98.
is to discover the consequences of different patterns of ethnic stratification on the salience of class and ethnic cleavages in the polity.

The widespread belief of the classical social theorists that class would supersede ethnicity and other status-based identities rested in part upon the assumption that the spatial and cultural barriers to intraclass communication would be eroded in the course of industrialization. A long list of structural changes—including the separation of workplace and residence; the increased scale of social production; urbanization, leading to that famous cauldron, the melting pot; the breakup of extended families; the greater efficiency of labor and commodity markets; and the establishment of universal education in the national language—all seemed to insure that interaction would occur increasingly on an intraclass rather than an intraethnic basis.

Moreover, many of these theorists anticipated that under capitalism individuals would be assigned to jobs on universalistic grounds, relating to skill and efficiency, which in principle would be orthogonal to membership in ethnic groups. For this reason there was every expectation that ethnic groups—and all other kinds of status groups—would in time have equivalent positions in the social structure. If ethnicity had little effect on an individual’s life chances its force would surely diminish—and there would be one fewer obstacle to the formation of self-conscious classes.

But this simple expectation overlooked several things. First was the importance of international migration. Every developing industrial economy was faced from time to time with shortages of unskilled labor that were frequently met by labor recruitment from less developed sectors of the world economy. The resulting waves of immigration promoted ethnic stratification instead of reducing it (Hechter 1976a; Castells 1975). This view also underestimated the role of informal interaction networks for getting jobs and choosing residential location. These and other factors are responsible for the reality that at least some ethnic groups continue to hold particular niches in the social structure of the United States and in many other industrial countries. The fact that they do so reinforces, or institutes anew, their ethnic identity somewhat to the detriment of loyalty to that wider and more culturally heterogeneous group, their class.

If class cleavages should prove to be muted in those societies where ethnicity has great salience, what are the societal conditions promoting ethnic solidarity in general? From the earlier analysis it has been seen that ethnic solidarity will be strengthened to the extent that interethnic stratification and intraethnic interaction are both maximized. Since a society with these characteristics should have strong ethnic cleavages it should have weak class cleavages. On the other hand, to the degree that interethnic stratification decreases and interethnic interaction increases, the prospects for class formation will be enhanced.

These general issues may be approached by using the concept of the cul-
tural division of labor. Whenever individuals having different cultural markers (in this case, ethnicity) are distributed through an occupational structure a cultural division of labor is thereby formed. However, since the pattern of the distribution of culturally marked groups in the occupational structure is variable, the cultural division of labor may take on different configurations. Just as a group's position in the occupational structure determines much about its level of solidarity, so the configuration of the cultural division of labor will affect the relative salience of ethnic as against class cleavages in the society as a whole.

The two defining parameters of the configuration of a cultural division of labor are its degrees of hierarchy and of segmentation. A cultural division of labor is *hierarchical* to the extent that the groups within it (ethnic groups in this case) are differentially stratified. A cultural division of labor is *segmental* to the extent that the ethnic groups within it are occupationally specialized to a high degree. Although these two factors may be empirically related they are analytically independent of one another. Both hierarchy and segmentation contribute separately to the strength of ethnic cleavages and corresponding weakness of class ones in the polity as a whole. To the degree that the cultural division of labor is hierarchical, stratification between ethnic groups will be maximized; to the degree that it is segmental, interaction within ethnic groups will be maximized. If these two basic requirements of group formation are met by ethnic groups, but not by classes, ethnic cleavages will be correspondingly strong. For precisely the opposite reasons cultural divisions of labor having low degrees of hierarchy and segmentation will encourage (but not necessarily *cause*) class formation and thus lead to stronger class cleavages in the polity as a whole.

The best example of a cultural division of labor that is simultaneously hierarchical and segmental is, of course, caste society (Weber 1946; Bouglé 1971; Leach 1962; Barth 1962; Berreman 1972). While there has been much debate about the precise definition of caste—as well as its utility in comparative analysis (see de Reuck and Knight 1967)—nevertheless it is usually held that caste implies three things: hereditary occupational specialization, a hierarchical ranking of groups, and great social distance between groups leading to extreme rates of endogamy. Interaction between castes is governed by rules of purity and impurity. If an untouchable so much as gazes at the dinner of a Brahman, the latter's dinner will be considered impure. Exogamy is prohibited, and imbalanced sex ratios among higher castes lead to hypergamy as well as female infanticide. The extreme sense of mutual repulsion among castes inhibits the development of alliances among groups having similar relations to the means of production.

There is a powerful structural tendency in most industrial societies that limits these dimensions of the cultural division of labor, namely, the pres-
sure toward social mobility (Bendix and Lipset 1959). In a highly differentiated division of labor all individuals are not capable of performing each occupational role. Not everyone can become a physics professor or a soccer star. Further, there is no a priori reason to suspect that some ethnic groups are better endowed than others to produce physicists or soccer stars. Channels of social mobility, education chief among them, have the usual function of insuring an ample supply of qualified individuals to perform specialized tasks. The idealized image of capitalist industrialism held by the 19th-century theorists, and by their contemporary followers, is thus neither hierarchical nor segmental. Rather, it is a kind of meritocracy where "race, religion, and national origin" are irrelevant to an individual's life chances. Under these conditions, it is easy to see that ethnic groups would not be differentially stratified and that interaction would generally cut across ethnic boundaries, thus favoring class formation. These, then, are the polar types of configurations of the cultural division of labor. Any actual social formation will tend to fall somewhere between these extremes of hierarchy and segmentation.

To explain differences in the political salience of class by variations in the configurations of the cultural division of labor would seem a relatively simple task. Yet adequate data are once again in short supply. Although the concept of class has long concerned political sociologists, there have been relatively few attempts to measure class cleavages comparatively. Following the conception that elections are reflective of the class structure (Lipset 1963) the most effective measures have been based on surveys of voter preferences, or the analysis of aggregate election returns. The most straightforward of these measures is an index of class voting developed by Alford (1963).16 Using this index Alford compared patterns of class voting in the United Kingdom, Australia, the United States, and Canada. Large differences in class voting emerged among the four societies, but these differences were not explained systematically. Alford ascribed some of the variation to contextual differences among the four countries: he held that the level of class voting was affected by the society's type of party system, the extent of its regional economic inequality, and the degree to which national minorities are geographically concentrated. All things equal, states with trade-union-based parties (the United Kingdom and Australia) should have higher levels of class voting than those lacking such parties (the United States and Canada). Similarly, regional economic inequality should lower class voting.

16 The index of class voting is computed by subtracting the percentage of persons in nonmanual occupations voting for Left parties from the percentage of persons in manual occupations voting for Left parties. The index assumes that the key dimension of class voting is the gap between the voting patterns of manual and nonmanual occupations, not the overall level of Right or Left voting.
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In order to evaluate the effects of variation in cultural divisions of labor, all independent effects on class voting should be controlled. In the face of severe evidentiary constraints the best strategy is to perform a regional analysis in a single country where contextual differences between the units to be compared are negligible. Since continental Australia is considerably more regionally homogeneous—both economically (Williamson 1965) and culturally (Alford 1963, p. 168)—than the United Kingdom, the United States, or Canada, it is best suited for this test.

The degree of hierarchy in the cultural division of labor may be estimated by the variance in mean occupational prestige among all ethnic groups. The higher this variance, the more the interethnic stratification; consequently, class voting should decline. The degree of segmentation is indicated by the mean occupational specialization for all ethnic groups. The higher this value, the greater the overall tendency toward ethnic occupational specialization; consequently, the lower the class voting.

Aggregate data from the Australian census of 1961 provide a rough occupational breakdown ($K = 10$) for immigrants from 28 countries as well as the native born. Alford (1967, p. 86) reports the index of class voting for Australian states in 1964. Table 6 presents this for five Australian states, together with the estimates of hierarchy and segmentation (Tasmania is excluded from the analysis because its politics is quite different from that of the mainland states).\footnote{The regional distinctiveness of Tasmania derives from its insular geography. The islanders are careful to distinguish between “Australians” and “Taswegians.” Tasmania’s political distinctiveness is reflected in institutional terms: alone among Australian states it has an electoral system based on proportional representation (Townsley 1976, pp. 20–38).}

Class voting is strongly associated in the predicted direction with the

\begin{table}
\centering
\caption{Characteristics of Five Australian States, 1961}
\begin{tabular}{llll}
\hline
& Variance in & & \\
Index of & Mean Ethnic & Mean Ethnic & \\
Class & Occupational & Occupational & \\
Voting* & Prestige & Specialization & \\
\hline
Queensland & 37 & 6.38 & .180 \\
Western Australia & 27 & 8.37 & .186 \\
New South Wales & 26 & 7.04 & .233 \\
Victoria & 19 & 11.64 & .247 \\
South Australia & 17 & 9.72 & .268 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

\begin{flushright}
\end{flushright}
measures of both hierarchy and segmentation. The zero-order correlation between the index of class voting and the variance in ethnic occupational prestige is $-0.837$ (significant at the .08 level), while its correlation with mean ethnic occupational specialization is $-0.893$ (significant at the .04 level). Whereas ethnic heterogeneity per se has often been thought to inhibit class formation (Rosenblum 1973), this analysis suggests that the absolute percentage of ethnic minorities in a social formation has no necessary consequence for variations in class formation. The configurational hypotheses, instead, predict that the interrelationship of these groups within the occupational structure is critical for class formation. To the degree these relationships are both hierarchical and segmental, the class principle will be attenuated.

While these results seem to support the configurational hypotheses, they can be regarded as merely suggestive. The small number of cases coupled with the absence of adequate controls does not allow the role of the configurations of the cultural division of labor to be gauged with much confidence. Nevertheless, these are the only data to be analyzed that bear on the hypothesis. As such, they should not be ignored: rather, they call for further research.

CONCLUSION

This paper has discussed the process of group formation and the relation between class and status group formation in complex societies. The concept of the cultural division of labor was introduced in order to analyze the latter problem. The cultural division of labor approach provides a simple and internally consistent set of propositions concerning the relationship between class and status group formation. When these propositions are stated in an operational form the problem becomes subject to straightforward empirical analysis. The importance of this cannot be overemphasized, for this is an issue that tends to be discussed in polemical or impressionistic ways—when it is raised at all. But the question is too consequential to be treated casually and with narrow political animus.

Data from two limited tests illustrated the utility of this approach by demonstrating that the solidarity of groups is in large part a function of overall patterns of intergroup stratification and interaction. Finally, the degrees of hierarchy and segmentation of the cultural division of labor were seen to influence the probability of class as against status group based political behavior for social formations as a whole.

There are several important things this kind of structural analysis does not pretend to accomplish. It cannot explain the cultural character (see Sahlins 1976), the intensity of the sentiments, or the organizational capacity
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of particular groups. Nor can it predict the outbreak of specific intergroup conflicts, such as race riots, in a particular place and time. The thrust of the analysis is quite different; it seeks to explicate the structural conditions that must lie at the base of different types of group formation.

Clearly factors lying beyond the realm of the cultural division of labor can intervene to blunt the potential of ethnic cleavages and strengthen that of class cleavages, or vice versa. If the state permits organization on an ethnic basis, but prohibits it on a class basis, this will decisively strengthen ethnic cleavages and weaken those of class quite independently of a given cultural division of labor. Similarly, if a depression sharply raises rates of unemployment among all ethnic groups in a society (as happened in many parts of the world during the 1930s) the ideology of class struggle will become much more appealing, even if there is no change in the cultural division of labor. This approach thus offers no substitute to detailed historical analysis of particular cases. However, in the absence of significant exogenous effects such as these, the kind of structural analysis illustrated here should be promising.

REFERENCES

Group Formation and Cultural Division of Labor

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